Apartheid South Africa´s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program

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MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE CO-ORDINATING MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF PROJECT COAST HELD ON 31 MARCH 1993 IN THE H.F. VERWOERD BUILDING, CAPE TOWN

The following people were present at the meeting:

Gen. AJ Liebenberg, CSADF (Chief of the SA Defence Force);
Lt Gen DP Knobel, SG (Surgeon General);
V/Adml A Malherbe, CSA (Chief of Staff Army);
V/Adml P Murray, CSN (Chief of Staff of Navy);
Genl Maj Hamman, Deputy Head of Army;
Genl Maj Verbeek, Head of the Department of Counter Intelligence;
Brig Sonnekus, PSO CSADF (Personal Staff Officer to the Chief of the SADF)
Brig. W Basson, Outgoing Project Officer;
Mnr W Van Heerden, Representative of the Auditor General;
Kol. BP Steyn  (Secretary) Current Project Officer

ITEM 1: Matters arising from the minutes:

1. Para 3. The Chief of the SADF raises the concern that questions relating to SA's possession of chemical weapons might arise from the exposure of SA's nuclear weapons. He orders that the possession of offensive chemical weapons should be denied until the project regarding NGT (New Generation tear Gas) is completed. Thereafter the position will be re-evaluated.

2. Para 4.The new Minister of Defence has not yet been informed about the programme. The Chief of the Defence Force and the Surgeon General were still to discuss with him the fact that the use of NGT had to be authorised by the Minister of Defence or the State President himself.

3. Para 5. Basson handed over the destruction certificate to the Surgeon General. The samples were still in the possession of the security officer of the Department of Intelligence. Basson confirms that the samples were taken by the security officer. The SG was to arrange for the samples to be analysed and certified by the KOMPOL forensic labs and thereafter be destroyed. The certificate was to be attached to the certificate of destruction.

4. Mr Van Heerden asks that a financial statement regarding the effect of destruction be delivered to the Auditor General. It is decided that such a statement as well as the certificate of destruction will be delivered to the Auditor General (monetary values included). It will contain the following information:

a. Stock in possession before destruction.

b. Amount destroyed.

c. Amount used for research.

d. Total.

5. The Surgeon General mentions that Advocate Swanepoel asked for a copy of the certificate of destruction. Mr Van Heerden says that it is not necessary. It is decided that certification will take place as is required in para 4 and that adv Swanepoel will be referred to the Auditor General.

6. Para 7. It is decided that the research into the delivery systems for the liquid and foam forms of NGT should continue until the end of the 1993/4 financial year. The management of the project will be the responsibility of col. Ben Steyn who will replace brig. Basson and the cost of the project was budgeted for the amount of +- R2.3 million.

7. Data fixing The Chief of the SADF expresses his concern about the advisability of capturing all the data and safekeeping it. He however acknowledged the Minister's decision to do so in order to maintain the capacity. It was stated that only technical data should be kept. All management documents should be destroyed as soon as an audit was completed after the closing of the project.

8. Para 8. It is confirmed that the financial and security offices will close on 30 June 1993, but that John Truter and Johan Theron will continue their tasks individually until the ending of the project at the end of the 1993/4 financial year.

9. Para 10. The Surgeon General presents a copy of a letter by the Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Ministers of Defence and Trade and Industry concerning the involvement of the SAMS at the conventions. The Chief of the SADF does not agree with the fact that these activities as well as the trips to the overseas meetings should be funded by the SADF. There is a general feeling that these costs will have to be carried by the new central body of authority. The SG however, obtains permission to budget for these costs until the body of authority has completed its financial year at the Dept. of Trade and Industry.

10. Para 12. Brig. Basson reports that Schalk van Rensburg has actually been paid by RRL. This matter was also discussed at the Swanepoel commission of inquiry and adv. Swanepoel wanted proof in writing that the CMC was aware of the matter. It is decided that an extract from the previous agenda dealing with the particular subject will be presented to him.

ITEM 2: NGT STILL AT SAMS (SA Medical Services)

11.  There is still 6 tons of NGT and 10 tons intermediary at the SAMS. It is decided that everything will be transferred to the SA Army for safekeeping. The intermediary should be kept in reserve.

12.  Sentrachem Managing Director.  Brig Basson says that Sentrachem made an offer to buy Delta G. Mr J. Job, their MD, was previously briefed by General Malan in his previous capacity as Minister of Defence. The details of the briefing are not known. Mr Job wants the Surgeon General to assure him that there is/will be no state interference in Delta G. The SG will give him the assurance but will at the same time find out from him if they would be interested in negotiating future contracts with the SADF.

ITEM 3: CONTRACTS

13.  Ownership Delta G and RRL.  Brig Basson states that both companies have completed the contractual conditions for privatisation  - they have handed over all the necessary documents and cleaned up all the contaminated areas. The required time for completion also expired on 31 March 1993. He asks for the letters of transferral of ownership which are still in possession of the Chief of Staff Finances to be transferred to the two companies. The motion is passed.

14.  Contract with Medchem.  Brig Basson mentions the R 300 000 contract with Medchem for the co-ordination of the research that was phased out. He suggests changing the contract in order to co-ordinate research with regard to NGT rather than cancelling it. The motion is passed. The necessary contractual changes are to be made.

ITEM 4: DISPOSAL OF ASSETS

15.  The list of assets of the financial and security companies are submitted (attached hereby). It is decided to appoint an authorised distribution committee for the closing of secret projects to dispose of the assets.

ITEM 5: RETRENCHEMENTS

16. Brig Basson states that no official arrangements have been made with the involved parties. He is however convinced that the ladies will be satisfied with a three month package and that the two men will be happy to stay on until the end of the financial year with a package. The negotiations are still to be concluded.

ITEM 6: PROBLEMS WITH CONTRACTS AT KRYGKOR

17. Col. Steyn informs the meeting about the problems experienced by Armscor with regard to the take-over of contracts with Technotek, Protechnik and Lifestyle Management. They cannot get a 30% advance payment without a guarantee from the bank. The Chief of Staff Finances is requested to help find a solution to the problem.

(B.P. STEYN)

PROJECT OFFICER PROJECT JOTA: COL

Commentary SG

(handwritten note):    5. Arrangements have already been made with Kompol to use the forensic laboratory. Col Steyn to liase with Brig Strauss and to obtain the necessary document as soon as possible.

signed by:

DP KNOBEL

(PROJECT MANAGER PROJECT JOTA: LT GENL

Commentary CSADF

Approved                       (handwritten)

signed by:

(A.J. LIEBENBERG)

CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY: GENL

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MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COORDINATING MANAGEMENT COMMITEE OF PROJECT JOTA HELD ON 29 JANUARY 1993 IN THE HF VERWOERD BUILDING, CAPE TOWN

People present at the meeting:

Gen AJ Liebenberg,                   Chief of the SADF;
Lt Gen G Meiring;                     Chief of the Army;
Lt Gen J Kriel,                          Chief of the Air Force;
Lt Gen DP Knobel,                    Surgeon General;
Brig Sonnekus,                         Personal Staff Officer to the CSADF
Brig W Basson,                        Outgoing project Officer;
Col B P Steyn,                         Project Officer

INTRODUCTION

1. The Chief of the SA Defence Force welcomes everybody

ITEM 1:  Report-back on the briefing to the Minister of Defence:

2. Brig Basson reports back on the briefing to the Min. of Defence as well as recommendations made to him and his findings.

3. It is noted that, in terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention SA will only have to declare its use of NGT in two years time.

4. The Minister of Defence said that either the State President or himself will have to authorise the use of NGT. The Chief of the Army raises his concern by saying that these kinds of circumstances will always require a quick decision. The Chief of the SADF instructs that the matter be raised again with the Minister.

5. Basson reports on the destruction of the chemicals that cannot not be used in future - this includes the incapacitants. The SAP did not want to get involved in the destruction, therefore the Department of Intelligence will issue a certificate of destruction. This has to be conveyed to the Minister of Defence.

6. At the time of destruction the representative of the Dept. of Intelligence took samples for certification. The CSADF orders the safekeeping of the samples until destruction is confirmed with the Minister and if the Minister has no objections, the samples must be destroyed.

ITEM 2: CURRENT STATUS OF PROJECT JOTA

7.  NGT  The Minister of Defence authorised the continued research into the foam and liquid form of NGT, and ordered that it should be conducted on a covert basis. The overall opinion was that this should take place within the existing structure of the Defence Force and should no longer be done by the South African Medical Services. The following decisions are made:

a.  Research should continue within the existing structure of the Defence Force in a covert manner to protect the identity of Delta G.

b. Payment should be done via Armscor keeping in mind the protection of the identity of Delta G. Brig Basson has to determine a modus operandi and discuss it with Armscor and the Chief of Staff Finances.

8.  Financial Office.   The financial and security office will close on 30 June 1993 and all staff except John Truter will be laid off. He will manage the finances of the research into NGT from his home until the end of the financial year. CSADF is concerned that some people will be dissatisfied after being retrenched and warns that this matter will have to be handled with care, even if it means that somebody stays on for a while longer until he/she has found another job. Expecting feedback on this.

9.  Data fixing   It is reported that the capturing of the data will take about 9 months. Data would be captured by a private company and overseen by a member of the SADF. Payment to the company will have to be investigated and presented to the CMC. The possibility of having it done through the DRDC (Defence Research and Development Council) must be investigated.

ITEM 3:  BRIEFING TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Surgeon General requests that the Minister of Foreign Affairs be briefed on the project especially with regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Chief of the SADF asks for the minister to be briefed only on the relevant issues that will be determined by the SG and not to identify the companies. He will appoint one member or members of his department to be briefed as well and the Surgeon General should arrange it.

ITEM 4:  RSA/SADF INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

11.  SG briefs the CSADF on the Chemical Weapons Convention and the involvement of the South African Medical Services (SAMS) in the Convention. He wants to formalize the position of the SAMS. CSADF agrees. He also states that it should be determined which party should fund these overseas trips.

ITEM 5: THE SCHALK VAN RENSBURG ISSUE

12.  Brig Basson informs the meeting about the issue. After discussion the following is decided:

a.  The SADF cannot pay him the amount of R200 000.

b.  RRL is privatised and therefore the matter should be between them and Van Rensburg - it does not involve the SADF.

c.  Brig Basson is to convey this to the above-mentioned parties.

signed by:

(BP STEYN)

PROJECT OFFICER: COL

signed by:

(DP KNOBEL)

SURGEON GENERAL:  LT GENL

signed by:

(AP LIEBENBERG)

CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE: GENL

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Telephone: 6715413

Enquiries: Brig W. Basson

SAMS Headquarters
 Private Bag X102
 Hennopsmeer
0046
26 March 1990

PROJECT COAST: BRIEFING OF THE STATE PRESIDENT

CONTENT

1.  The document is intended to provide the State President with an overview of the current status of CBW in the world - emphasising the philosophy and strategies of the different groups involved in this particular field. It then also discusses the purpose and the objectives of Project COAST. Certain pertinent aspects with regard to the SADF (as well as the RSA) will be discussed.

CURRENT SITUATION IN THE WORLD WITH REGARD TO CBW

2.  In the 1960s and '70s the SADF was dependent on the USA, Britain and other NATO countries for training and equipment with regard to CBW and particularly with regard to defensive chemical warfare.

3.  This period was relatively stable with regard to chemical and biological warfare. The United States of America, on the side of the West, produced chemical weapons and had stockpiled huge quantities of these. The USSR was responsible for the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons on the side of the Warsaw Treaty. These countries did indeed spell out the threat and the rest of the world was allowed to develop defensive measures. Weapons as well as capacity were very strictly controlled. Only under specific circumstances (and usually only when the producers wanted to conduct certain “tactical research” under battlefield conditions) would some of these weapons be made available to a third party/third parties. NATO also portrayed the threat to the West as being that of a massive arsenal of deadly chemical weapons, the so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’ that were in the hands of the USSR. This picture suited the political make-up of the West. It also suited the Warsaw Treaty in a military sense because it made them look more threatening.

4.  Within this relatively stable milieu the SADF gradually phased out all CBW capacity. The USSR did not represent a direct threat to the RSA and all training and research were halted.

5.  Internationally however, in the later 1970s and early 1980s the balance of power in relation to CB weapons shifted as they became more easily available. The changes were in these two particular fields:

a.  Technological development by other countries.

b.  The changing character of chemical weapons.

6.  Technological development by other countries.   Technological advancement in the chemical industry has made it possible for quite a number of companies in Europe to develop the ability to produce toxic agents (chemical agents). Greed as well as pressure to perform economically caused many of these companies (without informing their respective governments) to supply countries caught in conflict situations, enabling them to make a breakthrough with this technology. In this way did countries like Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, North-Korea, Cuba and Libya obtain the ability to produce chemical weapons.

7.  The above-mentioned complications have upset the stability in the world with regard to CBW. The new players in this game played according to their own rules. It seems as if the USA and the USSR have decided to counteract this by trying to place an ‘international embargo’ on chemical weapons. In January 1989 an International Conference was held in Paris to discuss the matter. At the conference the USA and the USSR had made a prima facie attempt to implement a bilateral embargo between them and an agreement  was reached to destroy chemical weapons. The true aim of the conference was however to force the “new players” to join the International Embargo. In November 1989 President Bush played his hand by announcing that he would agree to have the last 10% of the USA’s chemical arsenal destroyed, but only if every country in the world that had the ability to produce chemical weapons destroyed their arsenals. It has subsequently become clear that the threat was represented by a huge amount of potentially undisciplined suppliers of chemical weapons who were willing to supply anybody who had money or a common ideology - potential chaos.

8.  The other changing aspect of the international CBW scenario was the changing nature of the chemical arsenals of the USA and the USSR respectively.  They were the following:

a.  The delivery systems of CBW weapons.

b.  The effect of the CBW weapons.

Both the USA and the USSR wished for these changes to remain secret for obvious reasons.

9.  Changes in delivery systems of CBW weapons.  The classic delivery systems for chemical weapons were based on the philosophy and technique of maximum contamination of the target area with the particular chemical agent. It implied that the area would remain contaminated for a long time and that the attacker would need soldiers that were trained in CBW to enter the battlefield. It also implied that there would be enough time for the enemy to be warned of the attack because the attacker would need some extra time to arrange for equipment etc. The new techniques that were used to contaminate the target area were of a non-persistent aerosol-generating character and this overcame the problem of long-term contamination of the battlefield. The aerosol would remain in the target area for a limited period of time and then be dispersed by the wind. In this scenario an army that did not have CBW trained troops would be able to enter the battlefield and apply chemical weapons if it also had the conventional artillery and aeroplane systems. It would not need any special equipment or storage space and would be able to obtain a chemical capacity overnight if it were able to purchase the arms in time. The implications are clear.

10.  Changes in the effect of CBW weapons.  It became clear to the USA and the USSR that the threat posed by lethal chemical weapons to the human race was not acceptable, especially considering the changing social responsibility of the Western world. It was decided to move away from research and development with regard to lethal weapons and the following two new directions were looked at:

a.  The development of non-lethal chemical weapons that would affect the brain functions of soldiers in such a manner that they would not be able to function properly and would therefore be easier targets for conventional weapons. The more subtle the effect, the better. The purpose of such an exercise would be for the enemy not to even be aware of the chemical threat against them.

b.  The development of chemical weapons that would attack equipment. The purpose of these type of chemical weapons are to destroy the electronic systems of the enemy, to introduce rust into the material or to weaken it etc. These agents pose a serious threat to any conventional army.

11.  What is interesting is that none of the weapons mentioned in par 9 were discussed in any of the disarmament agreements.

12.  The USA conducts this research in several clandestine and covert laboratories and they are doing a very good job of keeping it a secret.

THE AIM OF PROJECT COAST

13.The aim of Project COAST is that of covert research and development of CBW and the establishment of production technology in the sensitive and critical areas of chemical and biological warfare to provide the South African security forces with a CBW capacity following the CBW philosophy and strategy.

THE OBJECTIVES OF PROJECT COAST

14.  To establish a research, production and development capacity with regard to chemical warfare.

15.  To establish a research, production and development capacity with regard to biological warfare.

16.  Effective financial and administrative management of the project.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE OBJECTIVES

17.  To realise these objectives, it was necessary to develop a number of systems and organisations for the chemical and biological capacities:

a.  Establish facilities.

b.  Establish secure covers and security systems.

c.  Establish safety systems and medical emergency services.

d.  Put in place industrial capabilities.

e.  The production of a technical information system.

f.  Put in place administrative and financial management systems.

SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CREATION OF A CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPACITY

18. The threat against the SADF.  Several accusations have been made in the international media with regard to the use of chemical weapons against UNITA. Most of these accusations are exaggerated. In 1986 shrapnel was found after an alleged chemical attack on UNITA which tested positive for the chemical warfare agent with the code-name DM. DM is an incapacitant which causes irritation to the eyes and throat, disorientation, nausea and vomiting and depression. It incapacitates soldiers for two to three days. These weapons are now used by FAPLA against UNITA. The SADF has done a number of verification exercises in Angola since 1986. The latest reports (March 1990) show that the UNITA troops were completely demoralised by these smoke bombs and that they are subsequently avoiding any kind of smoke - even shelter smoke that is harmless.

19.  This situation led to an escalating threat to the SADF during cross border operations in Angola. SA had to buy defensive equipment but found that the equipment was not effective. It was of a very poor quality. 30% of the gasmasks that were bought from Israel leaked and would incapacitate a soldier in a combat situation.

20.  SA therefore began production of its own defensive equipment. The local production of equipment has now reached such a level of sophistication that SA is able to sell defensive equipment to European countries which in turn sell it under their own names. Locally developed evaluation and quality control techniques are so sophisticated that we were able to detect some mistakes in the systems that were developed by NATO. We are currently in frequent contact with the various NATO committees, sharing information about CBW.

21.  Some of this equipment has already been used by the SADF in cross-border operations.

22.  Our Chemical research, development and production facilities maintain the highest security standards. It is run as a private company and has functioned covertly since 1986. We have done everything in our power to avoid a catastrophe similar to the one which has recently struck Gaddafi’s construction in Rabta.

23.  The programme focuses on the production and development of incapacitants and irritants. These agents are then built into armament systems in conjunction with Armscor. This way we have developed a new kind of teargas which is being used very effectively by the SAP. Several delivery systems have already been developed for this teargas, including air dispersal systems - the only effective riot control technique.

24.  With the withdrawal of AECI from the production of conventional teargas, Project COAST has the capacity to produce conventional teargas to fill the gap until Armscor is able to develop its own production capacity.

25.  It is therefore important to note that we focus our research and production capacity on incapacitants that are not being addressed by the Geneva Protocol. We have well placed sources in the USA and in the various NATO organisations, but research will have to continue in order to resist the potential threat against the SADF.

SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS WITH REGARD TO ESTABLISHING A BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPACITY

26.  It is not possible to describe the current biological threat to the world due to the rapid development of techniques to produce new bacteria as well as other organisms.

27.  Our biological capacity is focussed on staying up to date with the changing threat. To do this we are constantly producing new organisms in order to develop a preventative strategy as well as a strategy for treatment.

28.  This facility is also run as a private company. Minister Kraai van Niekerk and a parliamentary delegation had already visited the facility – however, not to investigate the biological warfare capacity of the laboratory but rather to evaluate its capacity to function as a facility for research into agricultural science and animal experimental science.

SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CREATION OF A FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

29.  From the outset the project had been thoroughly audited by the Auditor-General (AG). Due to the sensitive nature of the project and the fact that we have created front companies that employ mainly people who are not aware of the true objectives and financing of the companies, the AG has appointed a senior auditor from the private sector to report back to him.

30.  This auditor has been fully briefed about the objectives of the project and has unlimited access to the documentation.

31.  The Auditor- General had also been fully briefed about the project. Currently all auditing staff is working with the front company that is managing the financial part of the project.

signed by:

(BRIG W. BASSON)

PROJECT OFFICER: PROJECT COAST

WB/NS

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CS PLAN/DP/302/6/C

CS PLAN/DP/302/6/KEYBOARD

Telephone: 291-2395

Enquiries: Brig W. Basson

Chief of the SA Defence Force
(Department of Planning)
 Private Bag X161
 Pretoria
0001

31 October 1990

REDUCED DEFENCE COUNCIL: MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT 07H30 ON 25 OCTOBER 1990 AT SAMIK

Present at the meeting:

Lt Gen AJ Liebenberg;Chief of Staff of the Defence Force
V/Adm MA Bekker; Chief of Staff of the Navy
Lt Gen DP Knobel; Surgeon General
Lt Gen GL Meiring; Chief of the Army
Lt Gen KM Pickersgill; Chief of Staff Army
Lt Gen AJS van der Lith; Chief of Staff Planning
V/Adm P Murray; Deputy Chief of Staff Finances
Gen Maj PD Steyn; Deputy Chief of Staff Operations
Brig W Basson; Project Officer Coast
Col. D. Metaxas; Project Officer Keyboard
Brig WA Kempen (Secretary); Department of Planning

Appendix A:  The proposed philosophy for Chemical Warfare for the SADF  -  Principles and feedback on current status

Appendix B:  Copies of the transparencies that accompanied the input.

INTRODUCTION

1. The Chief of Staff Planning welcomes everybody and says that the presentation will be the first step in the normalisation of all highly sensitive projects at Chief of Staff Planning level e.g. Project Coast and sub-Project Keyboard.

2.  The purpose of this meeting is to:

a.  provide guidelines relating to research and development of Chemical weapons in the SADF project Coast.

b.  to re-confirm the status of research, development and use philosophy of the SADF on the basis of the existing directive as well as the State President’s ruling on the establishment of CW technology.

c.  to decide on the status of authorisation for the use of Chemical warfare at operational level.

3.  Already since 1982 research has been done under the direct guidance of the Surgeon General.

PRESENTATION

4.  Brig (Dr) Basson, project officer of project COAST, presents a summary of the worldwide development of CW, the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol on the use of CW and the status of CW development in the SADF. Appendix A contains the full presentation.

DISCUSSION

5.  The following directives will be discussed:

a.  In terms of security it is absolutely necessary for the CW capacity to be protected in the new dispensation.

b.  The State President only authorised research into chemical weapons and the operational use of non-lethal chemical weapons - he did not authorise the operational use of lethal chemical weapons.

c.  Concern was expressed about the SADF's ability to act effectively against 'masses' (especially in urban areas). -non-lethal and non-persistent chemical agents could possibly solve the problem.

d.  There is a difference between the conventional and internal use of chemical weapons. The policy regarding the use of CW will have to clearly define pro-active internal use and cross-border conventional use.

e.  The general opinion is that there is little chance of the ANC or PAC obtaining CW and the question about the prediction of a threat is raised. If the negotiation process was to fail the use of CW would probably be more effective than the use of conventional weapons, with fewer permanent implications.

6.  Sufficient quantities of chemical weapons must be available to control masses and not just small groups. Large-scale delivery will have to be looked at. Grenades alone will not solve the problem.

POLICY DECISIONS

7.  The following policy guidelines are approved:

a.  Research and development should be done in relation to the

- offensive threat

- defensive technology for protection against chemical weapons.

- control should be centralised in the Surgeon General

b.  Individual protection gear should be obtained

c.  Control of R&D and the procuring of chemical weapons should be centralised in the Surgeon General.

d.  Authorisation for the use and issue of chemical weapons rests with the Chief of the SA Defence Force. This authority could be delegated to the Head of the Army or even to a lower rank (the latter esp. with regard to counter-intelligence situations) depending on the operational scenario.

8.  The technological establishment and use philosophy are accepted and the production capacity of non-lethal agents is endorsed. Refer to Appendix A for more detail.

DISCUSSION AFTER CSDF, CSF(Navy) AND DEP/CS OPS HAVE LEFT THE MEETING

9.  Col Metaxas, project officer Keyboard, states that:

a.   Developmental work on the 120 and 127 mm CW has ceased due to budget cuts.

b.+- 1000 x 155 missiles that have conditionally qualified were made by using “Prone funds” and are currently in the depot. Qualification is still going on and permission is requested for the production of 500 in order to qualify the design as well as the process of production. Outcome: Permission is granted.

c.  4000 hand grenades (half substance) were borrowed from the SAP. Project Keyboard is currently performing two functions namely:

i.  The qualification of design/production processes on full substance grenades.

ii.  The qualification of half -substance grenades. These will replace the SAP grenades.

Outcome: Permission granted for 9.c.i. and ii. to be executed.

DISCUSSION

10.  The meeting confirms the necessity for crowd control and control of large areas.

11.  The distribution of the liquid form of CW provides a larger area to be covered and is more effective than the distribution of powder or smoke. All existing riot control agents can dissolve in liquid and can be applied either at ground level or from the air for crowd control. It will take more or less 14 days to prepare a sufficient amount of this liquid. This kind of solution is very stable and has a shelf life of several years. It should be weighed up whether stores of the liquid form of the agent should be placed near all 'hot spots'.

12.  It is recommended that the whole DCC (Defence Command Council) should be briefed on these substances as well as on all possible delivery techniques.

13.  The possibility is mentioned for the SAP to obtain the full-strength weapons that are developed by the SADF. It is however pointed out that all of these substances are being controlled by the SADF (SG) and that the SAP will have to get permission from the SG for the use of these weapons/substances. The importance of such an agreement between the SADF and the SAP is emphasised.

14.  Proper marking of hand grenades filled with chemical warfare agents (CWA) will differentiate them from conventional hand grenades. The policy of marking that was decided on will be implemented.

15.  The Chief of the Army controls the use of the borrowed “SAP grenades”.

16.  Additional budget demands for the funding of production, storage etc. will have to be submitted to the Chief of Staff Army and the Chief of Staff Finances as soon as possible. There is a possibility that DRDC funding could be used for this. Current funding does not provide for this. Brig Basson and CS Log will have to apply for this funding as soon as possible. The Defence Research and Development Council has already given R 3,5 million to Project Coast for CW.

17.  S Adm Malherbe must make a:

a.  detailed presentation of the defensive CW capacity

and

b.  present an overview of the offensive CW capacity.

18.  The Chief of the Army states that the projects within the Army will have to be reconsidered (prioritised) to accommodate CW. The termination of project Academic will have to be reconsidered.

signed by:

(W.A. KEMPEN)

SECRETARY: BRIG

(A.J. LIEBENBERG)

CHIEF OF THE SA DEFENCE FORCE: GENERAL

DISTR

For Action

Dep/CS Ops (Exclusively for Genl maj P.D. Steyn)

Project Off Coast (Exclusively for Brig W. Basson)

Project Off Keyboard (Exclusively for Col Metaxas)

Internal

File:      CS PLAN/DP/302/6/COAST

CS PLAN/DP/302/6/KEYBOARD

APPENDIX A

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GG/UG/306/3

Telephone: 6715413

Enquiries: Brig W. Basson

SAMS Headquarters
 Private Bag X102
 Hennopsmeer
0046
25 October 1990

PRESENTATION TO REDUCED DEFENCE COMMAND COUNCIL. :  PROPOSED PHILOSOPHY FOR SECRET CHEMICAL WARFARE FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE - PRINCIPLES AND FEEDBACK ON CURRENT STATUS IN THE SA DEFENCE FORCE

BACKGROUND OF THE CHEMICAL THREAT

1.  In the 1960s and '70s the SADF was dependent on the USA, Britain and other NATO countries for training and equipment with regard to CBW and particularly with regard to defence against chemical warfare.

2.  This period was relatively stable with regard to chemical and biological warfare. The United States of America, on the side of the West, produced chemical weapons and had stockpiled huge quantities of these. The USSR was responsible for the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons on the side of the Warsaw Treaty. These countries did indeed spell out the threat and the rest of the world was allowed to develop defensive measures. Weapons as well as capacity were very strictly controlled. Only under specific circumstances (and usually only when the producers wanted to conduct certain “tactical research” under battlefield conditions) would some of these weapons be made available to a third party/third parties. NATO also portrayed the threat to the West as being that of a massive arsenal of deadly chemical weapons, the so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’ that was in the hands of the USSR. This picture suited the political make-up of the West. It also suited the Warsaw Treaty in a military sense because it made them look more threatening.

3.  Within this relatively stable milieu the SADF gradually phased out all CBW capacity. The USSR did not represent a direct threat to the RSA and all training and research were halted.

4.  Internationally however, in the later 1970s and early 1980s the balance of power in relation to CB weapons shifted as they became more easily available. The changes were in these two particular fields:

a.  Technological development by other countries.

b.  The changing character of chemical weapons.

5.  Technological development by other countries.  Technological advancement in the chemical industry has made it possible for a lot of companies in Europe to develop the ability to produce toxic agents (chemical agents). Greed as well as pressure to perform economically caused many of these companies (without informing their respective governments) to supply countries that were caught in conflict situations and that could make a breakthrough with this technology. This way did countries like Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, North-Korea, Cuba and Libya obtain the ability to produce chemical weapons.

6.  The above-mentioned events have upset the stability in the world with regard to CBW. The new players in this game played according to their own rules. It seems as if the USA and the USSR have decided to counteract this by trying to place an ‘international embargo’ on chemical weapons. In January 1989 an International Conference was held in Paris to discuss the matter. At the conference the USA and the USSR had made a prima facie attempt to implement a bilateral embargo between them and an agreement  was reached to destroy chemical weapons. The true aim of the conference was however to force the “new players” to join the International Embargo. In November 1989 President Bush played his hand by announcing that he would agree to have the last 10% of the USA’s chemical arsenal destroyed, but only if every country in the world that had the ability to produce chemical weapons destroyed their arsenals. It has subsequently become clear that the threat was represented by a huge amount of potentially undisciplined suppliers of chemical weapons who were willing to supply anybody who had money or a common ideology - potential chaos.

7.  The other changing aspect of the international CBW scenario was the changing nature of the chemical arsenals of the USA and the USSR respectively.  They were the following:

b.  The delivery systems of CBW weapons.

c.  The effect of the CBW weapons.

d.  The conversion of conventional weapons into toxic weapons.

During the earlier “stable” phase of this threatening milieu there was a relative ‘openness’ amongst countries that produced chemical weapons (this openness bordered on advertisement-like propaganda). These eventual changes however, resulted in a new attitude of intense secrecy and security, probably because of the sinister nature of the weapons.

8.  Changes in delivery systems of CBW weapons.  The classic delivery systems for chemical weapons mainly used explosive charges that fragmented the liquid container in order to ensure maximum contamination of the target area with the particular chemical agent. It implied that the area would remain contaminated for a long time and that the attacker would need soldiers that were trained in CBW to enter the battlefield. It also implied that there would be enough time for the enemy to be warned of the attack because the attacker would have needed to arrange for equipment etc. The new techniques that were used to contaminate the target area were of a non-persistent aerosol-generating character and this overcame the problem of the long-term contamination of the battlefield. The aerosol would remain in the target area for a limited period of time and then be dispersed by the wind. In this scenario an army that did not have CBW trained troops would be able to enter the battlefield and use chemical weapons if it also had the conventional artillery and aeroplanes. It would not need any special equipment or storage space and would be able to obtain a chemical capacity overnight if it were able to purchase the arms. The implications are clear.

9.  Further development of CW by Iraq has far-reaching implications for chemical defence. The Iraqis have succeeded for the first time in connecting micronised dust to already existing toxins. The dust particles then act as carriers for the toxin and they are apparently relatively easily able to penetrate chemical protection gear. They have also for the first time successfully and with destructive consequences applied cyanide gas on a large scale to the battlefield by using a special cylindrical design. The implications are serious because the conventional gasmasks and filters which are generally used will not be effective against such an attack. The chief reason for the current hesitation on the side of the USA to engage with Iraq is because of the fact that the USA would not be able to survive an Iraqi chemical attack - they are neither properly trained nor geared for it.

10.  Changes in the effect of CBW weapons.  It became clear to the USA and the USSR that the threat posed by lethal chemical weapons to the human race was not acceptable, especially considering the changing social responsibility of the Western world. It was decided to move away from research and development with regard to lethal weapons and the following two new directions were looked at:

a.  The development of non-lethal chemical weapons that would affect the brain functions of soldiers in such a manner that they would not be able to function properly and would therefore be easier targets for conventional weapons. The more subtle the effect, the better. The purpose of such an exercise would be for the enemy not to even be aware of the chemical threat against them.

b.  The development of chemical weapons that would attack equipment. The purpose of these type of chemical weapons are to destroy the electronic systems of the enemy, to introduce rust into the material or to weaken it etc. These agents pose a serious threat to any conventional army.

11.  What is interesting is that none of the weapons mentioned in par 9 were discussed in any of the disarmament agreements.

12.  The conversion of chemical weapons into toxic weapons. The USSR has also successfully incorporated the use of toxicology into conventional ammunition. By changing the consistency and the proportions of the components of conventional smokescreen ammunition and illuminating flares, they have converted this ammunition into lethal toxic weapons. The weapons can be used randomly because of the difficulty experienced by conventions to control them. They can even be labelled as a “factory error”. In two types of ammunition used against UNITA, it has been found that the normal content of the missiles has been adapted/changed. In one of the missiles the quantities of Strontium metal (normally found in small quantities in these weapons) were as high as 50 times the normal concentration. A polyamide (a “nylon” type component) binding agent was used. Burning of this impure “nylon” causes the release of nitrous acid and cyanide into the air (smoke).

13.  The second missile that was, as far as we know, used against UNITA, is similar to the first one. In this instance the conventional metals of the illuminating flares are compounded by PVC which contains an unusually high percentage of tricrycelphosphate (up to 5-10 kg per bomb). Ignition of the flare releases tricrycelphosphate as well as a very toxic gas called phosphine, together with metal phosphides that are able to poison the soil (and therefore the water) for a very long time. These bombs, with their characteristic smell of piripiri, cause the paralysis that we have noticed in hundreds of UNITA soldiers.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHEMICAL THREAT TO THE SA DEFENCE FORCE

14.  The first implication of the worldwide change in scenario regarding CW is that there is now a bigger supply to the world market with a large number of suppliers who want to make money from their own developments.

15.  It is furthermore clear that the relatively secure application method of the new, non-persistent chemical weapons has made it possible for the less sophisticatedly developed armies to use CW in order to obtain the tactical advantage which they would not have had previously.

16.  The tendency to develop non-lethal agents that affect the brain functions of the target troops also influences the fact that CW will in the future become an integral (and possibly even a justifiable) part of the conventional battle.

17.  The modification of conventional ammunition from non-toxic to toxic turns the conventional battlefield into a highly contaminated environment. The development of advanced weapon platforms with closed-in crew space allows contamination levels on the battlefield to increase to 100 times higher than acceptable levels of air contamination. The long-term implications are clear. The respiratory tracts of soldiers are therefore extremely vulnerable.

18.  The classic philosophy of Chemical Warfare determines the possibility of a defensive posture based on a collective protection of personnel, vehicles and facilities together with an extensive detection and contamination capacity. In accordance with this view protective equipment that would protect own forces successfully against CW could be developed. The development of a large number of new distribution techniques (as well as new toxins) calls for these measures of protection to be so thorough as to cause disfunctionality and render military action impossible.

19.  The detection techniques are also incomplete and it would not be possible for a detection team confronted with CW in a modern war situation to evaluate the true situation given the amount of time they have. The large variety of CW and the increasing secrecy that surrounds it demands an ability to analyse - something that does not readily occur on the battlefield.

20.  It will therefore also be more difficult to decontaminate personnel and equipment due to the variety of these potential agents. It is clear that a purely defensive posture based on measures of protection will not be sufficient. An enemy with non-lethal chemical weapons will definitely have the tactical advantage. CW is here the multiplying factor.

21.  Considering the above mentioned it is also clear that the classic purpose of defensive chemical warfare precautions will have to be re-considered. The classic purpose was:

a.  to survive the attack, and

b.  to complete the mission.

Considering the extra weight that is added to a defensive force by the use of CW it is unlikely that the mission will be completed. The purpose therefore becomes that of survival of the attack in order to allow forces to fall back, regroup and continue. It seems therefore that the defensive emphasis will have to be on defensive equipment that would enable forces to survive, e.g. personal protection that offers the individual enough protection to reduce mortality as well as morbidity. The emphasis will therefore have to be on the development of masks and protective equipment as well as on proper training of troops and commanding officers.

(page missing)

27.  The logical conclusion is that the only true defensive measure is the use of non-lethal chemical weapons. The use of these weapons against a chemical attack will force the primary user to adopt the same defensive posture and it will level the playing field.

28. This way a new dimension is introduced into the purpose of CW. It becomes possible to apply CW in order to end a battle by forcing both sides to withdraw.

29.  The fast changing offensive technological threat implies that, for a defence force to protect itself, it will have to keep up with offensive as well as defensive technology. The key elements of defensive technology in particular will have to be identified and maintained. The current crisis in the Gulf shows clearly the importance of being prepared for limited run-up time. The latest defensive technology will not always be readily available in the markets because of the limited run-up time. All current attempts to get hold of defensive equipment only lead to the purchase of older generation equipment.

CHEMICAL WARFARE ON LAND: CONCLUSIONS

30.  The changing character as well as the increasing availability of CW, together with the rapid technological development in this area is currently leading to a situation in which Chemical Warfare is becoming a very important player in conventional warfare and where the threat posed by such a warfare is more topical than ever before.

31.  The South African Defence Force can therefore not afford to ignore the threat and must take the necessary precautions to ensure survival in a conventional battle.

32.  To be able to counteract the threat the SA Defence Force will have to adhere to the following measures:

a.  Keep up with research and development of the offensive threat.

b.  Keep up with research and development of the latest technology in the area of protection against chemical weapons.

c.  Establish a system of training in Chemical Warfare that will enable troops to withstand a physical threat and develop a command structure that will be able to make the right decisions with regard to Chemical Warfare.

d.  To establish and maintain the technology in South Africa to produce protective equipment according to the latest technology.

e.  To establish the technology in South Africa to produce non-lethal chemical weapons by using the latest technology.

f.  To develop an operational philosophy to implement the above mentioned elements successfully within the financial constraints. The rationalisation of functions and responsibilities will be very important here. The co-ordination of central projects will also be important.

OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

33. The operational philosophy of the SA Defence Force will, in the light of the changing threat in the Chemical Warfare scenario, provide for the following:

a.  The right to re-active use of non-lethal CW.

b.  The emphasis on survival of own troops as primary aim with completion of the mission as secondary aim.

c.  The integration of chemical warfare related actions into all conventional actions.

d.  A system of training that will allow prompt preparedness against new threats and that will train decision makers in the field of Chemical Warfare.

e.  The acceptance of the use of CW in a pro-active fashion in order to ensure the survival of the State, e.g. the combating of massive violence in the current revolutionary situation.

OFFENSIVE CW PHILOSOPHY

34. It is recommended that the SA Defence Force establishes and maintains a research and development capacity with regard to, and a limited production capacity of non-lethal chemical weapons. This capacity will then be responsible for the identification of, production and description of potential chemical agents which will comply to the offensive directives as issued by Chief of Staff Operations. After the Defence Command Council (DCC) gives its permission for the incorporation of these agents into ammunition this organisation will be responsible for developing the chemical weapons in order to maintain the technology. Production will be limited. Currently these aspects are handled by various agencies within the SADF. The centralisation of these developments is recommended. Stockpiling of CW on a large scale will only take place if there is an immediate threat and by command of the DCC.

DEFENSIVE PHILOSOPHY  

35. It is also recommended that the SADF develops a defensive philosophy based on personal protection. Respiratory protection by means of gasmasks is very important and the SADF will have to establish the key technology in SA in order to supply local demand. Our own research and production will ensure the effective protection against new threats. Gas masks purchased from the shelf hardly ever satisfy the demand.

36.  The key elements of a personal protection system will be identified in a similar manner in order to maintain local research and limited production. Once again the centralisation of these projects is emphasised.

37.  Defensive equipment demands specialised research, e.g.:

a.  Material Technology.

b.  Physiological Research.

c.  Psychological Research.

The centralisation of specialised research is suggested. Because of the nature of the project, the total defensive effort will probably only be optimally run and co-ordinated by the SAMS.

ACCEPTABILITY OF THE PHILOSOPHY MEASURED BY EXISTING PROTOCOLS/CONVENTIONS

38. The philosophy as explained here above complies to the current views of the international military community, i.e. that existing control protocols do not forbid the use of non-lethal agents. Some liberal organisations are making a strong effort to involve non-lethal agents in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and extensions to it. It seems however as if the USA is still very much involved in research and development and even the production of non-lethal weapons.

39. The right of retaliation is not taken lightly and it is on these grounds that the USA is producing certain new chemical weapons.

40.  This philosophy does not cover any aspects of Biological warfare. Because of the more uncontrollable nature of Biological warfare there are many more international control measures. The production of Biological weapons is not allowed anywhere in the world.

The philosophy as explained here above does not go against the national values of the RSA. It complies to the demands and the requirements of the International Law of War.

41.CURRENT STATUS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE TECHNOLOGY IN THE SADF.

INTRODUCTION

42.  The proposed Chemical warfare philosophy with regard to the use of Chemical Weapons (CW) and the development of a Defensive Chemical Capacity provides for the SADF’s need to address a number of elements. They are the following:

a.  Research and development with regard to the offensive chemical threat.

b.  Research and development with regard to the latest technology in the area of protection against CW.

c.  Training in Chemical Warfare.

d.  Establishing technology for the production of individual, personal equipment for a Defensive Chemical Capacity, and maintaining it.

e.  Establishing technology for the production of non-lethal CW based on the latest technology.

43. This document will address each of these elements. The current situation will be reported on.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WITH REGARD TO THE OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL THREAT

44.  The SAMS controls this research. Sophisticated laboratories are available for this purpose. This is where information is digested, models created and scientific conclusions are made.

45.  This practical research and development is closely connected to and supported by the Intelligence services of some NATO countries as well as several foreign research laboratories. This is how a worldwide CW information network was established.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WITH REGARD TO DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES

46.  In conjunction with two foreign partners we have obtained the capacity to evaluate and develop chemical defensive technology. The SAMS is presently studying the key technologies and has created the capacity to ward off any threat by up-dating continuously, thus creating a prompt reactive response.

47.  This capacity was of the utmost importance during the purchase of equipment. Investigation of a consignment of gas masks from Israel showed that 30% of these masks were faulty - this could lead to the death of an exposed subject.

48.  This capacity has enabled us to correct certain test procedures done by NATO. It has proved our credibility in the field.

49.  The research is currently being conducted in three main areas namely:

a.  Material technology.

b.  Physiology

c.  Psychology

50.  The defensive technological research is the basis of all defensive chemical capacities and is seen as key technology by all modern day defence forces. This technology is a best kept secret and not readily available.

51.  The big problem experienced by the SADF is that this research is currently being conducted by the SAMS, Armscor, DRDC and the SA Army in a relatively uncoordinated fashion. It is suggested that the research continues and that the project should be centralised.

TRAINING IN CHEMICAL WARFARE

52.  The Chemical Warfare policy of the SADF stipulates that the SAMS is responsible for the establishing of a training facility for the training of specialists and instructors for the SADF.

53.  Such a facility was established at 7 Medical Battalion. Three SAMS members, two from the Navy and one from the SA Army were trained as specialist chemical warfare instructors. Training equipment has been obtained and training can commence as soon as:

a.  there are more specialist instructors from the SA Army and

b.  some of the defensive equipment is transferred from the SA Army to the SAMS.

54.  At this stage the policy provides for different levels of Defensive Chemical warfare training. These levels have already been identified and courses with curriculums have been worked out. The Army still has to decide how they are going to implement the policy. It is interesting to note that in the past few months thousands of gas masks were issued - no training in the use of gas masks has yet been done.

ESTABLISHING PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY FOR PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

55.  Early in the investigation it has become clear that the production technology for the latest defensive technology would not be easily obtainable. Defence forces usually perceive this kind of technology as extremely sensitive - it is after all necessary to be protected against one’s own weapons. Efforts to purchase protective equipment at international markets lead to the distribution of older generation equipment.

56.  For this reason the SAMS established a local production capacity for the production of all defensive equipment. This technology was established with the aid of foreign partners and has been maintained for the past few years. No effort has been made to produce collective equipment or decontaminative equipment, because it is relatively standard with only the filter or decontaminative fluid that differs. The personal equipment program already addresses this technology.

57.  The one piece of equipment that is not locally produced is the gas mask. Investigation into the right kind of mask for the SADF is completed and production can begin.

58.  In view of the latest threat and the recommendation for personal protective equipment to be prioritised, the following recommendations were made:

a.  To go ahead with the implementation of a local production program for gas masks for the SADF.

b.  To go ahead with a limited production program for personal equipment to maintain the technology.

ESTABLISHING PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY OF NON-LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

59.  The production of non-lethal chemical weapons is characterised by the following phases:

a.  The acquisition of the chemical warfare agent (CWA), i.e. the active component.

b.  The description of the physical and pharmacological characteristics of CWA.

c.  The testing of the weapon characteristics i.e. the method of distribution or use, to determine optimal technique.

4 General techniques are tested:

i.   Pyrotechnical distribution
ii.  Explosive charge techniques
iii. Liquid aerosol techniques
iv. Solid matter aerosol techniques.

d.  Hereafter the CWA is presented to a special Defence Command Council for approval to be incorporated into the SADF weaponry systems.

e.  A specific defence force component takes it through the industrialisation process to the pre-production stage.

f.  Then the CWA is presented to the Defence Command Council (DCC) for approval to be included into the SADF arsenal as well as for further policy decisions with regard to authorisation for use/distribution, etc.

60.  Project COAST has already delivered one CWA, the so-called NGT (New Generation Teargas). This CWA is described with regard to its chemical, physical and pharmacological characteristics. The initial weapon characteristics were described and tested by COAST and Swartklip Products. This CWA was presented to a special DCC in 1985, which authorised its incorporation into the SADF. It was suggested that it be handed over to the SA Army as part of the pyrotechnical ammunition for use in crowd control (in a diluted form) and also in its offensive capacity (at full strength). The development of an air dispersal system for crowd control is also suggested. The SA Army has made further developments of this CWA and will today continue with its report on Project KEYBOARD.

61.  There are currently three new CWAs in the description stage. Development will take place over the next two years.

62.  Considering the constantly changing threat and increasingly sophisticated development of chemical weapons, it is recommended that the SADF continues with the production of non-lethal chemical weapons. It is however suggested that it maintains only a limited pre-production run. Thereafter the blueprints will be shelved and will it be possible to start production if necessary. In this way it will be possible for COAST to maintain its technological capacity and for Swartklip Products to maintain its efficiency in the field.

(signature)

(BRIG W. BASSON)

WB/NS

-----------------------------------------------------APPENDIX B

What do we need to do?

Conclusions

1.  More readily part of the Conventional warfare on land

2.  Balanced reaction.

3.  Elements of a Chemical warfare capacity.

a.  Research + Development with regard to the threat.

b.  Research + Development with regard to protective technology.

c.  Training - Personal/Individual precautions.

- High-level decision makers

d.  Establishing technology and maintaining production of personal protective equipment.

e.  Establishing technology and maintenance for the acquisition of non-lethal CW.

f.  Operational philosophy for the proper implementation of the above mentioned elements.

- within financial limits

- rationalised

- centrally co-ordinated.

Implications:

1.  CW more available.

2.  Use by “unsophisticated” troops.

3.  Non-lethal weapons part of the Conventional warfare on land.

4.  Highly contaminated battlefield.

5.  Classic philosophy of Chemical warfare does not apply any longer.

a.  Defensive posture not really possible.

  -  Protection

  -  Detection

  -  De-contamination

b.  Possession of CW a definite tactical advantage.

6.  New Philosophy

a.  Survival

b.  Personal Protection

c.  Retaliation Capacity

d.  Used to force a stalemate

7.  The need for prompt technological reaction capacity.

The Threat

1.  Stable phase.

2.  Unstable phase: Changes

a.  Technological development by other countries.

b.  Changing nature of chemical weapons.

3.  Technological development by other countries.

4.  Changing nature of chemical weapons.

a.  Changing delivery systems.

b.  Changing effect of CW.

c.  “Transformation” of Conventional weapons into toxic weapons.

5.  Delivery system changes

a.  non-persistent

b.  solids

c.  implications

6.  Effectual changes

a.  Non-lethal

b.  Aimed at equipment

7.  Transforming Conventional weapons into Toxic weapons

a.  Illuminating flares - Strontium/Polyamide

b.  Smoke generators/illuminating flare - PVC with Tricrycelphosphate.

Operational Philosophy

Offensive

1.  The right to the re-active use of non-lethal CW.

2.  The right to pro-active use to ensure the survival of the State.

3.  Continuation of R+D with regard to the threat (centralised).

4.  Limited R+D, acquisition of CW (non-lethal) (centralised).

Defensive

1.  Survival primary/completion of mission secondary.

2.  Integration of CW related behaviour in all conventional situations.

3.  Training: Prompt preparedness against new threats.

: Decision makers.

4.  Based on personal protection - Individual.

5.  Emphasis on respiratory protection.

6.  Centralisation of research: material technology

philosophy

psychology

What are we allowed to do?

Geneva Protocol and updating

1.  Limit first application of

asphyxiating

lethal CWA.

2.  Retaliation not ignored

3.  Allowed

 - NGT

 - Production

 - Storage

4.  USA/UK accept non-lethal CW.

5.  Extensive R+D / Prod by the USA.

Biological Warfare Conventions

1.  Only research.

2.  No production/stockpiling.

What are we currently doing?

Current status of Chemical Warfare technology in the SADF.

A.  R+D with regard to offensive threat.

1.  Laboratories.

2.  Sharing of information.

B.  R+D with regard to defensive technology

1.  Laboratories - evaluate/test

- develop

2.  Levels  - Material technology

- Physiology

- Psychology

3.  Recommendation - continue with centralisation.

C.  Training

1.  SAMS responsibility

2.  Levels of training/Curriculums/Lecture planning

3.  Facility: 7 Med BN GP

4.  Key instructors already trained

5.  Needs equipment from the Army.

D.  Establishing production technology of personal protective equipment.

1.  Sensitive Technology.

2.  Already established in SA.

3.  Not going ahead with collective protection/ de-contamination.

4.  Gas mask.

5.  Limited production program for personal equipment.

E.  Production technology of non-lethal weapons

Acquisition of non-lethal CW

Phases

1.  Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) acquired by COAST.

2.  Description of chemical/physical/pharmacological characteristics of CWA.

3.  Description of weapon characteristics and distribution - methods of use.

 -  Pyrotechnique -

 -  Liquid aerosol

 -  Solid matter aerosol

4.  CWA presented to DCC - approval for incorporation into weapons system.

5.  Process of Industrialisation - pre-production stage.

6.  Presented to DCC for inclusion in SADF arsenal as well as policy decisions with regard to authority of application/issue.

Completed:  NGT

Suggestion:  Continue to pre-production stage.

Recommendations

1.  Philosophy.  Accept the following philosophy:

a.  The SADF has the right to re-active use of non-lethal chemical warfare.

b.  Emphasis is on the survival of own troops as primary purpose in Chemical warfare, completion of mission as secondary.

c.  Integration of C warfare related behaviour into conventional warfare (also regarding the training of soldiers).

d.  Proper training of commanding officers.

e.  Non-lethal CW may be used pro-actively to ensure the survival of the State.

f.  Non-lethal weapons may also be used pro-actively to achieve a specific operational purpose.

2.  Policy.  Accept the following policy directives:

a.  Conduct research and development regarding:

 -  Offensive threat.

 -  Technology of protection against CW.

Centralised control at SG.

b.  Obtain individual protection equipment.

c.  Centralise control of R+D and acquisition of chemical weapons at SG.

d.  CSADF to authorise the use and issue of chemical weapons.

This authority can be delegated to C Army or even a lower rank depending on the operational scenario (especially with regard to the counter intelligence situation).

Return to Table of Contents

TOP SECRET

GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5

Telephone: 622631

Enquiries: Lt genl D.P. Knobel

SAMS Headquarters
 Private Bag X102
 Hennopsmeer
0046

8 January 1993

CONFIRMING NOTES: PRESENTATION TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE ABOUT THE COURSE AND CURRENT STATUS OF PROJECTS COAST AND JOTA IN GEORGE ON 7 JANUARY 1993

Present at the meeting:

Mr E. Louw                                Minister of Defence

Lt genl D.P. Knobel                    Surgeon General

Brig W. Basson                         Out-going project officer

Col B.P. Steyn                          Commanding Officer 7 Med Bn Gp and newly

appointed project officer

INTRODUCTION

1. The need to brief the minister is expressed to ensure that he is up to date with the projects in view of the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris and the current situation in the country. Recommendations will be made and the minister - or the State President - will be expected to make certain decisions.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of the briefing will be to brief the minister on the current status of projects COAST and JOTA and to make specific recommendations regarding further action and decisions.

DISCUSSION

3.  The minister is briefed by Lt Genl Knobel, brig Basson and col Steyn and is given a document GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5 dated 7 Jan 1993 containing all the detail.

4.  Background.   The background is sketched, explaining the origin, the reasons for and the beginning of the projects. The reason for their assignment to the SAMS is also supplied.

5.  The purpose and objectives of the project are sketched.

6.  Chronology.  it is divided into 4 phases:

a.  Phase 1.  Establishment 1982 - 1988.

b.  Phase 2.  Commercialisation 1988 - April 1990.

c.  Phase 3.  Privatisation April 1990 - September 1991.

d.  Phase 4.  Normalisation September 1991 - currently.

7.  The status of the project is discussed. SG says that in 1990 the current State President was thoroughly briefed, that he approved the continuation of the project adhering to the same directives which have always been in place -they are the following:

a.  The defensive program can continue.

b.  The offensive program may continue, but only with regard to non-lethal agents. All development regarding lethal agents should be halted.

8.  Additional information regarding the nature and effects of NGT, application methods in crowd control as well as research still to be conducted regarding the liquid and foam application methods, are discussed. A similar discussion about the other two incapacitating agents follows.

9.  The defensive status of the project is discussed.

10.  The financial and administrative management is discussed.

11.  Three possible scenarios around the continuation of the project with regard to NGT and the other incapacitating agents are discussed. They include possible action and the implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention for SA and the SADF as well as for the companies involved. The scenarios, implications and written instructions are discussed thoroughly. They are the following:

a.  Scenario 1.  That, immediately after the convention takes effect, the SADF announces that it has NGT and the other agents.

b.  That the SADF only announces the identity of NGT after its first application, then start negotiating with the UN.

c.  That the SADF only admits the use of NGT after another party proves it, then start negotiating with the UN.

12.  Recommendations.   The following recommendations are made to the Minister:

a.  The continuation of the defensive projects under the control of the Defence R+D Council and Armscor.

b.  That the SADF conceals its possession of NGT until the use of it can be proved. That the SADF continues and completes the research into the liquid and foam forms of NGT, provided that it be done covertly to ensure the protection of the companies involved.

c.  That all development regarding the other incapacitants be halted. That all raw materials and existing agents be destroyed in the presence of a member of the SAP, appointed by the Police Commissioner, in order to issue a certificate of destruction.

OUTCOME

13.  The Minister accepts all three recommendations.

14.  The Minister commands the safekeeping of all technical as well as scientific documentation with regard to the offensive program, to ensure the re-activation of the program if necessary. He states that the SADF cannot afford to lose its offensive non-lethal capacity by limiting its capacity to fight anarchy.

signed by:

(B.P. STEYN)

COMMANDING OFFICER 7 MED BN GP: COL

handwritten Commentary by SG as acting chair of the CMC:  Brig Basson to discuss recommendation par 12 c with KOMPOL.

signed by:

(D.P. KNOBEL)

ACTING CHAIR CMC: LT GENL              Date: 8 January 1993 

handwritten Commentary by the Minister of Defence:  If NGT is not listed by the Chemical Weapons Convention and is regarded as a crowd control agent, I will approve the above on the condition that NGT is used only when authorised by the Minister and or the State President.

signed by:

(E. LOUW)

MINISTER OF DEFENCE                                   DATE: 11-01-1993

This document takes effect from 11-01-1993 subject to the endorsement on p3.

signed by:

(E. LOUW)

MINISTER OF DEFENCE                                   DATE: 11-01-1993

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CBW 6(B)

TOP SECRET

GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5

Telephone: 6640413

Enquiries: Col B.P. Steyn

SAMS Headquarters
 Private Bag X102
 Hennopsmeer
0046

7 January 1993

PRESENTATION TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE REGARDING THE CHRONOLOGY AND CURRENT STATUS OF PROJECTS COAST AND JOTA IN GEORGE ON 7 JANUARY 1993

BACKGROUND

1.  At the end of the 1970 ’s it was clear to the military intelligence community that the increased presence of Russian and Cuban surrogate troops in Angola (also in the rest of Southern Africa), together with their advanced weapon technology posed a definite conventional military threat to SA. This was especially clear with regard to their capacity to use chemical weapons. In the early eighties the RSA and the SADF had no offensive and/or defensive chemical warfare capacity. It was therefore theoretically possible for these troops to attack South Africa through Namibia leaving the SADF incapable of defending itself against their chemical weapons.

2.  In the beginning of 1981 the CSADF and a reduced DCC presented this serious situation to the Minister of Defence. The Minister instructed that a solution be found to the CB threat against South Africa.

3.  In April 1981 Brig Basson (at that stage cmdt Basson) was sent overseas with the instruction to covertly collect information about the CBW capacity of various Western countries and to develop an approach that could be adopted in South Africa. He was also to make contact with organisations that could provide information about the CBW capabilities of Eastern bloc countries.

4.  After the visit a report was handed in to the RDCC. A CBW philosophy was developed. It included the following elements:

a.  The CBW arena - offensive and defensive - was emotionally loaded and filled with misinterpretations and misleading statements.

b.  Most Western countries openly exhibited only relatively outlived and already known technology in their armies.

c.  All offensive research and development up to the weaponisation process, was conducted by “civil fronts”.

d.  The weaponisation process was executed in top secret defence force laboratories.

e.  The key elements of the defensive capacity, that is the nature of the activated carbon and the material compounds of key pieces of equipment had to be protected to ensure the secrecy of the nature of our own chemical weapons.

f.  A proper defensive posture by means of defensive equipment will not be efficient because of the physical limits and extra weight. An offensive capacity was needed to ensure that the enemy is forced to take on a defensive posture to level the playing field.

g.  Results on the battlefield must be obtained not by means of superior lethal weapons but by means of effective defensive equipment integrated in a sensible doctrine and a tactic that will ensure the most suitable defensive posture.

5.  During his visit cmdnt Basson attempted to procure technology and equipment but it soon became clear that the Western countries were intent on misleading the SADF and provided outdated technology.

6.  In August 1981 a feasibility study was authorised to look into the establishment of an own CBW programme and funding was made available at the end of the year by the Chief of the Defence Force for the Project(COAST).

7.  The RDCC delegated Genl N.J. Nieuwoudt to draw Armscor into discussions around the possibility of the parastatal becoming involved in the project. Genl Nieuwoudt and cmdt Basson discussed the matter with cmdt Piet Marais and mr Fred Bell of Armscor who said that it was too risky an undertaking for Armscor. It would not be possible to recruit and to maintain the scientists for the project. It was therefore decided that the project would resort solely under the Defence Force and that Armscor would be employed to undertake less sensitive tasks. Armscor’s munitions programme was after all very full at this point in time and would have been unable to accept the additional responsibilities.

8.  The Minister of Defence authorised the project to go ahead under the control of a management committee (the CMC) that included the:

a.  Chief of the Defence Force,

b.  Surgeon General,

c.  Chief of Staff Finances,

d.  Chief of Staff Intelligence and

e.  other co-opted members as/when necessary.

9.  The aim of project COAST is to 'do research + development covertly and clandestinely and to establish the production technology in the sensitive critical areas of chemical and biological warfare in order to provide the South African security forces with a CBW capability in line with the CBW philosophy and strategy.'

10.  The objectives of project COAST are the following:

a.  The establishment of facilities for basic CBW research (including specific implemented CBW research).

b.  The establishment of the necessary security coverage and security systems for the CBW facilities.

c.  The establishment of the necessary safety systems for the CBW research facilities.

d.  To conduct basic CBW research (including specific implemented research).

e.  The creation of an industrial capacity with regard to CBW (acc. to the directives of CS Plan and in co-operation with Armscor).

f.  To conduct a CBW technical information system.

g.  To conduct specific own CBW operations.

h.  To supply operational and technical/equipment support to the SADF regarding CBW operations.

i.  The efficient financial and administrative management of the project.

11.  The project is to be run in four stages:

a.  Phase 1: The establishment phase:  From April 1982 to March 1988 This phase is characterised by:

i.  The establishment of the various front companies needed for the project.

ii.  The planning, building and implementation of the various research and production facilities.

iii.  The running of research and production programmes.

iv.  The management of the facilities and the project acc. to an expense budget.

v.  The establishment of defensive technologies in the private sector with the help of foreign co-workers.

b.  Phase 2: The Commercialisation Phase:  From March 1988 to April 1990. This phase is characterised by:

i.  Presentations to the COAST control committee with regard to the possible privatisation of the various facets.

ii.  Balance-sheet restructuring of the front companies to create manageable commercial packages -to be completed in September 1988.

iii.  Preparation for a private commercial approach by changing to an objective oriented and contractual budget for the front companies.

iv.  Continuation of research and final identification of research objectives and agents for production according to directives issued by the State President after his briefing session on 26 March 1990.

c.  Phase 3. The Privatisation Phase:  From April 1990 to September 1991. This phase is characterised by:

i.  The continuation of research as in phase 2.

ii.  The eventual cancellation of all research contracts with the previous front companies.

iii.  The final selling of the two research /production units with the approval of the State Attorney, the Auditor General and the Ministers of Defence and Finance. This will take place on 30 August 1991.

iv. A presentation to the Parliamentary Commitee that investigates all sensitive State projects - in September 1991. This committee is made up of 4 ministers: du Plessis, Coetzee, Dawie de Villiers and Gerrit Viljoen. The chronology and contents of the project will be presented to them.

d.  Phase 4:The Normalisation Phase: From September 1991 to currently.

This phase is characterised by:

i.  Completion of production of two new incapacitants.

ii.  More emphasis on the application of knowledge and skills in the field of crowd control and mass action.

iii.  The two new chemical weapon control conventions at Geneva which will be signed by SA on 14 January 1993.

iv.  The preparation of the project and the various associated organisations for the “normalisation” of project activities.

v.  The final planning of the normalisation of the project.

THE ESTABLISHMENT PHASE

12.  During this phase the chemical branch of the project was established as a front company called Delta G Scientific (Pty) Ltd and the facility was erected in Midrand at the cost of +- R30 million. It started operating in 1985.

13.  At the same time research into all possible warfare agents as well as weaponisation options were conducted. The scientists found this field extremely challenging and due to the potentially lethal consequences in the case of an error, they initially only worked with irritants and eventually with incapacitants and lethal agents. All molecules were investigated, synthetised and the effects were tested on experimental animals.

16.  This facility oversees two activities:

a.  The research and development of biological agents that can be used as weapons with the emphasis on the defensive regulations against them.

b.  The toxicological research of experimental animals with all chemical agents developed at Delta G Scientific.

17.  The financial and administrative management front, Infladel (Pty) Ltd was established during this time. This company initially dealt with the technical information system and the operational co-ordination of the project, as well as the security and safety systems. These functions were eventually handed over to other fronts and private companies.

18.  Since 1986 contact has been made with a group of Belgian industrialists who showed interested in working with SA on defensive technology. A German group later became part of this co-operative development scheme and private companies like Technotek, Protechnik and Lifestyle Management were established.

THE COMMERCIALISATION PHASE

19.  The scientific activities of this phase continued as was planned, but it was decided that the original objective regarding the establishment of the various facilities had been achieved and that there had to be a movement away from CBW research and production as only activity. At the same time the direct involvement of the State in these companies was entrenched.

20.  It was decided that preparations had to be made to have Delta G Scientific and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories sold off to management and staff. After several presentations the companies were divided into manageable units. The property and buildings were separated from the business units, a balance sheet restructuring and transfer of shares was done and a loan account was created for the State. Hereafter all research and production was conducted on a contractual basis and official orders.

THE PRIVATISATION PHASE

21.  The initiation of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the changing threat against the SADF together with drastic budget cuts forced the management of the project to recommend the discontinuation of all research into offensive programmes in July 1991. In co-operation with the Auditor General, the State Attorney and the Ministry of Finance a process of contractual cancellation with Delta G Scientific and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories was initiated - cancellation payments were done, debit accounts were settled and ownership of the companies was handed over to the management and staff. This took place on30 August 1991.

22.  The project activities were divided into the following categories:

a.  Defensive research.

b.  Procurement of defensive equipment.

c.  Production of offensive equipment.

d.  Operational activities.

e.  Financial and Administrative Management.

23.  Defensive research.  This program will be completed in March 1994 as was originally planned. The importance of the last few elements of a defensive system for a Conventional as well as a counter intelligence situation is emphasised. In line with the new Chemical Weapons Convention the program is being managed relatively “openly” by the SAMS and Defence Research and Development Council (DRDC).

24.  The Procurement of defensive equipment.  This program will be completed in March 1995 and from April 1993 it will also be managed relatively “openly” by the SAMS with Armscor as the procuring agent. The SAMS acts as commodity manager for the SADF. At the recent meetings of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, the fact that the SAMS had “neutralised” the issue of CBW so to speak by taking control of research and training, had created quite a stir. Most of the other defence forces use their Armies for this purpose. Quite a number of these countries indicated their interest in investigating a similar system.

25.  Operational activities.  This includes the purchase and transport of sensitive chemicals and will be completed by the end of December 1992.

26. Financial and Administrative Management.  Currently these activities (including that of security) are being managed by the last active front company of the project, D. John Truter Financial Consultants CC. As the funding is moved from the project to the “open” channels, these activities will be transferred to the new group i.e. the DRDC and Armscor. If there are no further covert activities this front company will close its doors by the end of June 1993. If there are further covert activities, the front company will function for as long as there are funds to be administered.

27.  Offensive equipment procurement and research. In line with guidelines stipulated by the State President in 1990, research and production of only irritants and incapacitants for use in conventional and counter intelligence situations were developed. The agents are:

a.  New Generation Tear Gas (NGT), a derivative of CR. (Irritant)

b.  A BZ variant which is produced locally. (Incapacitant)

c.  A methaqualone derivative which is locally produced. (Incapacitant)

d.  A Di-methylketone-amphetamine derivative. (Incapacitant)

28.  The BZ variant is the least problematic: we have produced 1000kg for weaponisation in 1993. The variant is however forbidden by the Chemical Weapons Convention and the report states that it will have to be destroyed or declared. It is advised that it be destroyed.

29.  The NGT is even less problematic. It is not prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention although the document states that it should be reported. We could argue that our interpretation was that it did not have to be reported. NGT can be applied as:

a.  Smoke grenades.  These systems are developed, tested and ready for application.

b.  Spraying system.  The NGT is emulsified and sprayed over the target area/persons. The system is almost ready for application - the delivery system still needs some work.

c.  Foam systems.  The NGT is dissolved in foam. The foam serves as an unimpenetrable barricade that impedes eyesight. This system still needs a lot of work.

30. The question arises whether the SADF should continue research and development of the NGT, considering the South African government’s approach to contentious activities. Mr Louw decided that research had to continue covertly until it is completed. It will also only be necessary to declare the NGT when the convention takes effect, which will probably only be in 1995.

31. The project management concludes that, if they decide to continue with research and development, it be done covertly by using the front companies of the SADF as clients to protect the producer against recriminations.

32.  If the government decides that the SADF should apply the three different formulations of NGT, it will have to be decided if they declare it or not. There are three possible scenarios:

33.  The SADF declares the NGT immediately after the signing of the new Chemical Weapons Convention. This give the SADF and the SA government the moral high ground, but it has the following implications:

a.  The international scientific community will immediately realise the advanced status of the production of chemical agents. This could lead to rumours that the SADF is developing other agents which might result in a witch hunt.

b.  In line with the Chemical Weapons Convention the SADF will then also have to declare the origin and quantitative value of the agent as well as the quantities and types of weaponry produced. All facilities and technicians will have to be made available for investigation and questioning.

c.  The groups who are pro mass-action and violence will in the interim get the opportunity to investigate the precautions against NGT. This will negatively impact on the effectiveness of the SADF’s most important crowd controlling weapon.

34.  It has to be noted that the commercial survival of the production facility at Delta G depends on our ability to conceal the company’s previous connection with the SADF and CBW. If the SADF declares its NGT and its connection with Delta G the company will immediately be investigated by international investigation teams. It is obvious that the company will not be able to survive in a changing South Africa with this stigma to its name. The recommendation is that if the government decides to declare the NGT it should state that it was acquired outside of the country and that it took place during the previous era and is therefore still subject to the moratorium on the declaration of co-workers in the SA Weapon industry.

35.  The second scenario is that the SADF conceals its NGT capacity until after the first large-scale application. The implications are similar to the first scenario. The directives of the Chemical Weapons Convention will be technically violated. The convention will then give the SADF the opportunity to explain the reasons for the initial concealment. The description of agents in the protocol is very vague and the possibility of a lengthy debate to justify our actions is foreseeable. A probable loss of credibility is to be expected.

36.  The third scenario is that the SADF conceals its NGT capacity until a third party steps in to analyse the weapon rests and there is undeniable proof of NGT. This should take months after application. It should create the necessary time - 6-8 months for the development of precautions. In this way the SADF gains about one year before the weapon is made ineffectual. The further implications are similar to those of scenarios 1 and 2.

37.  Incapacitants.  The SADF has two other incapacitants which were to be weaponised in 1993. These agents affect the brain functions of the target persons and alter their emotions, both agents have a strong calming effect. These agents may be more effective in crowd control situations than NGT, because the incorrect application of NGT can lead to stampedes and the damaging of people and facilities (in cities). The first two agents are preferable due to their calming effect on crowds.

38.  However, the application of these agents has the same implications as NGT but on a more contentious level. The UN debate on the interpretation of definitions will be more complicated and the potential loss of credibility to the SA government is considerately higher than in the case of NGT. It may be interpreted that these agents interfere with the personalities of people, even if it is only temporarily. In spite of the temptation to use these agents rather than NGT, they will probably have to be reserved for conventional warfare and counter intelligence situations against well trained and armed insurgents.

39.  It must be noted that these agents have the potential to be used as drugs because of their capacity to alter brain functions and emotions. Their raw materials are internationally controlled substances and it is illegal to trade in them. If there is to be any further development of these substances we will inevitably have to obtain authority from the Minister of Law and Order to use them.

40.  In view of the current changing circumstances and perceptions in the country it is advised that these two incapacitants together with BZ be destroyed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

41.  The continuation of the defensive projects under DRDC and Armscor.

42.  The SADF does not declare NGT and continues and completes the research and development of the liquid and foam forms of NGT. This must be done covertly to protect producers.

43.  Development of the other two incapacitants should be halted and the raw materials as well as the existing agents should be destroyed in the presence of a member of the SAP, appointed by the Police Commissioner, to issue a certificate of destruction.

signed by:

(D.P. KNOBEL)

SURGEON GENERAL: LT GENL

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SECRET

OFFICE FOR SERIOUS ECONOMIC OFFENCES

Ref.                  : 1/4/3 (20/92)
Telephone:        (012) 320 6000
Fax nr.              : (012) 320 6155
(Adv JA Swanepoel)

handwritten: (4 of P/G - 3253750)

Private Bag X297
PRETORIA
0001
8 December 1992

General Knobel
The Surgeon General
Servamus-building
VERWOERDBURG CITY
0140

INVESTIGATION IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE ACT REGARDING THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ECONOMIC OFFENCES, 117 OF 1991: ARMSCOR, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO BRIG. W. BASSON

As telephonically discussed with you, I request answers to the following questions:

1.  What was brig Basson’s position in the SADF?

2.  Was he involved in the management and handling of sensitive

projects

3.  What was his involvement in SADF and SAMS contracts?

4.  What was his involvement in front companies or closed corporations, and what was his compensation?

5.  Did he have signing powers to any accounts of the SADF, SAMS or front companies?

6.  What was the role of the co-ordinating management committee (CMC)?

7.  Was brig Basson a director of any company or a member of any closed corporation?

8.  What was the SADF/brig Basson’s involvement in:

-  Wisdom Erf 82

-  Pretokon (Pty) Ltd

-  Intramex

-  Wag-’n-Bietjie-Boerdery

-  Sefmed Information Services (Pty) Ltd

-  Data Image

-  Infladel

-  Medchem Consolidated Investments

-  Organochem

-  Delta G Scientific

-  Technotek

-  Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises

-  Roodeplaat Research Laboratories

9.  Who authorises the use of fronts and specific front companies, and which financial control systems do they have?

10.  Detail about the production of and authorisation for the production of methaqualone is asked for.

11.  Did brig Basson earn a salary and was it merely a brigadier-salary?

12.  Who controlled, and who authorised his activities?

13.  What was the role of the following people in the front companies, were they previously involved in the SADF and did they receive any compensation from the SADF:

PA Mijburgh,

WP Swanepoel

WD Basson,

TJR Viljoen and

MM Viljoen.

signed by:

J.A. SWANEPOEL

DIRECTOR: OFFICE FOR SERIOUS ECONOMIC OFFENCES

Return to Table of Contents

TOP SECRET

SURGEON GENERAL

Telephone: 671-5431

Enquiries: Lt genl D.P. Knobel

SAMS Headquarters
Private Bag X102
Hennopsmeer
0046
11 January 1993

The Director
Office for Serious Economic Offences
Private Bag X297
Pretoria
0001

The honorary Adv Swanepoel

INVESTIGATION IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE ACT REGARDING THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ECONOMIC OFFENCES, 117 OF 1991: ARMSCOR, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BRIG. W. BASSON

1.  My telephonic conversations with you and your letter ref. nr: 1/4/3(20/92) dated 8 December 1992 refer.

2.  The questions are answered in point form. As discussed telephonically with you, some of the questions had to be cleared out with the Chief of Staff Army, Chief of Staff Finances and the Chief Director of Counter Intelligence of the SA Army respectively as well as with my staff manager brig Venter and brig Basson. Where necessary, I will stipulate the origin of the information or who confirmed it. I would like to accentuate the fact that several of your questions relate to events that took place during the term of office of my predecessor, the late Lt genl N.J. Nieuwoudt. He died two years ago, therefore I could not confirm specific information with him. I have however no reason to doubt the truthfulness of the facts that were supplied by the above mentioned persons.

Question 1: What was brig Basson’s position in the SADF?

According to records that were investigated by brig Venter, the following relevant facts were established:

a.  Brig Basson was appointed to the SADF on 2 January 1975 as a medical officer with the rank of Lt. He was the MO at 1 Military Hospital from 2 January 1975 to 28 February 1981. During this time he completed several post-degree courses and had advanced to the professional rank of 1st specialist (internal medicine) in 1980. His military rank at this stage was that of full commandant. From 1 March 1981 he was the special advisor and project officer of special projects to the Surgeon General at the SAMS headquarters and was assigned to Special Forces headquarters under Operational Command of BG Special forces of the SADF. On 1 January 1985 he was appointed to full colonel and Commanding officer of a newly found unit at the SAMS, 7 Medical Battalion group, to provide medical support to Special forces, Special Tasks and 44 Parachute brigade of the SADF as well as to the Security branch of the SAP and NID. During this period he completed several qualifying military courses and was promoted to the military rank of brigadier and Chief of Medical Staff Operations at the SA Medical Services headquarters on 1 January 1988. He fulfilled this function for nine months after which time he was appointed by me to Director of Research and Development at the SA Medical Services remaining responsible for special projects at the SAMS.

Question 2: Was he involved in the management and handling of sensitive projects?

4.  Since April 1981 brig Basson has been involved in several sensitive SADF projects. They were essentially two types:

a.  Medical support and intelligence projects in co-operation with CSI.

b.  Technological developmental projects overseen by the Surgeon General.

5.  The medical support and intelligence projects which were run by brig Basson were mainly launched in other African countries. It entailed the establishment of medical facilities in the defence forces of several countries e.g. Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. These projects led to a better relationship between the defence forces and their governments and the SADF and it made it possible for assigned CSI personnel to satisfy intelligence demands.

6.  For the running of the chief activity in the area of technology establishment brig Basson was appointed to project officer of project COAST (currently known as project JOTA). The following facts led to the run-up to the above:

During the presence of Cuban forces in Angola it became clear that the Angolan government forces (MPLA) and the Cubans were using chemical weapons against the Angolan rebel movements and specifically against UNITA. In the early 1980’s there was a real danger that the SADF forces in Angola, who were fighting against PLAN (SWAPO armed forces) and MPLA with their Cuban surrogate forces, would be exposed to this type of warfare. The fact that the Cubans had these weapons made it possible for them to stage a chemical attack on South Africa from the Namibian side. The SADF would not have been able to survive such an attack because it lacked a chemical or offensive capacity.

7.  In April 1982 the Minister of Defence authorised Project COAST to establish a reliable defensive and limited offensive warfare capacity for the SADF. This was a sensitive field worldwide and the larger countries tried to deny the new players access to the field. They furthermore controlled the technology by enforcing a complicated network of control measures for chemicals and scientific and production equipment. Most of these larger countries also founded front companies to do research and development of CBW in order to protect their governments. The armed forces in these countries also deal essentially with the defensive conventional capacity and the classic conventional weaponry which is already familiar to us.

8.  Discussions about the need for such a project were held with the minister involved, the top management structure of Armscor as well as the top management structure of the SADF. Armscor refused responsibility for the project. There are two possible explanations:

a.  The negative international publicity if Armscor’s involvement in the project would become known.

b.  There was no existing established source of technology in SA and all development had to be done ab initio - Armscor was already overloaded.

9.  Most of these activities would not comply with the International Law and in some countries this would imply that they had to break their national laws as well as sanctions and isolation precautions against South Africa.

10.  Therefore it was decided to assign these sensitive projects to the SADF. Due to the physical, chemical, bio-chemical and physiological nature of the technologies involved and with the accent on defensive technology, the Surgeon General was appointed as project manager. Brig Basson was appointed as project officer because of his relatively unique scientific qualifications. He was also a trained arms expert and explosives disposal expert and would be able to offer skilled advice with regard to weaponisation.

11.  The approved objectives of the project were the following:

a.  The establishment of facilities for the conducting of basic CBW research including specific applied CBW research.

b.  The determination of specification quantities and delivery times with regard to the product service.

c.  The budget actions and presentation of the budget to a Co-ordinating Management Committee (CMC) for approval.

d.  Monitoring of performance and supply on both sides (i.e. client as well as supplier).

Question 4: What was his involvement in front companies or closed corporations, and what was his compensation?

16.  The question should be replied to against the following background:

a.  Most of the staff members of the front companies were not briefed about the contents of their work. Only the senior directives of each front company were fully aware of what was going on. Some of the directors knew the nature of the work but did not know the funding or contractual details.

b.  When my predecessor was still involved in the project they mainly concentrated on the establishment of a CBW capacity. This was seen as Phase 1 of the project.

c.  When I was appointed as Surgeon General on 1March 1988, Phase 1 was - in terms of all the objectives - completed and it was possible to start with the commercialisation and privatisation phases to ensure the normalisation of the project and its activities. This led to the initiation of Phase 2.

17. During Phase 1 brig Basson had to see to the fulfilment of the following functions:

a.  The identification of the need for a specific front according to input from consumers and the CMC as well as the security threat.

b.  The planning of the establishment and management of the front, security coverage and staff and equipment needs.

c.  The physical establishment of the fronts and the appointment of staff.

d.  Management responsibilities with regard to the fronts, through constant contact (meetings) with the informed management personnel.

e.  Establishing contact between the CMC and the fronts with regard to management, budgeting, activities and instructions.

f.  Use of the facilities and the fronts to provide him with a civilian cover to the outside world.

18.  During Phase 2 brig Basson was no longer directly involved in the management ant the running of the front companies, only in the commercialisation and privatisation process as well as controlling quality insurance of services rendered. Some of the facilities were still used to maintain his civilian cover.

19.  According to Basson himself, he never received any compensation or salary from any of the front companies. Sometimes the front companies had to organise his travel schedule, but this money came from the budget of the central project fund. In some instances the cars that were used by Basson during operational services were also registered and used by the front companies.

20.  Due to Basson’s covert military image the following payment system was developed:

a.  The SADF paid Basson’s salary into a Volkskas account. The account was registered in his name (W. Basson) and was used for this purpose only.

b.  Brig Basson then transferred a certain amount by cheque to the account of one of the front companies. This was always done at a different time and with a different amount so that it would not have the appearance of a monthly salary.

c.  The front companies then transferred the money to an account in the name of W. Basson at Nedbank Limited. These amounts were intended to appear as periodic consultation fees and Basson used this account for his daily activities. Therefore the military nature of Basson’s work would not become transparent even if these payments or his credit cards were to be investigated.

21.  It must be noted that brig Basson was at no time registered as a full time state employee at any of the medical professional control bodies (neither at the SAMDC nor at the SA Medical Association) - this was also due to his covert military image.

Question 5: Did he have signing powers to any accounts of the SADF, SAMS or front companies?

22.  Brig Basson had no signing powers to any SADF, SAMS or front company accounts. The staff of the financial management front had the signing powers.

Question 6: What was the role of the coordinating management committee (CMC)?

23.  The CMC was the control body of project COAST and determined the strategic direction of the project. Policy decisions about the type of activities and products that would have to be delivered were taken and this was done in view of consumer demand, the threat as well as the results of previous own projects and research. The research programme and the budget had to be authorised by the CMC on an annual basis. The CMC arranged meetings around the development and changing circumstances of the project. Since 1988, after the chief objectives of the project - as described in para 11 - had been achieved and commercialisation and privatisation could be continued with (Phase 2), the CMC mainly got together to authorise the annual budget.

24.  In line with the management directive of project COAST, the CMC had the following structure:

a. Chief of the Defence Force (Chairman).

b. Surgeon General (functioned as acting chair in the absence of the CSADF).

c. Chief of Army Staff.

d. Chief of Army Staff Intelligence.

e. Chief of Army Staff Finances.

f.  Co-opted members as/when necessary:

i.  Chief of SA Army

ii.  Chief of Army Staff Operations.

iii.  Chief of Army Staff Logistics.

iv.  Other persons as/when necessary.

Question 7: Was brig Basson a director of any company or a member of any closed corporation?

25.  Brig Basson was not supposed to be a member of any closed corporation or a director of any front company.

26.  However, according to Basson he was requested by the Wisdom Group to function as director of WISDOM ERF 82 for several months (see question 8 for full details).

27.  According to brig Basson he was also appointed as director of INTRAMEX for a certain amount of time (see question 8).

Question 8: What was the SADF/brig Basson’s involvement in:

28.  Wisdom Erf 82.  Information provided by brig Basson. The SADF had no official involvement in WISDOM ERF 82 (Pty) Ltd. It was a private company owned by the Wisdom Group. Patricia Leeson, one of the employees of project COAST had been employed in England. During this time - in 1987 - she was arrested by the British Security Services. Shortly after her arrest she was deported to South Africa. Due to these difficulties she developed some emotional problems and in the process accumulated huge debts. No conventional methods of aid could solve her problems. Brig Basson subsequently asked Mr Viljoen (see further on) to organise the purchase of her flat in Sunnyside by WISDOM ERF 82 (Pty) Ltd. An additional motive for the purchase of the flat was to use it as accommodation for covert visitors of project COAST. The company provided certain guarantees in favour of Patricia Leeson and to see that everything goes smoothly Basson was asked to act as director of WISDOM ERF 82 until all the problems were dealt with. Brig Basson received no remuneration for the task. The company had no business dealings with the state.

29.  Pretokon (Pty) Ltd.  Information provided by brig Basson. The SADF had no involvement in this company. It is a private company owned by Mr and Mrs Viljoen (see further on). The current status of the company is not known. It however originated from INTRAMEX (Ptd) Ltd and then changed its name to PRETOKON. Brig Basson had no involvement in this company.

30.  Intramex (Pty) Ltd.  Information provided by brig Basson. In 1987 the war in Angola and the chemical threat escalated and SA discovered the need for certain offensive as well as defensive equipment. At this stage the technology and products were only available at companies that were either fronts (e.g. DELTA G SCIENTIFIC) or private companies that were in the process of specific technological development for project COAST. The CMC ordered the secrecy of technological sources in both categories. It was therefore decided that the above-mentioned products (NGT - in the case of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC) had to be purchased by the SA Army through Armscor. Project COAST funding was not used for this production. Armscor was not supposed to know the origin of the New Generation Teargas and a front was created to buy the substance from DELTA G SCIENTIFIC and sell it to Armscor. Only the additional costs for the managing of the front as well as the physical handling of the substances were added to the selling price of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC. The CMC appointed Mr Viljoen to manage the front and to act on behalf of the project. Brig Basson co-ordinated these activities through contact with the SA Army, Armscor and DELTA G SCIENTIFIC seeing to it that orders, deliveries and the further handling of substances ran smoothly. Mr Viljoen received no remuneration for the task. Mrs Viljoen was paid for her half a day’s work. Patricia Leeson was employed to oversee physical stock control and to deal with deliveries. She was initially appointed as one of the directors of the company. However, her emotional problems surfaced again and she was asked to resign as director. Like with all front companies, at their initial appointment all the directors and shareholders had to sign undated letters of resignation as well as blank share transfer forms. Presented in all instances were letters of resignation and letters of appointment for substitutes in case of the resignation or sudden death of an official. In the case of INTRAMEX, all of these substitutes in the group of fronts could be traced back to DELTA G SCIENTIFIC. Brig Basson was asked to act as a “reserve” and also signed undated letters of appointment and resignation. In July 1989 brig Basson went to the USA for a period of four months. In September 1989 Mr Viljoen fell suddenly ill and within 48 hours he was taken up in hospital for a secondary coronary by-pass operation. At the time he could not contact brig Basson in the USA and he activated the undated directoral appointment to ensure continuity in the event of something happening to him. He then went on sick leave until January 1990. During this postoperative period he forgot to inform Basson about the details of his actions. His forgetfulness was most probably the result of extensive postoperative treatment for behaviour problems created by the combination of the effect of the heart/lung machine and certain prescribed medication. As part of his retirement package mr Viljoen was allowed to take over Intramex. At that stage the company was no longer doing business with the SA Army and Armscor and the company was worth almost nothing - except for the rated taxes. At this time Mr Viljoen handed in brig Basson’s resignation as director of the company. Brig Basson received no further remuneration from the company.

31.  Wag-’n bietjie-boerdery (Pty) Ltd.  Information provided by brig Basson. This company owned a farm in the district Ermelo. Brig Basson ran the farm in his private capacity in partnership with Mr Viljoen, dr. W. Swanepoel and Mr P.W. de Jager. The company had no business dealings with the state. The SA Army had no involvement in this.

32.  Sefmed Information Services (Pty) Ltd.  This was a front company of the project and was managed and run by the project in its totality. It served as the central technical information office for the project. This is where all data and information was processed and made available to other elements of the project (these elements were often not aware of each other). The SA Army funded the company and brig Basson was ordered by the CMC to run the company. Brig Basson also used the offices of this company for the creation of his specific image.

33.  Data Image.  The Medchem Group owns this company. With the downscaling of offensive research and the privatisation of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC and ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES, an agreement was made with the company to have all project data captured on optical disc. Brig Basson oversees this process. The SA Army has no further involvement in the company.

34.  Infladel (Pty) Ltd.  This company was a front created by the project to act as:

a. Financial and administrative management element of the project.

b. Technical information centre until SEFMED was created.

c. Operational Co-ordination centre.

The company was funded by the SADF and managed by Brig Basson.

35.  Medchem Consolidated Investments (Pty) Ltd.  This company is privately owned by dr P.A. Mijburgh. Neither the SADF nor brig Basson is involved in the financing or running of this company. The project had however signed research contracts with this company after the commercialisation of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC because it was the holding company of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC. Dr Mijburgh also played an important role in co-ordinating between defensive and offensive research production because of his scientific and operational background.

36.  Organochem (Pty) Ltd.  This company is owned by Mr J.W. Brandt. The SADF has no involvement in the funding or the running of the company. In the past years Mr Brandt had succeeded in acquiring certain chemical products that are hard to come by on the international market and to moving them to SA without leaving any traces. In view of this his company was used by Armscor as well as other organisations for the import of sensitive chemicals. Project COAST used his services from time to time. Organochem was -like Intramex- applied to serve as a cover between DELTA G SCIENTIFIC and Armscor.

37.  Delta G Scientific (Pty) Ltd.  This company was created in April 1982 to serve as the chemical branch of the project. Until 1988 it was a front company and funded and managed by the SA Army. Brig Basson was responsible for the management and running of the company. In September 1988 the process of commercialisation and privatisation started and the SA Army had no further control over the company. A number of research and production contracts were however signed after commercialisation started. Brig Basson managed these contracts.

38.  Technotek (Pty) Ltd.  The following two groups own this company:

a. A foreign group controlled by a group of Belgians that keeps its shares in a Luxembourg holding company.

b. Mr C. van Remoortre and other employees of the company.

This company was through its Belgian group instrumental in the establishment of a whole range of technologies in the field of defensive warfare in SA for project COAST. It supplied the Defence Force with equipment by contract. The SADF has no further involvement in this company. Brig Basson acted as project officer.

39.  Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises (Pty) Ltd.  This company was created as a front company for the project. It was funded and controlled by the SADF. With the downscaling of certain offensive research the company made some budget cuts. At the same time the SADF, who was one of the big commercial clients of the company with regard to the purchase of trained battle supporting dogs, made large budget cuts in their dog-purchasing program. These changes obviously threatened the commercial survival of RBE. After negotiations with the SAP the CMC authorised the take -over of the facility by the SAP and the SAP was allowed to create their own account with regard to the dog-breeding program. The company’s land and buildings were expropriated by the SAP on 27 March 1991.

40.  Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (Pty) Ltd.  This company was created in 1983 as a front company of project COAST. It served as the biological branch of CBW research of the project. The SADF funded and controlled the company until September 1988. Brig Basson was responsible for the management and running of the company. In September 1988 the process of commercialisation and privatisation commenced and the SA Army had no further control over the company. A number of research and production contracts were however signed after commencement of commercialisation. Brig Basson managed these contracts.

Question 9:  Who authorises the use of fronts and specific front companies, and which financial control systems do they have?

41.  The CMC constantly measured the need for use of front companies by means of the research and production plan. When necessary, the CSADF and the Minister of Defence would authorise the establishment of a front company with its own bank account.

42.  The use of front companies (i.e. other identities and cover) was an operational matter planned and evaluated by brig Basson. He only reported on this officially in the event of a security threat to the State or whenever he needed back-up from another State or SADF department.

43.  Financial control was exercised on several levels. Every front company had a qualified accountant to implement the financial control measures according to the prescribed laws of the company.

44.  The front companies were properly audited according to company law. This was done by Mr P. Theron, senior partner of the firm Coopers, Theron and Du Toit. He was initially appointed by the previous State President and the Minister of Defence to this specific job.

45.  The Auditor General officially appointed Mr P. Theron to audit the whole project and hand in an annual report to the AG. This audit covered the total flow of funds, from the source (the State coffers) to the front companies. After the privatisation of the front companies Mr Theron stayed on in this capacity. He also controlled the use of funding by means of approved objective oriented budgets.

46.  Brig Basson attempted to negotiate the appointment of Mr Theron as auditor to the contractors to ensure the following up of project funds.

47.  As a further control measure the project auditor and the staff of Chief of Staff Finances had unlimited access to the activities and records of all the companies that had contracts with the project. This was determined contractually.

48.  The Chief of the Defence Force Staff Finances also made available a cost calculator of his Civilian Force staff to do all cost calculations with regard to contracted services and products and to confirm it (in co-operation with the company involved). He was also responsible for the drawing up and examination of all contracts concerning products delivered.

Question 10. Detail about the production of and authorisation for the production of methaqualone is asked for.

49.  Information provided by brig Basson. Methaqualone formed part of the offensive side of the CBW programme and was being investigated in 1987 for use as an incapacitant. The agent (like a few others that are being produced experimentally) behaved excellently in the pyrotechnical format. Therefore the necessary    and some derivates of methaqualone were produced. The physiological effect of the methaqualone was determined on animals and people and a few mortars prepared for experimental use. The results of this were satisfactorily, although it seemed as if the intense upsurge, excitement, stress and tension that the target individuals experienced during armed skirmishes led to the agent taking longer to take effect than what was experienced by the people experimented on. The application of the agent was halted in 1988. Since then a much more effective analogue has been developed through further research which should be able to rule out the above-mentioned disadvantages.

50.  The methaqualone and its different analogues were produced at DELTA G SCIENTIFIC as part of a program for the development and weaponisation of incapacitants. The program was authorised by the CMC who received regular feedback on its development. The program was developed with the knowledge of the Minister of Law and Order, the Commissioner of Police as well as staff appointed by them to monitor the project and give assistance where it was needed. Certain technical information was obtained from these people.

51.  The raw materials for production were imported by ORGANOCHEM through the project officer. Brig Basson controlled the security of the project and of the production, the balance between input and output and had to see to it that none of the product disappears out of the system.

Question 11. Did brig Basson earn a salary and was it merely a brigadier salary?

52.  In November 1980 brig Basson was appointed to the professional rank of first specialist. He therefore received a bigger salary than a vice director-general in the government services. He also received several operational danger and privation packages according to army procedure and in line with his additional military qualifications.

Question 12: Who instructed and who authorised his activities?

53.  Since his appointment to the SA defence force brig Basson has been under the functional command of the Surgeon General and he was accountable to the SG for medical and related issues. He has however been under the operational command of the Chief of Special Forces from March 1981 to December 1987 and all his military actions were controlled by this department. From 1 March 1981 I became his commanding officer and confirmed it by appointing him to the position of Director Research and Development in my HQ on 1 October 1988.

54.  Brig Basson was accountable to the CMC for the running of the project (CBW programme), i.e. all research, development and production. The CMC authorised his actions. The situation was however different with regard to the operational application of products delivered and he was instructed in relation to the use of CB agents by the following people:

a. The Minister of Defence

b. The Chief of the Defence Force

c. The Commanding General: SADF Special Forces SA Defence Force

d. The Chief of Staff Intelligence of the SADF

e. The Commissioner of Police

f.  The Commanding General SA police: Security Branch

g. The Director-general: National Intelligence Service.

I did not find the above-mentioned situation acceptable and handed in my objection to the Chief of the SADF (Genl Geldenhuys). My objection was heard but it did not change the situation.

55.  Whenever brig Basson was operationally tasked by the above mentioned people (par 54) the CMC only knew about it if the research and production facilities had to be activated to satisfy the operational need. The CMC would then authorise it as an active part of the total project.

Question 13:  What was the role of the following people in the front companies, were they previously involved in the SADF and did they receive any compensation from the SADF:

56.  Dr. P.A. Mijburgh.  Dr Mijburgh completed his National Service in the SAMS between January 1981 and December 1982. During this time he was re-assigned to special forces and was trained as a special forces soldier. In January 1983 he joined the SAMS as a member of the Permanent Force and he did his service in special forces. At the same time he finished the degree B. Com with accountancy as his major and he showed an aptitude for management and finances. In 1985 when the front company DELTA G SCIENTIFIC experienced problems at management level, he was asked to resign from the Permanent Force and the CMC appointed him to management director of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC. He was therefore in this capacity a paid official of the SADF through the budget of project COAST. After the commercialisation of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC he did not remain a paid official of the State. He became an independent businessman and co-owner of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC and sole owner of MEDCHEM CONSOLIDATED INVESTMENTS - a private company.

57.  Dr W.P. Swanepoel.  Dr Swanepoel studied dentistry at the University of Pretoria as a bursary holder of the SA Defence Force. After the completion of his studies he worked as a dentist in the SAMS. In 1981 he completed a military management course in the SAMS and he was appointed to acting commanding officer of 3 Military Hospital in Bloemfontein. In 1982 he was transferred to SAMS HQ in Pretoria and became second-in-command of the Medical Department Special Forces, where he was responsible for the administrative and financial management of the department. During this time he completed several management courses in the SADF as well as at the University of the Witwatersrand. In 1986 when the front company ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES experienced problems at management level, he was asked to resign from the Permanent Force and the CMC appointed him to management director of RNL. He was therefore in this capacity a paid official of the SADF from the budget of project COAST. After the commercialisation of RNL he did not remain a paid official of the State. He became an independent businessman and co-owner of RNL.

58.  Dr W.D. Basson.  In 1981 Dr Willie Basson was asked to aid in the strategic planning of the chemical side of project COAST. At the time he was a professor in the Chemical Department at the University of Pretoria and he was paid by the SADF for expenditure incurred by him and his department. After the establishment of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC in April 1982 he was asked to resign from the University of Pretoria and he was appointed by the CMC as managing director of DGS. He then became a full-time paid official of the SADF from the budget of project COAST. In May 1985 he had a disagreement with the board of directives and he resigned as MD of DGS. He then became the technical director of PROTEA CHEMICALS LTD. In this capacity he was contracted in 1988 by the project to act as technical advisor and program manager to a large part of the defensive program. All contracting and payments were made to PROTEA CHEMICALS LTD.

59.  Mr T.J.R. Viljoen.  In 1985 Mr Viljoen was appointed as accountant to the front company INFLADEL Ltd.  After the managing director Mr van den Berg was transferred to DGS as director, Finances, Mr Viljoen became the managing director of INFLADEL. He acted as responsible accountancy official for the whole project and also for smaller fronts e.g. INTRAMEX. In 1988 he was made responsible for the management of ROODEPLAAT BREEDING ENTERPRISES. He remained in these capacities until September 1989 when he had to have a secondary coronary by-pass operation. In 1990 he was declared medically unfit and pensioned off. Up to this point he remains a paid official of the SADF from the budget of project COAST. Mr Viljoen was never a member of the Permanent Force of the SADF.

60.  Mrs M.M. Viljoen.  Mrs Viljoen is the wife of Mr T.J.R. Viljoen. She was appointed as accounts clerk at INFLADEL and also handled the account and administration of INTRAMEX. She was initially employed on a half-day basis but soon became a full-time employee. She was eventually asked by the CMC to act as director of INTRAMEX in support of Mr Viljoen. She was never a member of the Permanent Force.

61.  I would like to notify you that in the past two years extensive investigation into the person of brig Basson was done by the Chief of Staff Intelligence, Chief of Staff Finances and myself in co-operation with the Auditor General. It dealt with most of your questions. I also confirm that on 25 August 1992 I met with the project auditor of the AG who expressed his satisfaction with his audit of the project and on 14 December 1992 Mr W. van Heerden from the office of the Auditor General also expressed the satisfaction of the AG with regard to his internal investigation.

62.  From the above you will realise the complexity of the project which stretched over an era of close by eleven years.

63.  I would also like to inform you that on 26 March 1990 the current State President in the presence of genl Malan, genl Geldenhuys, genl Liebenberg and myself was thoroughly briefed on the status and magnitude of project COAST with special reference to the process of commercialisation and privatisation. The SP approved the continuation of the project issuing a special directive regarding offensive research - only irritants and incapacitants were to be attended to. This command has been executed to the letter. In a follow-up meeting on 20 September 1991, brig Basson briefed a special Cabinet Committee on sensitive projects of the State, represented by Mr B. du Plessis, dr D. de Villiers, mr K. Coetzee and dr G. Viljoen, in the presence of genl Malan, genl Liebenberg and Vice-admiral Murray, on the state and magnitude of the project with special reference to the directives of the SP as well as the process of privatisation and commercialisation in which mr B. du Plessis would be involved. (I was not present at this presentation due to other obligations, but was notified of the contents immediately after my return.)

64.  Notwithstanding the above, in my opinion the financial management of the project has always run smoothly and the objectives were achieved in a satisfactory manner without compromising the security of the project and/or the SADF (SAMS).

65.  You will understand that I would like to see this issue being dealt with as swiftly and satisfactorily as possible.

66.  I would like to inform you that the contents of this report have been brought to the attention of the current Minister of Defence.

With friendly regards

(D.P. KNOBEL)

SURGEON GENERAL: LT GENL

Return to Table of Contents

TOP SECRET

GG/UG/302/6/J282/5

Telephone: 6640413

Enquiries: Col B.P. Steyn

SAMS Headquarters
Private Bag X102
Hennopsmeer
0046

10/08/1993

Appendix A: Chronology

Appendix B: Destruction Certificate

Appendix C: Statement from the Commanding Officer SAP Forensic Laboratories

PRESENTATION TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE REGARDING THE CHRONOLOGY AND CURRENT STATUS OF PROJECTS COAST AND JOTA IN PRETORIA ON 10/8/93

INTRODUCTION

1.  At the end of the 1970 ’s it was clear to the military intelligence community that the increased presence of Russian and Cuban surrogate troops in Angola (also in the rest of Southern Africa), together with their advanced weapon technology posed a definite conventional military threat to South Africa. This was especially clear with regard to their capacity to use chemical weapons. In the early eighties the RSA and the SADF had no offensive and/or defensive chemical warfare capacity. It was therefore theoretically possible for these troops to attack South Africa through Namibia leaving the SADF incapable to defend itself against their chemical weapons.

2.  In the beginning of 1981 the CSADF and a reduced Defence Command Council (DCC) presented this serious situation to the Minister of Defence. The Minister ordered for a solution to be found to the CB threat against South Africa.

3.  In April 1981 Brig Basson (at that stage cmdt Basson) was sent overseas with the order to covertly collect information about the CBW capacity of various Western countries and to develop an approach that could be adopted in South Africa. He also had to make contact with organisations that could provide information about the CBW capabilities of Eastern bloc countries.

4.  After the visit a report was handed in to the Reduced DCC. A CBW philosophy was developed. It included the following elements:

a.  The CBW arena - offensive and defensive - was emotionally loaded and filled with misinterpretations and misleading interpretations.

b.  Most of the Western countries openly exhibited only relatively outlived and already known technology in their armies.

c.  All offensive research and development up to the weaponisation process, was conducted by “civil fronts”.

d.  The weaponisation process was executed in top secret defence force laboratories.

e.  The key elements of the defensive capacity, that is the nature of the activated carbon and the material compounds of key pieces of equipment had to be protected to ensure the secrecy of the nature of our own chemical weapons.

f.  A proper defensive posture by means of defensive equipment will not be efficient because of the physical limits and extra weight. An offensive capacity was needed to ensure that the enemy is forced to take on a defensive posture to level the playing field.

g.  Results on the battlefield must be obtained not by means of superior lethal weapons but by means of effective defensive equipment integrated in a sensible doctrine and a tactic that will ensure the most suitable defensive posture.

5.  During his visit cmdnt Basson attempted to procure technology and equipment but it soon became clear that the Western countries were intent on misleading the SADF and provided outdated technology.

6.  In August 1981 a feasibility study was authorised to look into the establishment of an own CBW programme and funding was made available at the end of the year by the Chief of the Defence Force for the Project(COAST).

7.  The RDCC delegated Genl N.J. Nieuwoudt to draw Armscor into discussions around the possibility of the parastatal becoming involved in the project. Genl Nieuwoudt and cmdt Basson discussed the matter with cmdt Piet Marais and mr Fred Bell of Armscor who said that it was too risky an undertaking for Armscor. It would not be possible to recruit and to maintain the scientists for the project. It was therefore decided that the project would resort solely under the Defence Force and that Armscor would be employed to undertake less sensitive tasks. Armscor had at this stage such a loaded munitions programme that it would in any case have been incapable of accepting the additional responsibilities

8.  The Minister of Defence authorised the project to go ahead under the control of a management committee (the CMC) that included the:

a.  Chief of the Defence Force,

b.  Surgeon General,

c.  Chief of Staff Finances,

d.  Chief of Staff Intelligence and

e.  other co-opted members as necessary.

9.The aim of project COAST is to 'do research + development covertly and clandestinely and to establish the production technology in the sensitive critical areas of chemical and biological warfare in order to provide the South African security forces with a CBW capability in line with the CBW philosophy and strategy.'

10.  The objectives of project COAST were the following:

a.  The establishment of facilities for basic CBW research (including specific implemented CBW research).

b.  The establishment of the necessary security coverage and security systems for the CBW facilities.

c.  The establishment of the necessary safety systems for the CBW research facilities.

d.  To conduct basic CBW research (including specific implemented research).

e.  The creation of an industrial capacity with regard to CBW (acc. to the directives of CS Plan and in co-operation with Armscor).

f.  To conduct a CBW technical information system.

g.  To conduct specific own CBW operations.

h.  To supply operational and technical/equipment support to the SADF regarding CBW operations.

i.  The efficient financial and administrative management of the project.

11.  The project is to be run in four stages:

a.  Phase 1: The establishment phase:  From April 1982 to March 1988 This phase is characterised by:

i.  The establishment of the various front companies needed to run the project.

ii.  The planning, building and implementation of the various research and production facilities.

iii.  The running of research and production programmes.

iv.  The management of the facilities and the project acc. to an expense budget.

v.  The establishment of defensive technologies in the private sector with the help of foreign co-workers.

b.  Phase 2: The Commercialisation Phase:  From March 1988 to April 1990. This phase is characterised by:

i.  Presentations to the COAST control committee with regard to the possible privatisation of the various facets.

ii.  Balance-sheet re-structuring of the front companies to create manageable commercial packages -to be completed in September 1988.

iii.  Preparation for a private commercial approach by changing to an objective oriented and contractual budget for the front companies.

iv.  Continuation of research and final identification of research objectives and agents for production according to directives issued by the State President after his briefing session on 26 March 1990.

c.  Phase 3. The Privatisation Phase:  From April 1990 to September 1991. This phase is characterised by:

i.  The continuation of research as in phase 2.

ii.  The eventual cancellation of all research contracts with the previous front companies.

iii.  The final selling of the two research /production units with the approval of the State Attorney, the Auditor General and the Ministers of Defence and Finance. This will take place on 30 August 1991.

iv. A presentation to the Parliamentary Committee investigating all sensitive State projects - in September 1991. This committee is made up of 4 ministers: du Plessis, Coetzee, Dawie de Villiers and Gerrit Viljoen. The chronology and contents of the project will be presented to them.

d.  Phase 4:The Normalisation Phase: From September 1991 to currently.

This phase is characterised by:

i.  Completion of production of two new incapacitants.

ii.  Increased emphasis on the application of knowledge and skills in the field of crowd control and mass action.

iii.  The two new chemical weapons control conventions in Geneva which will be signed by SA on 14 January 1993.

iv.  The preparation of the project and the various associated organisations for the “normalisation” of project activities.

v.  The final planning for the normalisation of the project.

THE ESTABLISHMENT PHASE

12.  During this phase the chemical leg of the project was established as a front company called Delta G Scientific (Pty) Ltd and the facility was erected in Midrand at the cost of +- R30 million. It started operating in 1985.

13.  At the same time research into all possible warfare agents as well as weaponisation options were conducted. The scientists found this field very challenging and because of the potentially lethal consequences in the case of an error, they initially only worked with irritants and eventually with incapacitants and lethal agents. All molecules were investigated, synthetised and the effects were tested on experimental animals.

16.  This facility oversees two activities:

a.  The research and development of biological agents that can be used as weapons with the emphasis on the defensive regulations against them.

b.  The toxicological research on experimental animals with all chemical agents developed at Delta G Scientific.

17.  The financial and administrative management front, Infladel (Pty) Ltd was established during this time. This company initially dealt with the technical information system and the operational co-ordination of the project, as well as the security and safety systems. These functions were eventually handed over to other fronts and private companies.

18.  Since 1986 contact has been made with a group of Belgian industrialists who showed interested in working with SA on defensive technology. A German group later became part of this co-operative development scheme and private companies like Technotek, Protechnik and Lifestyle were established.

THE COMMERCIALISATION PHASE

19.  The scientific activities of this phase continued as was planned, but it was decided that the original objective regarding the establishment of the various facilities had been achieved and that there had to be a movement away from CBW research and production as the only activity. At the same time the direct involvement of the State in these companies was entrenched.

20.  It was decided that preparations had to be made to have Delta G Scientific and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories sold off to management and staff. After several presentations the companies were divided into manageable units. The property and buildings were separated from the business units, a balance sheet re-structuring and transfer of shares was done and a loan account was created for the State. Hereafter all research and production was conducted on the basis of contracts and formal orders.

THE PRIVATISATION PHASE

21.  The initiation of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the changing threat against the SADF together with drastic budget cuts forced the management of the project to recommend the discontinuation of all research into offensive programmes in July 1991. In co-operation with the Auditor General, the State Attorney and the Ministry of Finances, a process of contractual cancellation with Delta G Scientific and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories was initiated - cancellation payments were done, debit accounts were settled and ownership of the companies was handed over to the management and staff. This took place on30 August 1991.

22.  The project activities were divided into the following categories:

a.  Defensive research.

b.  Procurement of defensive equipment.

c.  Production of offensive equipment.

d.  Operational activities.

e.  Financial and Administrative Management.

23.  Defensive research.  This program will be completed in March 1994 as was originally planned. The importance of the last few elements of a defensive system for a Conventional as well as a counter-intelligence situation is emphasised. In line with the new Chemical Weapons Convention the program is being managed relatively “openly” by the SAMS and Defence Research and Development Board (DRDC).

24.  The Procurement of defensive equipment.  This program will be completed in March 1995 and from April 1993 it will also be managed relatively “openly” by the SAMS with Armscor as the procuring agent. The SAMS acts as commodity manager for the SADF. At the recent meetings of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, the fact that the SAMS had “neutralised” the issue of CBW so to speak by taking control of research and training had created quite a stir. Most of the other defence forces use their Armies for this purpose. Quite a number of these countries indicated their interest in investigating a similar system.

25.  Operational activities.  This includes the purchase and transport of sensitive chemicals and will be completed by the end of December 1992.

26. Financial and Administrative Management.  Currently these activities (including that of security) are being managed by the last active front company of the project, i.e. D. John Truter Financial Consultants CC. As the funding is moved from the project to the “open” channels, these activities will be transferred to the new group i.e. the DRDC and Armscor. If there are no further covert activities, this front company will close its doors by the end of June 1993. If there are further covert activities, the front company will function for as long as there are funds to be administered.

27.  Offensive equipment procurement and research. In line with guidelines laid down by the State President in 1990 only irritants and incapacitants for use in conventional and counter-intelligence situations were to be developed. The agents are:

a.  New Generation Tear Gas (NGT), a derivative of CR. (Irritant)

b.  A BZ variance which is produced locally. (Incapacitant)

c.  A methaqualone derivative which is locally produced. (Incapacitant)

d.  A (Di-methylketoon-amphetamine) derivative. (Incapacitant)

28.  The BZ variance is the least problematic: We have produced 1000kg for weaponisation in 1993. The variance is however forbidden by the Chemical Weapons Convention and the report states that it will have to be destroyed or declared. It is advised that it be destroyed.

29.  The NGT is even less problematic. It is not prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention although the document states that it should be reported. We could argue that our interpretation was that it did not have to be reported. NGT can be applied as:

a.  Smoke grenades.  These systems are developed, tested and ready for application.

b.  Spraying system.  The NGT is emulsified and sprayed over the target area/persons. The system is almost ready for application - the delivery system still needs some work.

c.  Foam systems.  The NGT is dissolved in foam. The foam serves as an impenetrable barricade that impedes eyesight. This system still needs a lot of work.

30. The question arises whether the SADF should continue research and development of the NGT, considering the South African government’s approach to contentious activities. Mr Louw decided that research had to continue covertly until it is completed. It will also only be necessary to declare the NGT when the convention takes effect, which will probably only be in 1995.

31.  Incapacitants.  The SADF has developed two other incapacitants which we planned to weaponise in 1993. These agents affect the brain functions of the target persons and alter their emotions, both agents have a strong calming effect. These agents may be more effective in crowd control situations than NGT, because the incorrect application of NGT can lead to stampedes and the damaging of people and facilities (in cities). The first two agents are preferable, due to their calming effect on crowds.

32.  However, the Chemical Weapons convention does not allow these agents. They have to be declared at the convention and a destruction program has to be attached to the declaration.

33.  It must be noted that these agents have the potential to be used as drugs, because of their ability to affect brain functions and emotions. Their raw materials are internationally controlled and it is illegal to trade in them. If the development of these agents continues, we will have no choice than to obtain authority from the Minister of Law and Order to use them.

34.  In view of the above mentioned facts it is advised that these two incapacitants together with BZ be destroyed. Mr Louw gave his approval and destruction took place on 27 January 1993.

RECOMMENDATIONS

35.The following recommendations were made and accepted by Mr Louw:

a.  The continuation of the defensive projects under the control of the DRDC and Armscor.

b.  The SADF does not declare NGT and continues and completes the research and development of the liquid and foam form of the NGT. This must be done covertly to protect laboratories and producers.

c.  Development of the other two incapacitants should be halted and the raw materials as well as the existing agents should be destroyed in the presence of a member of the SAP, appointed by the Commissioner of Police, to issue a certificate of destruction.

CONTINUED CHRONOLOGY

36.  Defensive Research.  Now run as a DRDC (Defence Research and Development) program - the Medical Man Support program. The 1993/1994 budget is transferred from JOTA to the DRDC who will in turn be responsible for the future budget.

37.  Procurement. Armscor took over the procurement contracts for equipment which will be funded through the SAMS. These funds were also be transferred from JOTA to the SAMS.

38.  Research with regard to NGT. There were three sub-projects initially, of which the research into the foam application of NGT by using a water cannon was one, and the capturing of all existing data was another. This was approved by Mr Louw. During the presentation to Mr Coetzee on 30 April 1993, he ordered that application of the water cannon and the use of NGT in a foam form had to be re-investigated. The post - investigation recommendations are:

a.  to stop development of the foam form due to too many uncertainties.

b. water cannon. In the current financial year research will present a demonstration of the water cannon as well as engineer drawings of a pre-production model. If there is still a need, the SADF will be allowed to continue development. Work on the demonstration is already under way and should be completed by December 1993. We are also busy finalising the necessary specifications in co-operation with the SA Army.

These recommendations were approved by the Minister on 22 June 1993.

39.  Data capturing. All technical data is captured on computer compact discs by means of a data system that will facilitate its future use. All sensitive documents are destroyed after capturing. The process will be completed in October 1993.

40.  Privatisation. The final phase of privatisation of Delta G and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories was completed on 31 March 1993. Certificates of shares were handed over to the parties involved after they have certified that they had no more SADF documents in their possession.

41.  Financial Year 1993/93. From March 1993 the SADF was still in arrears with regard to Technotek and Delta G Scientific. This was due to the problems that were created when we the Croatian government was unable to refund us. The companies were subsequently in such a financial dilemma that they were forced to claim for settlement of debt or start court procedures. Due to this the CSF allowed the companies to be paid out.

42.  Destruction of stock. All materials were destroyed following the instruction by Mr Louw. Destruction took place on 27 January 1993 by dropping everything out of an aeroplane into the southern Atlantic Ocean. Before destruction a representative of the Department of Intelligence sub-department Counter Intelligence took samples. He certified the destruction. (Appendix B). Thereafter the samples were taken to the SAP Forensic Laboratory for analysis and certification of the contents. (Appendix C). A certificate specifying the value still has to be issued by brig Basson and the auditor. All these certificates will then be handed over to the Auditor General.

CONCLUSION

43.  Due to the fact that research will be completed on 31 March 1994, the project will also then be terminated. On January 1993 the Defence Command Council decided to start the process of termination and to close down all inactive elements. The following has already been done:

a. It is decided to close down the last existing front company, D. John Truter and the security office on 30 June 1993 and to lay off all staff except Mr Truter (financial official) and Mr Theron (security official) who will carry on individually until 31 March 1994. The company has not closed down yet because the Minister of State expenditure still has to submit his final approval. The Minister of Defence has already given his approval.

b. A committee disposal was appointed to dispose of the assets. Their task will be completed on 31 March 1994. .

44.  After the completion of the last two projects, Water cannon and Data capturing, the final conclusions will be made.

signed by:

(D.P. KNOBEL)

SURGEON GENERAL: LT GENL

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMPANIES

FRONT COMPANIES

1. Delta G Scientific.  Chemical Production and Research.

a. Established.  April 1982.

b. Facility opens in Midrand.  1985

c. Company sold to Management and Employees.  30 August 1991.

d. Last contracts completed.  March 1993.

e. Final transfer of Share certificates.  31 March 1993.

2. Roodeplaat Research Laboratories.  Biological Research and Development.

a. Established.  1 November 1982.

b. Company sold to Management and Employees.  30 August 1991

c. Final transfer of Share certificates.  31 March 1993.

3. Infladel.  This company was used for gathering of information and as a management front.

a. Established.  June 1984.

b. Closed down.  February 1990.

4. Sefmed Information Services.  Took over the function of infladel.

a. Established.  March 1990.

b. Closed down.  February 1992.

5. D. John Truter.  The Management Committee acted as financial front for funding for suppliers as well as for the other fronts.

a. Established.  1 May 1989.

b. Closed down.  Waiting for authorisation from the Minister of State Expenditure. Already authorised by Minister of Defence.

OTHER COMPANIES

6. A number of companies that were founded and are still conducting defensive research and development. However, they were never owned by the SADF.

7. Lifestyle Management.  Responsible for Physiological Research.

a. Established.  28 July 1988.

8. Protecnik Laboratories.  Responsible for research into material and equipment.

a. Established.  December 1985.

9. Technotek.  Responsible for the production of protective clothing and masks.

a. Established.  1986.

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Telephone: 6715413

Enquiries: Brig. W Basson

South African Medical Services Headquarters
Private Bag X102
Hennopsmeer
0046

7 August 1992

Dr PA Mijburgh
Medechem Technologies
265 West Street
Verwoerdburg
0157

Dear Dr Mijburgh

PRODUCTION OF d-N,a-DIMETHYLPHENETHYLAMINE (BAXIL)

Your quotation dated 30 July 1992 refers. I hereby confirm that we are placing the order for the production of 1000kg of the above-mentioned product with your facility. With regard to your request for protection and cover against prosecution I would like to inform you that we can only provide this cover in far as it concerns the supply of raw materials and the successful of delivery of the product to our project officer. Any misconduct arising during the production, as well as any unlawful delivery to other clients (either directly or indirectly through theft from the facility) will remain the full responsibility of the Board of Directors of the production facility.

Yours truly

Signed

D.P. Knobel

Surgeon-General  - Lieutenant General

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Medchem Tecnologies (Ply) Ltd.
Reg. 90/03541/07
3rd Floor (Level 4), Karree, Tulnhof265 West Street
Verwoerdburg 015779HG
Hennpsmeer 0046
Phone: (012) 663-5150
Telefax: (012) 663-5157

Brig. W Basson
South African Medical Services
Servamus Building
July 30, 1992     

Strictly Confidential

Dear Brig. Basson

Offer for the manufacture of “Baxil”

We have pleasure in submitting the following offer:

1. 1.000kg of d-N, a-dimethylphenethylamine (codename BAXIL) @ R2.800,00 per kilogram, delivered to your premises in Verwoerdburg.

2. QUALITY:
Purity                            >99.5%
Moisture Content           0.10% max
Melting Range               152-153° C

3. TIME OF DELIVERY:
Within 6-10 Weeks after receipt of 30% down payment and delivery of Raw materials, as per 7.2 below.

4. PAYMENT TERMS:
30% of total (R840.000,00) with confirmation of your order.
The balance payable within 30 days from invoice. (Part deliveries may take place)

5. PLACE OF DELIVERY:
Servamus Building, Verwoerdburgstad.

6. PACKING:
In sealed, double polypropylene bags, in 25L steel drums, 10-15 kg per drum.

7. ORDER CONDITIONS:
7.1. This offer is valid till August 15. 1992.

7.2. Raw Materials to be supplied by client.

I am looking forward to receiving your official order

Regards

Dr Philip A Mijburgh

Strictly Confidential

Directors: Dr P A Mijburgh, Mr O P van den Berg

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HSF/UG/302/6/C119DD Nov 92 (handwritten)

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Copy 1
Telephone: 671 5413
Enquiries: Brig. W Basson

SAMS Headquarters
Private Bag X 102
Hennopsmeer
0046

9 November 1992

CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT OF PRODUCTS DELIVERED: PROJECT COAST/JOTA

1. Your correspondence HSF/UG/302/6/C119 dd 24 September 1992 refers.

2. Since COAST/JOTA began in 1982 four main groups of products were delivered as follows:

a. Facilities/Buildings. Two large laboratories (Delta G and Roodeplaat) were built, equipped and manned and the running costs of these facilities were paid until the privatization began. Naturally this represents the largest part of the project funding. These buildings were taken over and the asset lists were drawn up and managed in totality. With the privatization of these facilities the full inventory was handed over to the new owners.

b. Research Reports. During the first few years of the project no products were produced. Only reports were published. With the privatization of the project the research budget of the project amounted to more or less R30million per year. This research resulted in a number of research reports that were delivered according to project schedule. Brig. Basson received these reports and he is available at the project office at the SAMS Headquarters for inspection and investigation. All scheduled reports were received. There are no outstanding reports.

c. Specialist Equipment. This project also aimed to deliver certain products to users within the South African Defence Force. In this regard two main groups of products were delivered:

(i) Covert Products. These products were delivered to the SADF for training purposes and are regarded as consumable items and were written off on delivery. These items make up less than 5% of the budget.

(ii) Conventional Products. These products were delivered and used during the 1987/1989 Angolan war. The last of these products that were used mainly in New Generation Tear Gas mortars were destroyed in 1991 after they were retrieved from the operational area.

d. Conventional Defensive Equipment. All conventional defensive equipment that were to be delivered according to the Technotek contracts were received by the SAMS at MBKD. All receipts were inspected and found to be in order. This stock will now, as part of the affirmative action at MBKD, be incorporated in SAMS stock. This process should be completed by the end of March 1993. The SAMS acts as commodity manager to the Defence Force with regard to defensive CBW equipment. Equipment is issued to other users. Repairs and maintenance of this equipment is carried out by the SAMS.  Proof of issue with regard to goods issued to other parts of the military are available at MBKD.

3. The following specialist chemicals to be developed for certain projects during the 1993/4 financial year are currently in stock at the SAMS:

a.         1000kg product B

b.         500kg product M

c.         30 kg product C

4. If there are any other specific questions with regard to the delivery or receipt of certain aspects of COAST we will gladly assist.

Signed

DP Knobel
Surgeon General, Lt Gen
WB/NS
DISTR

For Action
Chief of Staff Finances (Personally)
Internal
File GG/UG/302/6/J1281

Copy No 1

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Copy Number 1 of 2

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AI/UG/302/6/C123-2

Department of Intelligence
Private Bag X367
Pretoria

30 March 1993
Telephone: 3150063

Enquiries: Cmdt JG De Bruyn

CERTIFICATION WITH REGARD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL PRODUCTS ON 27 JANUARY

1. Herewith I, 76153865 PE Cmdt J.G. De Bruyn, certify that the below-mentioned cargo of Project JOTA was dumped into the sea by Brig W. Basson other Project members and two 28 Squadron (South African Airforce) in my presence on 27 January 1993.

2.The cargo contained the following items:

a.         18 Blue plastic drums (weight 50 kg, contents 100 litres product M)

b.         73 white metal drums (weight 12,5 kg, contents 20 litres, product BX)

c.         2 white metal drums (weights 12,5kg, contents 20 litres, product C)

d.         2 small white plastic containers (weight ± 500, contents ± 1 litre, product P)

e.         2 small white metal drums (weight ± 6kg, contents ±12 litres, Product C)

f.          11 green metal drums (weight 80kg, contents 200 litres, Product B)

g.         4 paper drums (weights 50kg, contents ±200 litres, 2 containing Product M and 2 containing Product B)

h.         2 cardboard boxes, air supply-type containing 60mm and 81mm mortars respectively.

3. The contents of the cargo was supplied by Brig. W Basson on 30 March 1993. The issue of whether the contents of the cargo should be verified or not was discussed with Gen Maj Verbeeck and it was decided that it was not necessary to do spot checks on the basis that it would attract too much attention during the analysis of these products. However, when Brig. Basson arrived at 28 Squadron on 27 January 1993 he insisted that samples be taken of the blue plastic drums. The sample was taken from the 4 blue plastic drums and is currently in my possession. On 30 March 1993 Brig. Basson handed over 3 more samples (1 each of products B, C and BX) which are currently in my possession.

3. A decision needs to be taken with regard to what needs to be done regarding the samples.

Signed
JG De Bruyn

76153865 PE-Commandant

Remarks: (in handwriting). The three samples were handed over to Cmdt De Bryun at a later stage after they were deactivated. The samples were taken on the day of their destruction.

Signed
W. Basson

Project Officer: JOTA, Brig

Distribution
For Action
Surgeon General – Exclusive
Internal
AI/UG/302/6/123-2

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AFFIDAVIT

HEINRICH FREDERICK STRAUSS declares under oath, in terms of sub-articles 212/4(a) and 8(a) of Act 51/77 as follows:

1. I am a Brigadier in the South African Police at the Forensic Laboratory, in the service of the Republic of South Africa.

2. I have a BSc -degree from the University of Pretoria with Chemistry and Physics as majors, as well as an MSc-degree in Organic Chemistry and a DSc-degree in Chemistry from the University of Pretoria. I was trained by the SA Banknote company (Pty) Ltd to identify South African Reserve banknotes. I am a member of the South-African Chemical Institute, an associate member of the South African Institute for Arts and Science and I am a registered natural scientist in terms of article 18 of the Natural Scientists Act of 1982. I have 21 years’ experience in analytical chemistry.

3. During my period of service I received the following sealed samples from Col Steyn on 3 May 1993:

3.1  A container marked “Product B”;

3.2  A container marked “Product BX”;

3.3  A container marked “Product CA” and

3.4  A container with no identifying marks.

4. During my period of service I analysed the samples and identified the contents of each container as listed here:

4.1  “Product B” is (1-metiel-3-piperidielbensilaat);

4.2  “Product BX” is (3,4-metileendiosimetamfetamienhidrochloried);

4.3  “Product C” is cocaine-hydrochloride and

4.4  the fourth sample was methaqualone.

5. During my period of service I safeguarded the above-mentioned samples from 1993-05-03 to 1993-06-09.

6. I know the contents of the above declaration and I understand it.

I do not object to the declaration of the prescribed oath.

I regard the prescribed oath as binding on my conscience.

signed by:
H F STRAUS: BRIGADIER

I certify that the above statement was taken by me and that the deponent has acknowledged that he knows and understands the contents of this statement. The statement was sworn to before me and the deponents signature was placed thereon in my presence at PRETORIA on 09 June 1993.

Signature of:

COMMISSIONER OF OATHS

PHILLIPUS RUDOLPH BAREND DANIEL DE BRUIN

Forensic science laboratory
L P Neethling building
Pretoria road
SILVERTON 0184

BRIGADIER: SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

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AFFIDAVIT

HEINRICH FREDERICK STRAUSS declares under oath, in terms of sub-sections 212/4(a) and 8(a) of Act 51/77 as follows:

1. I am a Brigadier in the South African Police at the Forensic Laboratory, in the service of the Republic of South Africa.

2. I have a BSc -degree from the University of Pretoria with Chemistry and Physics as majors, as well as an MSc-degree in Organic Chemistry and a DSc-degree in Chemistry from the University of Pretoria. I was trained by the SA Banknote company (Pty) Ltd                        to identify South African Reserve banknotes. I am a member of the South-African Chemical Institute, an associate member of the South African Institute for Arts and Science and I am a registered natural scientist in terms of article 18 of the Natural Scientists Act of 1982. I have 21 years’ experience in analytical chemistry.

3. Adding to my affidavit on 1993-06-09 I would like to correct a typing error in 4.1:” “Product B” is 1-methyl-4-p.bensilate” and not ” “Product B” is 1-methyl-3-p bensilate”.

4. I know the contents of the above declaration and I understand it.

I do not object to the declaration of the prescribed oath.

I regard the prescribed oath as binding on my conscience.

signed by:
H F STRAUS: BRIGADIER

I certify that the above statement was taken by me and that the deponent has acknowledged that he knows and understands the contents of this statement. The statement was sworn to before me and deponents signature was placed thereon in my presence at PRETORIA on 09 June 1993.

Signature of:

COMMISSIONER OF OATHS

PHILLIPUS RUDOLPH BAREND DANIEL DE BRUIN

Forensic science laboratory
L P Neethling building
Pretoria road
SILVERTON 0184

BRIGADIER: SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

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Office of the Attorney General
Republic of South Africa

A:\57\brief174.wpd\sp

The Commanding Officer
Airforce Headquarters
Private Bag X199
Pretoria 0001         

Office of the Special Investigation Team
Attorney-General: Transvaal
PO Box
40451Arcadia
0007

12 May 1997

For Attention: Lt Gen Hechter

INFORMATION AND STATEMENTS REQUESTED: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE INVESTIGATION: Dr D’OLIVEIRA SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM: QUERY NUMBER 276/96

1. During the investigation of Dr Wouter Basson it was discovered that certain chemicals were allegedly thrown in the sea during a flight of the 28 Squadron South African Air Force, Pretoria, on 27 January 1993.

2. Through investigation it was determined that all flights were scheduled with Transfers. [Transfer Division of the Air Force]

3. There was however a flight, H38L which was tasked on 28 January 1993 for Search-Rescue and Training, tasked WaterkloofXWaterkloof. It appears that the flight flew over the sea.

4. It is of significance that the flight plan of the flight which was used by Brig Basson in the relevant time span, is made available in terms of:

(a)        the name of the navigator;
(b)        the name of the pilot;
(c)        list of all the passengers aboard the aircraft;
(d)        what type of aircraft was used for the flight;
(e)        the grid-reference where the aircraft’s destnation [intersection of longitude and latitude];
(f)         the contents of the cargo.

5. Statements are necessary from the people involved in the interests of justice.

Signed
Dr JP Pretorius
Deputy/ Attorney-General
Transvaal

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Dr. J.P. Pretorius (Deputy Attorney General)
Office of the Special Investigating Team
Attorney-General: Transvaal
P.O. Box 40451
ARCADIA
0007

27 May 1997

Dear Dr. Pretorius

REQUIRED INFORMATION AND STATEMENTS: CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL WARFARE INVESTIGATION: DR. D'OLIVIERA SPECIAL INVESTIGATING TEAM: QUERY NUMBER 276/96

1. Your letter 276/96 dated 12 May 1997 refers.

2. The mentioned flight was logged and applied as a search-and-rescue-training flight.

3. Here are the details as requested in para 4 of your letter:

a.  The name of the navigator.  The navigator of the flight was commandant D.J. Rouse.

b.  The name of the pilot.  The Commander of the flight was major R.O. Ischner.

c.  List of passengers.  We could unfortunately not trace a list of passengers and the 4 or 5 passengers who were on board were not known to the crew.

d.  What type of plane was used.  The plane that was used is a C130 Hercules cargo plane.

e.  The co-ordinates of the flight.  Due to it being a training flight it is not possible to determine the co-ordinates, that is, exactly where the cargo was disposed of. As far as it is possible to determine - south of the Agulhas Plato, +- 150sm from the coast, south of Agulhas.

f.  The contents of the cargo.  The crew did not know the nature of the contents, they were however assured of its safety. The cargo apparently consisted of 20 blue plastic drums. During the flight the contents of the drums (plastic bags filled with some kind of matter) were loaded onto small wooden pallets and were rolled out of the plane.

Yours sincerely

signed by:
(W.H. HECHTER)
CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE

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Only Copy

GG/UG/302/6/J1282

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS WITH REGARD TO CROATIAN TRANSACTIONS

1. Since 1981 the aim of Project COAST (now JOTA) has been to clandestinely and covertly conduct research and development and to establish the production technology in the sensitive critical areas of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) in order to equip the SA security forces with a CBW capacity according to the CBW philosophy and strategy.

2. As a result various research and production processes were launched and completed. Contact was made with several official and unofficial suppliers of controlled technology and products.

3. Initially products and weapons that included all three categories of agents were produced, namely irritants, incapacitants and lethal agents.

4. On 26 March 1990 the State President issued a directive for the production of irritants and incapacitants only. Research of lethal weapons was only to be conducted in so far as it was necessary to develop a defensive capacity.

5. On 25 October 1990 the Defence Command Council re-evaluated the program and decided that three types of incapacitants and one type of irritant will be developed in future, and that counter-intelligence and conventional weapons (of different formats) will be produced by using these three agents. This includes all phases leading to the first production - i.e. including FOM (first production model/s), and PPM (pre-production model/s).

6. The program was re-scheduled to be completed by the end of the 1993/94 financial year.

7. However, on 30 October 1992 the Management Committee raised the following two important issues:

a.  The impending new chemical weapons control agreement could negatively impact on our local as well as international activities.

b.  The ever increasingly strict control measures in Europe with regard to the movement and supply of raw materials for the production of weapons of mass destruction would complicate the 1993 procurement activities.

8. It was decided that all procurement activities with regard to the offensive project and those dependent on foreign involvement, would be accelerated and, where possible, completed before the end of` 1992. In February 1993 authorisation was given for the transfer of R6.6 million from the 1993/4 budget to the 1992/93 budget to comply with the adapted project schedule.

9. At this stage the project officer (brig W. Basson) had already negotiated with a Croatian group of people concerning the procurement of certain raw materials that were needed for the weapons project.

10. It is a well-known fact that, during the regime of the old USSR, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were the two most important countries with regard to research and production of chemical weapons.

11. After the fall of the Communist regime in the old USSR several state departments and officials started selling equipment illegally in the market due to lack of funding and fear of the future.

12. The equipment they sold was expensive and the kind of equipment that was not easily obtained.

13. After the project officer visited Moscow in February 1991, he was introduced to a group of people who were involved in the field of chemical warfare, inter alia a group in Croatia.

14. Due to the acceleration of the project and the budget cuts it became impossible to produce all chemical products locally. It was therefore necessary to find these sources outside the RSA.

15. Already in September 1992, negotiations were held with a group of Croatians in Zagreb in order to obtain a specific substance M which would be developed in SA. The leader of the Croatian group was the Minister of Energy Affairs, Mr M. Kajfeg. The rest of the delegation consisted of representatives of the Croatian Army, the Croatian border guard, the security police (KOS) and the Special Forces Unit (HOS).

16. An agreement was made that 500 kg of substance M would be made available to the project officer on the following conditions:

a.  The project officer would sample the substance, thereafter the containers would be sealed.

b.  The project officer would do an analysis of the substance in a laboratory in Switzerland.

c.  If the analysis proved to be satisfactory, a final price would be determined (according to the quality of the substance). The estimated amount was to be between US Dollar 4600,00 per kg and 5400,00 per kg.

d.  Delivery would be made either by plane from Zagreb (organised by the project officer) or by road from a safe area on the Austrian-Slovenian border.

17. The conditions of payment were a problem. The four parties involved did apparently not trust each other and were not satisfied with a single payment without any guarantees. No official conditions could be used e.g. credit statements etc. due to the nature of the substance dealt with.

18. Arrangements were made for a deposit to be paid into an account at Banque Indosuez in Geneva to serve as guarantee for all four parties. After the successful delivery and payment each party involved would accompany the project officer to Geneva to cancel its specific guarantee. Every party would be paid by an agent who was planted in Zagreb and approved by everyone. This agent was to receive the global amount.

19. The samples were of a good quality and the project officer - because of the closing of the Zagreb airport - received the goods in Austria. (He accompanied the convoy from Zagreb to the Croatian depot).

20. The transfer of funds to the agent -Capt Jurg Jacomet, from the Swiss Intelligence Service - took place on 6 November 1992. It was directly paid into an account at the Zagrebacka Banka dd in Zagreb, Croatia from an account held by D. John Truter in Zurich - a total amount of 2 300 000,00 USA Dollar.

21. This agent was responsible for the transfer of funds to the parties involved.

22. Two parties received their money, their respective guarantees at the Geneva Bank were cancelled and the money was sent back to the RSA in December 1992 - an amount of USA Dollar 400 000,00 and USA Dollar 390 000,00 respectively.

23. At this stage the project officer lost contact with the Croatians as well as with Capt Jacomet. Attempts made by him to find them failed and during a visit to Zagreb in January 1993 he was told that the involved parties were dealing with problems of war. Due to the relatively chaotic situation in this area at the time, the fact that they could not be reached did not attract any suspicion.

24. In February it became clear that Capt Jacomet and the government official involved, Minister Kafjeg were arrested due to a number of fraudulent transactions. The purchase/sale of Substance M had nothing to do with this - it seems as if he embezzled other money.

25. It was requested that the project officer return to Europe to seek a solution to the problem.

26. From conversations with Jacomet, who was released in the interim, officials from the Department of Internal Affairs and the Banker in Zagreb, it was determined that the Croatian government had temporarily frozen his account until they have completed an investigation into the parties involved. The project officer was assured that the problem would be solved by the end of March 1993.

27. Throughout this time Capt Jacomet informed the project officer of the satisfactory progress of the situation.

28. When, by the end of March there was still no solution to the problem, the CMC decided to send the project officer to Europe one more time in order to find a solution. During his first visit, from 7 April 1993 to 7 May 1993, he negotiated with several Croatian government officials and representatives.

29. A follow-up visit took place from 11 May 1993 to 14 May 1993. During this visit the project officer (Basson) became involved with a Danish Intelligence agent who assisted him in obtaining documents with the value of USA Dollar 40 million USA Dollar. These were “bearer bonds” that were given to the Croatian government by the Vatican for the purchase of weapons (non-traceable funding) and were intercepted by the Danish agent and the project officer.

30. The agent involved was notified that the project officer was in possession of the bonds and that he wanted to exchange them for the cancellation of the outstanding guarantee of 1 600 000,00 USA Dollar.

31. Further negotiations took place and as a result the project officer was invited to discuss the matter with KOS officials in Zagreb. This discussion took place from 26 June to 28 June in Zagreb.

32. A letter of authorisation was given to the project officer that allowed him possession rights to the bonds with a value of 5 million USA Dollars. These documents could be traded or sold to generate money to settle the outstanding amounts, to cancel the deposit and to return the funds to the RSA.

33. On 28 June the project officer presented the bonds - in Jacomet’s name - to the Anlage-und-Kreditbank in Zurich for payment.

34. However, the Croatians had already reported the whole situation to the Zurich Police who held the project officer for questioning until the afternoon of 30 June after which he was released.

35. The Zurich Police is currently investigating the matter and the project officer has made himself available to return to Zurich for further questioning.

36. During the above-mentioned investigation and questioning the project officer became pressurised to pay back the outstanding amount to the parties involved. He did this by using the money from the recoverable deposit. He was released on the grounds of a document in his possession which specified that he acted on the command and under the authorisation of Capt Jacomet. Capt Jacomet was questioned again and he was released after the Swiss Intelligence Service intervened on his behalf.

37. After the project officer’s return on Friday 2 July, he remained in bed for the weekend due to exhaustion and reported the matter on Monday 5 July.

38. The following pertinent points are important:

a. During a briefing to the Minister of Defence on 2 January 1993, authorisation was given for all incapacitants (including pre-production agents) and similar weapons to be destroyed.

b. These substances were destroyed and a certificate of destruction was issued (dated 30 March 1993).

c. The technology was stored to be used again if necessary.

39. On 30 April 1993 the new Minister of Defence was briefed about the project. He authorised a re-evaluation of the research into the water and foam form of NGT. Copies of the prescribed documents to Mr E. Louw and the Confirmatory Notes were handed to him.

40. On 14 May 1993 a reduced Defence Command Council informed the Chief of the SADF that the project officer was still overseas trying to get the recoverable deposits back into the country. At that stage they were again reassured that the problem would soon be solved.

41. On 22 June 1993 the recommended retrenchment packages for the staff of D. John Truter Financial Consultants CC were presented by the CSADF, SG and CSF. The SG also recommended the continued development of the water cannon and the liquid form of NGT, but that the development of the foam form had to be discontinued. This was approved by the Minister of Defence.

Return to Table of Contents

TOP SECRET

Handwritten note: Purpose: To separate the investigation into the person of Brig Basson from the project activities in order to maintain security and to give him the opportunity to personally provide answers

Telephone: 663 2901
GG/UG/302/6/J282/5

SAMS Headquarters
Private Bag X102
Hennopsmeer
0046

24 September 1993

REPORT ABOUT THE BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATUS OF PROJECT COAST/JOTA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE POSITION OF BRIG. W. BASSON.

Appendix A: Chronology

Appendix B: Destruction Certificate

Appendix C: Statement from the Commanding Officer SAP Forensic Laboratories

PRESENTATION TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE REGARDING THE CHRONOLOGY AND CURRENT STATUS OF PROJECTS COAST AND JOTA IN PRETORIA ON 10/8/93

INTRODUCTION

1.  At the end of the 1970 ’s it was clear to the military intelligence community that the increased presence of Russian and Cuban surrogate troops in Angola (and also in the rest of Southern Africa), together with their advanced weapon technology posed a definite conventional military threat to SA. This was especially clear with regard to their capacity to use chemical weapons. In the early eighties the RSA and the SADF had no offensive and/or defensive chemical warfare capacity. It was therefore theoretically possible for these troops to attack South Africa through Namibia leaving the SADF incapable of defending itself against their chemical weapons.

2.  In the beginning of 1981 the Chief of the SADF and a reduced Defence Command Council presented this serious situation to the Minister of Defence. The Minister instructed that a solution be found to the CB threat against South Africa.

3.  In April 1981 Brig Basson (at that stage cmdt Basson) was sent overseas with the order to covertly collect information about the CBW capacity of various Western countries and to develop an approach that could be adopted in South Africa. He was also instructed to make contact with organisations that could provide information about the CBW capabilities of Eastern bloc countries.

4.  After the visit a report was handed in to the Reduced Defence Command Council. A CBW philosophy was developed. It included the following elements:

a.  The CBW arena - offensive and defensive - was emotionally loaded and filled with misinterpretations and misleading interpretations.

b.  Most of the Western countries’ armies openly exhibited only relatively outlived and already known technology.

c.  All offensive research and development up to the process of weaponisation, was conducted by “civil fronts”.

d.  The weaponisation process was executed in top secret defence force laboratories.

e.  The key elements of the defensive capacity, that is the nature of the activated carbon and the material compounds of key pieces of equipment had to be protected to ensure the secrecy of the nature of our own chemical weapons.

f.  A proper defensive posture by means of defensive equipment will not be efficient because of the physical limits and extra weight. An offensive capacity was needed to ensure that the enemy is forced to take on a defensive posture to level the playing field.

g.  Results on the battlefield must be obtained not by means of superior lethal weapons but by means of effective defensive equipment integrated in a sensible doctrine and a tactic that will ensure the most suitable defensive posture.

5.  During his visit cmdnt Basson attempted to procure technology and equipment but it soon became clear that the Western countries were intent on misleading the SADF and provided outdated technology.

6.  In August 1981 a feasibility study was authorised to look into the establishment of an own CBW programme and funding was made available at the end of the year by the Chief of the Defence Force for the Project(COAST).

7.  The RDCC delegated Genl N.J. Nieuwoudt to draw Armscor into discussions around the possibility of the parastatal becoming involved in the project. Genl Nieuwoudt and cmdt Basson discussed the matter with cmdt Piet Marais and mr Fred Bell of Armscor who said that it was too risky an undertaking for Armscor. It would not be possible to recruit and to maintain the scientists for the project. It was therefore decided that the project would resort solely under the Defence Force and that Armscor would be employed to undertake less sensitive tasks. In addition to this, Armscor had at this stage such a loaded munitions programme that it would have been incapable of accepting the additional responsibilities.

8.  The Minister of Defence authorised the project to go ahead under the control of a management committee (the CMC) that included the:

a.  Chief of the Defence Force,

b.  Surgeon General,

c.  Chief of Staff Finances,

d.  Chief of Staff Intelligence and

e.  other co-opted members as necessary.   (handwritten):   (Chief Army ....Special Forces  Chief of Staff Army)

9. The aim of project COAST was as follows:

The aim of project COAST is to 'do research + development covertly and clandestinely and to establish the production technology in the sensitive critical areas of chemical and biological warfare in order to provide the South African security forces with a CBW capability in line with the CBW philosophy and strategy.'

10.  The objectives of project COAST were the following:

a.  The establishment of facilities for basic CBW research (including specific implemented CBW research).

b.  The establishment of the necessary security coverage and security systems for the CBW facilities.

c.  The establishment of the necessary safety systems for the CBW research facilities.

d.  To conduct basic CBW research (including specific implemented research).

e.  The creation of an industrial capacity with regard to CBW (in accordance with the directives of CS Plan and in co-operation with Armscor).

f.  To conduct a CBW technical information system.

g.  To conduct specific own CBW operations.

h.  To supply operational and technical/equipment support to the SADF regarding CBW operations.

i.  The efficient financial and administrative management of the project.

11.  The project is to be run in four stages:

a.  Phase 1: The establishment phase:  From April 1982 to March 1988 This phase is characterised by:

i.  The establishment of the various front companies needed to run the project.

ii.  The planning, building and implementation of the various research and production facilities.

iii.  The running of research and production programmes.

iv.  The management of the facilities and the project acc. to an expense budget.

v.  The establishment of defensive technologies in the private sector with the help of foreign co-workers.

b.  Phase 2: The Commercialisation Phase:  From March 1988 to April 1990. This phase is characterised by:

i.  Presentations to the COAST control committee with regard to the possible privatisation of the various facets.

ii.  Balance-sheet re-structuring of the front companies to create manageable commercial packages -to be completed in September 1988.

iii.  Preparation for a private commercial approach by changing to an objective oriented and contractual budget for the front companies.

iv.  Continuation of research and final identification of research objectives and agents for production acc. to directives issued by the State President after his briefing session on 26 March 1990.

c.  Phase 3. The Privatisation Phase:  From April 1990 to September 1991. This phase is characterised by:

i.  The continuation of research as in phase 2.

ii.  The eventual cancellation of all research contracts with the previous front companies.

iii.  The final selling of the two research and production units with the approval of the State Attorney, the Auditor General and the Ministers of Defence and Finance. This will take place on 30 August 1991.

iv. A presentation to the Parliamentary Commitee that investigates all sensitive State projects - in September 1991. This committee is made up of 4 ministers: du Plessis, Coetzee, Dawie de Villiers and Gerrit Viljoen. The chronology and contents of the project will be presented to them.

d.  Phase 4:The Normalisation Phase: From September 1991 to currently.

This phase is characterised by:

i.  Completion of production of two new incapacitants.

ii.  Increased emphasis on the application of knowledge and skills in the field of crowd control and mass action.

iii.  The two new chemical weapon control conventions at Geneva which will be signed by SA on 14 January 1993.

iv.  The preparation of the project and the various associated organisations for the “normalisation” of project actions.

v.  The final planning of the normalisation of the project.

THE ESTABLISHMENT PHASE

12.  During this phase the chemical branch of the project was established as a front company called Delta G Scientific (Pty) Ltd and the facility was erected in Midrand at the cost of +- R30 million. It started operating in 1985.

13.  At the same time research into all possible warfare agents as well as weaponisation options were conducted. The scientists found this field to be very challenging and because of the potentially lethal consequences in the case of an error, they initially only worked with irritants and eventually with incapacitants and lethal agents. All molecules were investigated, synthetised and the effects were tested on experimental animals.

16.  This facility oversees two activities:

a.  The research and development of biological agents that can be used as weapons with the emphasis on the defensive regulations against them.

b.  The toxicological research on experimental animals with all chemical agents developed at Delta G Scientific.

17.  The financial and administrative management front, Infladel (Pty) Ltd was established during this time. This company initially dealt with the technical information system and the operational co-ordination of the project, as well as the security and safety systems. These functions were eventually handed over to other fronts and private companies.

18.  Since 1986 contact has been made with a group of Belgian industrialists who showed interested in working with SA on defensive technology. A German group later became part of this co-operative development scheme and private companies like Technotek, Protechnik and Lifestyle were established.

THE COMMERCIALISATION PHASE    handwritten note:(New SG 1 March 88)

19.  The scientific activities of this phase continued as was planned, but it was decided that the original objective regarding the establishment of the various facilities had been achieved and that there had to be a movement away from CBW research and production as only activity. At the same time the direct involvement of the State in these companies was entrenched.

20.  It was decided that preparations had to be made to have Delta G Scientific and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories sold off to management and staff. After several presentations the companies were divided into manageable units. The property and buildings were separated from the business units, a balance sheet re-structuring and transfer of shares was done and a loan account was created for the State. Hereafter all research and production was conducted on a contractual basis and formal orders.

THE PRIVATISATION PHASE  handwritten note: (New SP 26 March 90)

21.  The initiation of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the changing threat against the SADF together with drastic budget cuts forced the management of the project to recommend the discontinuation of all research into offensive programmes in July 1991. In co-operation with the Attorney General, the State Attorney and the Ministry of Finances, a process of contractual cancellation with Delta G Scientific and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories was initiated - cancellation payments were done, debit accounts were settled and ownership of the companies was handed over to the management and staff. This took place on30 August 1991.

22.  The project activities were divided into the following categories:

a.  Defensive research.

b.  Procurement of defensive equipment.

c.  Production of offensive equipment.

d.  Operational activities.

e.  Financial and Administrative Management.

23.  Defensive research.  This program will be completed in March 1994 as was originally planned. The importance of the last few elements of a defensive system for a Conventional as well as counter intelligence situation is emphasised. In line with the new Chemical Weapons Convention the program is being managed relatively “openly” by the SAMS and Defence Research and Development Board (DRDC).

24.  The Procurement of defensive equipment.  This program will be completed in March 1995 and from April 1993 it will also be managed relatively “openly” by the SAMS with Armscor as the procuring agent. The SAMS acts as commodity manager for the SADF. At the recent meetings of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, the fact that the SAMS had “neutralised” the issue of CBW so to speak by taking control of research and training had created quite a stir. Most of the other defence forces use their Armies for this purpose. Quite a number of these countries indicated their interest in investigating a similar system.

25.  Operational activities.  This includes the purchase and transport of sensitive chemicals and will be completed by the end of December 1992.

26. Financial and Administrative Management.  Currently these activities (including that of security) are being managed by the last active front company of the project, i.e. D. John Truter Financial Consultants CC. As the funding is moved from the project to the “open” channels, these activities will be transferred to the new group i.e. the Defence Research and Development Council (DRDC) and Armscor. If there are no further covert activities this front company will close its doors by the end of June 1993. If there are further covert activities, the front company will function for as long as there are funds to be administered.

27.  Offensive equipment procurement and research. In line with guidelines laid down by the State President in 1990, only research and production of irritants and incapacitants for use in conventional and counter-intelligence situations was done. The agents are:

a.  New Generation Tear Gas (NGT), a derivative of CR. (Irritant)

b.  A BZ variance which is produced locally. (Incapacitant)

c.  A methaqualone derivative which is locally produced. (Incapacitant)

28.  The BZ variance is the least problematic: we have produced 1000kg for weaponisation in 1993. The variance is however forbidden by the Chemical Weapons Convention and the report states that it will have to be destroyed or declared. It is advised that it be destroyed.

29.  The NGT is even less problematic. It is not prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention although the document states that it should be reported. We could argue that our interpretation was that it did not have to be reported. NGT can be applied as:

a.  Smoke grenades.  These systems are developed, tested and ready for application.

b.  Spraying system.  The NGT is emulsified and sprayed over the target area/persons. The system is almost ready for application - the delivery system still needs some work.

c.  Foam systems.  The NGT is dissolved in foam. The foam serves as an impenetrable barrier that impedes eyesight. This system still needs a lot of work.

30. The question is raised whether the SADF should continue research and development of the NGT, considering the South African government’s approach to contentious activities. Mr Louw decided that research should continue covertly until it is completed. It will also only be necessary to declare the NGT when the convention takes effect, which will probably only be in 1995.

31.  Methaqualone.  As was already mentioned, besides BZ the SADF also developed a methaqualone derivative which was to be weaponised in 1993. These agents affect the brain functions of the target persons and alter their emotions, both agents have a strong calming effect. These agents may be more effective in crowd control situations than NGT, because the incorrect application of NGT can lead to stampedes and the damaging of people and facilities (in cities). The first two agents will be preferable, due to their calming effect on crowds.

32.  However, the Chemical Weapons convention does not allow these agents. They have to be declared at the convention and a program of destruction must be attached to the declaration.

33.  It must be mentioned that these agents have the potential to be used as drugs because of their ability to affect brain functions and emotions. Their raw materials are internationally controlled and it is illegal to trade in them. If these agents are developed, we will have to obtain authority from the Minister of Law and Order to use them.

handwritten note:( earlier situation-Genl Coetzee, Genl de Wit-Min Vlok)

34.  In view of the above-mentioned facts, it is advised that these two incapacitants together with BZ be destroyed. Mr Louw gave his approval and destruction took place on 27 January 1993 (see later).

35.  On 7 January 1993 Mr Louw approved the following recommendations:

a.  The continuation of the defensive projects under the control of the DRDC and Armscor.

b.  The SADF does not declare NGT and continues and completes the research and development of the liquid and foam form of the NGT. This must be done covertly to protect laboratories and producers.

c.  Development of the other two incapacitants should be discontinued and the raw materials as well as the existing agents should be destroyed in the presence of a member of the SAP, appointed by the Commissioner of Police, to issue a certificate of destruction.

d.  All technical and scientific documentation regarding the project must be saved on optical disc and safekept for re-activation if it becomes necessary.

36.  On 30 April 1993 the Minister of Defence, Minister Coetzee, was thoroughly briefed about the status of the project as well as about Minister Louw’s decisions.

CONTINUED CHRONOLOGY

37.  Defensive Research.  Now run as a DRDC program - the Medical Man Support program. The 1993/1994 budget is transferred from JOTA to the DRDC, who will be responsible for the future budget.

38.  Procurement. Armscor took over the procurement contracts for equipment which will be funded through the SAMS. These funds were also transferred from JOTA to the SAMS.

39.  Research with regard to NGT. There were three sub-projects initially, two of which were conducting research into the use of NGT as a foam in a water cannon, as well as the capturing of all existing data. This was approved by Mr Louw. During the presentation to Mr Coetzee on 30 April 1993, he instructed that the water cannon and the use of NGT as a foam had to be re-investigated. The recommendations are as follows:

a.  to stop development of the foam due to too many uncertainties.

b. water cannon. During the current financial year, researchers will deliver a demonstration of the water cannon as well as engineer drawings of a pre-production model. If the demand is still there, the SADF will be allowed to continue development. Work on the demonstration is already under way and should be completed by December 1993. We are also busy finalising the necessary specifications in co-operation with the SA Army.

These recommendations were approved by the Minister on 22 June 1993.

40.  Data capturing. All technical data is captured on computer compact discs by means of a data system that will facilitate its future use. All sensitive documents are destroyed after capturing. The process will be completed in October 1993.

41.  Privatisation. The final phase of the privatisation process of Delta G and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories was completed on 31 March 1993. Certificates of shares were handed over to the parties involved after they have certified that they had no more SADF documents in their possession.

42.  Financial Year 1992/93. From March 1993 the SADF was still in arrears with regard to Technotek and Delta G Scientific. This was due to the problems created when it became clear that the Croatian government was unable to refund us. The companies were in such a financial dilemma that they were forced to claim for settlement of debt or start court procedures. Due to this the CSF allowed the companies to be paid out.

handwritten note: (Efforts are still being made to recover the money)

43.  Destruction of stock. All materials were destroyed following the order of Mr Louw. Destruction took place on 27 January 1993 by dropping everything out of an aeroplane into the southern Atlantic Ocean. Before the destruction a representative of the Department of Intelligence sub-department Counter Intelligence took samples. He certified the destruction. (Appendix B). Hereafter the samples were taken to the SAP Forensic Laboratory for analysis and certification of the contents. (Appendix C). A certificate specifying the value still has to be issued by brig Basson and the auditor. All these certificates will then be handed over to the Auditor General.

CONCLUSION

44.  Due to the fact that the research will be completed on 31 March 1994, the project will also then be terminated. On January 1993 the Defence Command Council decided to start the process of termination and to close down all inactive elements. The following has already been completed:

a. It is decided to close down the last existing front company, D. John Truter and the security office on 30 June 1993 and to lay off all staff except Mr Truter (financial official) and Mr Theron (security official) who will carry on individually until 31 March 1994. The closing has not been implemented yet because the Minister of State expenditure still has to submit his final approval. The Minister of Defence has already given his approval.

b. A committee of disposal was appointed to dispose of the company assets. Their task will be completed on 31 March 1994. .

45.  After the completion of the last two projects, Water cannon and Data capturing, the final conclusion will be made.

THE POSITION OF BRIG W. BASSON

46.  Brig Basson was appointed to the SADF on 2 January 1975 as a medical officer with the rank of Lt. He became the MO at 1 Military Hospital from 2 January 1975 to 28 February 1981. During this time he completed several post-degree courses and had advanced to the professional rank of 1st specialist (internal medicine) in 1980. His military rank at this stage was that of full commandant. From 1 March 1981 he was the special advisor and project officer of special projects to the Surgeon General at the SAMS headquarters and was assigned to Special Forces headquarters under Operational Command of BG Special forces of the SADF. On 1 January 1985 he was appointed to full colonel and Commanding officer of a newly found unit at the SAMS, 7 Medical Battalion group, to provide medical support to Special forces, Special Tasks and 44 Parachute brigade of the SADF as well as to the Security branch of the SAP and NID. During this period he completed several qualifying military courses and was promoted to the military rank of brigadier and Head of Medical Staff Operations at the SA Medical Services headquarters on 1 January 1988. He fulfilled this function for nine months after which time he was appointed by me to Director of Research and Development at the SA Medical Services remaining responsible for special projects at the SAMS.

Following an order by the State President during December 1992 Basson was placed on compulsory leave from January 1993 and on pension from 31 March 1993.

INVOLVEMENT IN PROJECT COAST/JOTA

47.  Brig Basson was from the beginning responsible for the planning, the design, the budget and the running of project COAST/JOTA.

48.  As project officer he was informed about, and in control of all activities on ground level. Due to the sensitive nature of the research carried out and the high level of security, he often had to make use of unorthodox methods and he personally had to see to the carrying out of policies and orders from the Co-ordinating Management Committee (CMC).

49. The CMC was the control body of project COAST and determined the strategic direction of the project. Policy decisions about the type of activities and products that had to be delivered were taken and this was done in view of consumer demand, the threat, as well as the results of previous own projects and research. The research programme and the budget had to be authorised by the CMC on an annual basis. The CMC arranged meetings that concerned the development and changing circumstances of the project. Since 1988, after the chief objectives of the project - as described in para 10 - had been achieved and commercialisation and privatisation could continue (Phase 2), the CMC mainly got together to authorise the annual budget.

50.  The need for the use of front companies was often weighed up by the CMC, and when necessary, the Chief of the Defence Force and the Minister of Defence would provide authorisation for the establishment of such a company with its own bank account.

51.a. The use of fronts (i.e. other identities and covers/fronts) by Basson was a matter he decided upon for security reasons and only reported on these if it posed a security threat to the state or if he needed back-up from another State or army department.

b.   Financial control was exercised on several levels. Every front company had a qualified accountant to implement the financial control measures according to the prescribed laws of the company.

c.  The front companies were properly audited in accordance with company law. This was done by Mr P. Theron, senior partner of the firm Coopers, Theron and Du Toit. He was initially appointed to this specific job by the previous State President and the Minister of Defence.

d.  The Auditor General officially appointed Mr P. Theron to audit the whole project and to hand in an annual report to the AG. This audit covered the total flow of funds, from the source (the State coffers) to the front companies. After the privatisation of the front companies Mr Theron stayed on in this capacity. He also controlled the use of funding by means of approved objective oriented budgets.

e.  Brig Basson attempted to negotiate the appointment of Mr Theron as auditor to the contractors to ensure that project funds will be followed up.

f.  As a further control measure the project auditor and the staff of Chief of Staff Finances had unlimited access to the activities and records of all the companies that had contracts with the project. This was determined contractually.

g.  The Chief of the Defence Force Staff Finances also made available a cost calculator from his Civil Force staff for all cost calculations and confirmation of contracted services and products (in co-operation with the company involved). He was also responsible for the drawing up and examination of all contracts that dealt with products delivered.

DETAILS REGARDING THE AUTHORISATION OF BRIG BASSON’S ACTIVITIES

52.  Since he was appointed to the SA Defence Force, brig Basson has fallen under the functional command of the Surgeon General where he was accountable to the SG for medical and related issues. However, between March 1981 and December 1987 he fell under the operational control of the Head of Special Forces and all his military activities were controlled by this department. From 1 March 1981 I became his commanding officer and confirmed it by appointing him to the position of Director Research and Development in my HQ on 1 October 1988.

53.  Brig Basson was accountable to the CMC for the running of the project (CBW programme), i.e. all research, development and production. The CMC authorised his activities. As far as the operational use of products of the project was concerned, the end user was the person who could issue Basson with command. These included:

a. The Minister of Defence

b. The Chief of the Defence Force

c. The Commanding General: SADF Special Forces SA Defence Force

d. The Chief of Staff Intelligence of the SADF

e. The Commissioner of Police

f.  The Commanding General SA police: Security Branch

g. The Director-general: National Intelligence Service.

I did not find the above-mentioned situation acceptable and mentioned my concerns to the Chief of the SADF (Genl Geldenhuys). My objection was heard but the practice continued.

54.  Whenever brig Basson was operationally tasked by the above mentioned people (par 54) the CMC would only have knowledge of this if the operational requirements included the need for further research and development. The CMC would then authorise it as an active part of the total project.

INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF BRIG BASSON

55.  During the past two years a number of investigations have been launched into the person and activities of brig Basson as a result of allegations of self-enrichment at the expense of the State. Thorough investigations into these allegations were conducted by the Chief of Staff Intelligence, Chief of Staff Finances and myself and nothing was found that would substantiate the allegations.

56.  During December 1992 OSEO (the Office for Serious Economic Offences) launched an investigation into Basson in terms of Article 5 of the Act on the Investigation into Serious Economic Offences 117 of 1991 with regard to Armscor. On 8 December 1992, I was asked to comment on a number of questions concerning brig Basson. A thorough report about this matter was submitted to the Director of OSEO on 11 January 1993.

57.  On 15 June 1993 the Office of the Auditor-General confirmed to OSEO that it agreed with the answers given by Mr P. Theron (AG’s appointed auditor to project JOTA) regarding the front companies of the SADF with special reference to brig Basson.

BRIG BASSON’S POSITION SINCE 1 APRIL 1993

58.  Brig Basson was no longer under the functional command of the Surgeon General from 1 April 1993. Since he was still involved in matters surrounding contractual and financial arrangements that he had made overseas he agreed to work with col Ben Steyn, the current Project Officer and P. Theron to resolve the matters. The specific transactions and documentation still has to be completed.

FINAL COMMENTARY AND RECOMMENDATION

59.  I would also like to inform you that on 26 March 1990 the current State President in the presence of genl Malan, genl Geldenhuys, genl Liebenberg and myself, was thoroughly briefed on the status and magnitude of project COAST, with special reference to the process of commercialisation and privatisation. The SP approved the continuation of the project and issued a special directive regarding offensive research - the continued work on irritants and incapacitants only. This has been executed to the letter. In a follow-up meeting on 20 September 1991, brig Basson briefed a Special Cabinet Committee on sensitive projects of the State, represented by Mr B. du Plessis, dr D. de Villiers, mr K. Coetzee and dr G. Viljoen, in the presence of genl Malan, genl Liebenberg and Vice-admiral Murray, on the state and magnitude of the project with special reference to the directives of the SP as well as the process of privatisation and commercialisation in which mr B. du Plessis would be involved. (I was not present at this presentation due to other obligations, but was notified of it immediately after my return.)

60.  Notwithstanding the above, in my opinion the financial management of the project has always run smoothly and the objectives were achieved satisfactorily without compromising the security of the project and/or the SADF (SAMS).

61.  You will understand that I would like to see this issue being dealt with as swiftly and satisfactorily as possible.

62.  It is suggested that brig Basson is offered the opportunity to personally answer all future questions concerning himself to National Intelligence. Where necessary, I will assist you in this matter.

signed by:

(D.P. KNOBEL)

SURGEON GENERAL: LT GENL

____________________________________________________________

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMPANIES

FRONT COMPANIES

1. Delta G Scientific.  Chemical Production and Research.

a. Established.  April 1982.

b. Facility opens in Midrand.  1985

c. Company sold to Management and Employees.  30 August 1991.

d. Last contracts completed.  March 1993.

e. Final transfer of Share certificates.  31 March 1993.

2. Roodeplaat Research Laboratories.  Biological Research and Development.

a. Established.  1 November 1982.

b. Company sold to Management and Employees.  30 August 1991

c. Final transfer of Share certificates.  31 March 1993.

3. Infladel.  This company was used for gathering of information and as a management front.

a. Established.  June 1984.

b. Closed down.  February 1990.

4. Sefmed Information Services.  Took over the function of infladel.

a. Established.  March 1990.

b. Closed down.  February 1992.

5. D. John Truter.  The Management Committee acted as financial front for funding for suppliers as well as for the other fronts.

a. Established.  1 May 1989.

b. Closed down.  Waiting for authorisation from the Minister of State Expenditure. Already authorised by Minister of Defence.

OTHER COMPANIES

6. A number of companies that were founded and are still conducting defensive research and development. However, they were never owned by the SADF.

7. Lifestyle Management.  Responsible for Physiological Research.

a. Established.  28 July 1988.

8. Protecnik Laboratories.  Responsible for research into material and equipment.

a. Established.  December 1985.

9. Technotek.  Responsible for the production of protective clothing and masks.

a. Established.  1986.

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VILJOEN-FRENCH & COTER Ing/Ing Reg. No. 90/07619/21
ATTORNEYS, NOTARIES, CONVEYANCERS & TRADE MARK AGENTS
PROKUREURS, NOTARISSE, AKTEUITMAKERS & HANDELSMERKAGENTE

YOURS/U:OUR/ONS: MR VILJOEN /mb/B845
DATE/DATUM 22 March 1994         
ST GILES STREET/STRAAT 10
RANDBURG2194
PO BOX / POS
BUS 2414
RANDBURG2125
TEL: 789-4302
FAX: 789-5315
DX: 12 RANDBURG

ATTENTION GENERAL KNOBEL

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

Surgeon General
SAMSHQ
Private Bag 102                                     REGISTERED
HENNOPSMEER
0046

Sir

BACSIL PROJECT

We wish to advice that we act on behalf of Mr. J. Brandt and Organochem (Pty) Ltd.

Our clients instructed us to address a letter of demand to Sefmed Information Systems dated 18 February 1994, a copy of which is enclosed herewith for your information.

Our client has requested us to address this letter to yourselves in your capacity as the co-ordinator of the Bacsil project.

Our clients’ claim is set out in the copy of our letter dated 18 February 1994. Our clients informed us that the abovementioned project was of an extremely sensitive nature and could have far reaching political ramifications should this matter have to go to Court and evidence available to the press and the general public.

Our client requested us to address this letter to yourselves in a final attempt to resolve the matter without resorting to legal action.

Should our clients’ claim however not be dealt with satisfactorily within 10 (ten) days date hereof, we are instructed to proceed with this issue of Summons without further notice to the parties involved.

We look forward to receiving your urgent reply

Yours faithfully

VILJOEN-FRENCH & COTER INC

Per: H.C. VILJOEN

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VILJOEN – FRENCH & COTER Incorporation / Ingelyf

Reg. No. 90/07619/21

ATTORNEYS – CONVEYANCERSPROKUREURS - AKTEUITMAKERS

Director/Direkteur: HENDRIK CORNELIS VILJOEN B. PROC

Associates/Assosiate: LUCIA C. COTER B. PROC B.C.L. WAYNE VAN NIEKERK B.COMM.LL.LB

Assisted by/Bygestaan deur: LINDA VAN DER WESTHUIZEN B.A. LL.B FREDERICK AUBREY CHESTER B. IURIS LL.B.

RANDBURG HEAD OFFICE

ST GILES STREET/
STRAAT 10
RANDBURG2194

P O BOX/POSBUS 2414
RANDBURG2125

TEL: 789-4302
FAX: 789-5315
DX: 12 RANDBURG

JOHANNESBURG BRANCH

11TH FLOOR/
11 DE VERDIEPING
NEDBANK CORNERCOR./H/v BICCARD & JORISSEN STRBRAAMFONTEIN, 2017

P O BOX/
POSBUS 2414
RANDBURG
2125

TEL: 339-6853/4
FAX: 339-3657
DX: 12 RANDBURG

YOURS/U:
OUR/ONS: MR VILJOEN/mb
OFFICE
RANDBURG
KANTOOR:

18 February 1994

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTENTION MR JOHN TRUTER
Sefmed Information Systems
Level 4
Karee Building
Tuinhof Complex
VERWOERDBURG
0157

Dear Sirs

J. BRANDT / ORGANOCHEM (PTY) LTD.

We wish to advise that we act on behalf of Mr. Jerry Brandt and Organochem (Pty) Ltd. who have instructed us to address this letter to you.

We address this letter to you at the request of our clients in a final attempt to resolve the matter expeditiously as possible as his previous letter to Mr. Basson remains unanswered. It is our instructions to immediately proceed with the issue of a Summons should our clients’ demand not be met and that this action could have dire consequences for yourselves and a number of other people due to the sensitivity of the matter.

It is our instruction that, in terms of an agreement reached between our client and yourselves, the formula for the manufacture of PMK was sold to yourselves for an amount of $100 000,00 (the equivalent of RT334 000,00).

It is our instructions that pursuant to the said agreement, our clients furnished you with the necessary formula but that to date our clients have still not been paid for the amount agreed to as referred to above. In addition to the above there is an amount of R119 157,00 due to our clients in respect of the fourth delivery of PMK to you.

Should the R453 157.00 not be paid to ourselves by the 28th February 1994, it is our instructions to immediately proceed with the issue of Summons without further notice and to refer the matter to the Press.

We however, trust that this will not be necessary.

Yours faithfully

VILJOEN – FRENCH & COTER INC

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24 November 1994

The Surgeon General
Private Bag X102
HENNOPSMEER
0146

Dear General Knobel

CLAIM FROM MR. BRANDT FOR TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIED BY HIM TO PROJECT JOTA

1. Attached hereby is a copy of a chemical process used in the production of the substance BAXIL authored by Dr. J Koekemoer who was responsible for the production.

2. There were two processes used in the production of BAXIL:

a.  The oximercurisation and demercurisation of Sassafras. (The initial process was riddled with problems, we would probably never have achieved the production target).

b.  The glycidic ester route that was provided by Mr Brandt - this was successful and it solved the production problems.

3. Dr Koekemoer made a thorough analysis of the cost savings that were achieved with regard to the raw material use of these two routes. He would not explain the technical aspects of these two routes for obvious reasons. However, it is clear that the glycidic ester route also had other advantages.

4. According to dr Koekemoer, the cost of the raw materials per kg for the sassafras-route was R1 927.00 and for the glycidic ester route was R326.34, a saving of R1 600.66 per kg for the end product delivered. Keeping in mind that a total end product of 1000 kg was delivered, using the glycidic ester route provided by mr Brandt would mean cutting the costs of raw materials of the total production by R1 600 000.00.

5. Mr Brandt provided this technology at a time when production was behind schedule and the project officer had asked him to assist in finding another synthesis technology for the process. He was never compensated for the technology.

6. Mr Brandt had claimed R350 000 as outstanding payment for the technology.

7. It is difficult to determine a precise amount that would serve as proper compensation for this original technology because none of the normal evaluation techniques (sales profits, etc.) can be implemented in this situation.

8. It is proposed that Mr Brandt be offered R275 000. I request that this long-standing claim be dealt with as soon as possible.

9. Hereby attached, the letter (Appendix A) and the report (Appendix B) by dr Koekemoer.

Yours faithfully

DR W. BASSON

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

APPENDIX A

P.O. Box 15723
East Lynne
0039
24-11-1994

Dear Dr Basson

Attached hereby is a cost comparison of the two routes for the preparation of 2-(3,4-methylindioxiphenyl)propane. Only raw material costs and not production costs were taken into account.

Yours faithfully

signed by:

Dr J.M. Koekemoer

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Only copy

CC/UG/302/6/J1282

MINUTES OF A SPECIAL CO-ORDINATING MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON 2 DECEMBER 1994 IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

Present
Gen GL Meiring Chief National Defence Force
Lt Gen DP Knobel          Surgeon General
Lt Gen D Verbeeck        Chief of Staff Intelligence
Gen Maj CL Bröcker       Acting Chief of Staff Finance
Brig GJ Coertzen           Department of Finance
Brig W Basson 
Col BP Steyn    Project Officer

NEWSPAPER REPORTS

1.         The Chief of the National Defence Force was informed with regard to reports which appeared the Weekend Argus. Further media inquiries were discussed. It was decided that these inquiries had to be responded to fully but without revealing unnecessary details. Answers to be provided to the Chief Directorate of Communication by the Surgeon General were formulated. [Action: Surgeon General]

OUTSTANDING CLAIMS

2.         G. Brand. Brig Basson provides the background of this claim amounting to R350000, 00  it was decided that the claim should be paid but that the amount of R250 000,00 was reasonable.

3.         W. Basson. Brig. Basson’s claim with regard to his travel and accommodation was discussed. He explained that he had to travel business class due to the fact that his travel arrangements had changed on short notice and these changes can only be made in business class. The meetings accepts the claim as reasonable. The total amount is R240 000,00.

4.         Travel and accommodation D.J. Truter, C. Marlow and P. Mijburgh.  The claim stems from the support that Brig Basson needed during his handling of the court case in Switzerland and/or testimony which had to be delivered. The same motivation with regard to business class travel is accepted. These claims are accepted. Claim amounts:

a.         D.J Truter                      R1 539,22

b.         Adv Marlow                    R14 368.67

c.         P Mijburgh                     R15 181,15

5.         These claims can only be paid out after ministerial approval. It is decided that Brig. Coertzen and Basson must prepare a presentation from the Chief of the National Defence Force to the Minister.  [Action: Coertze and Basson]

Signed
B.P. Steyn
Secretary – Col

Remarks: Surgeon General (handwritten)
With regard to paragraph 2 it is recommended that the amount is reconsidered.

Signed
DP Knobel

Surgeon General: Lt Gen

Signed
G.L Meiring
Chief of the National Defence Force: General

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CONFIDENTIAL

GG/V/306/3

PRESENTATION TO THE CO-ORDINATING MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF PROJECT JOTA ABOUT THE FUTURE MANAGEMENT OF CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR PROTECTION AND DEFENCE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE.

INTRODUCTION

1. The work that has been done by this project was largely directed towards doing research to develop an understanding and a technological basis of defensive chemical and biological warfare. The work was done so well, that South Africa is now regarded as one of the leading countries in the world as far as this is concerned. Sufficient defensive equipment was manufactured to be used as and when necessary. The shelf life of this equipment is +- 15 years.

2. Because of the past emphasis on research, more emphasis will now have to be placed on the development of doctrine, policies and on training and these should be properly co-ordinated between Defence Force and Staff departments.

3. The Project has always been managed on a secretive basis due to its sensitivity. This has led to a lot of misconceptions about the activities and work within the project and the SADF.

4. After the closing of project Jota, a greater level of openness can prevail. There is no further need for secrecy, in fact, it has become essential to expose the work that is being done.

POINTS OF CONTENTION

5. Certain points of contention will have to be discussed to ensure the continuation of the management and development of a defensive CBW capacity in the SANDF.

6. Full ownership and involvement of all relevant elements in the SANDF is proposed.

7. A new management mechanism will have to be put in place.

8. The SADF policy directives with regard to CBW that appeared in 1988 as a top secret document, as well as policy directives of the army departments involved, will have to be revised. New doctrines will have to be developed.

9. A thorough routine training programme for the SANDF will have to be introduced.

10. Research and development will have to continue and finances made available for this. Currently the Defence R+D Council only has funding for research, there is however a pressing demand for applied research.

11. Capital will have to be made available for the special equipment required by the South African Medical Services.

CONCLUSIONS

12. A More open approach to the work is essential and members of all Defence Force as well as Staff departments will have to become involved.

13. Increased exposure of the subject to SANDF members is essential in order to change the misconceptions and ignorance.

14. The SANDF will have to co-ordinate its activities with Armscor.

15. To ensure continuation in this highly specialised field, it is essential to establish dedicated elements within the relevant headquarters.

16. Seven Medical Battalion, which would be responsible for detection, warning, identification and decontamination should develop and should also be able to provide assistance in civilian emergencies. Therefore it must be accepted that this specialised capacity - esp. with regard to decontamination, identification and detection - can also be applied against commercial chemical agents, e.g. in disasters and accidents.

RECOMMENDATIONS

17. It is suggested that the name Defensive Chemical and Biological Warfare be changed to Chemical-Biological and Nuclear protection and Defence (CBNP). The new title covers the full spectrum of activities and explains the SA approach to a non-offensive capacity, as well as its ability to be applied during times of peace.

18. The establishment of a management mechanism within the SANDF to manage and co-ordinate activities with regard to CBNP. The appointment of a pilot committee is suggested, represented by the Defence force and Staff departments involved and led by Chief of Staff Operations.

19. The establishment of a reduced staff element at SAMS headquarters is suggested for full-time work on CBNP. An organisation study is suggested to determine the plausibility of such a staff element.

20. A revision of existing SADF policy directives and doctrines is suggested for the establishment of responsibilities and a reduced security classification to make it a work document.

21. A seminar for the top structure of the SANDF and Armscor is being planned for 21 February 1995 where the subject and future approach will be introduced. The non-proliferation conventions and their effect on the SANDF and Armscor will also be discussed in depth. We trust that some of the misconceptions about this subject will be laid to rest. We recommend that all DCC members as well as representatives of the defence force and staff departments and their directors attend the seminar. Attached hereby is a preliminary program for inspection.

22. It is suggested that a properly prepared, selective briefing and demonstration with regard to the CB defence capacity of the SANDF be issued to the media at a later stage.

23. Due to the fact that the SAMS will be responsible for most of the work and has the specialised capacity, the SAMS will necessarily conduct most of the research and will need to procure special equipment, which means capital expenditure. Therefore we recommend an additional capital budget to be drawn up for the SAMS.

signed by:

(B.P. STEYN)

PROJECT OFFICER PROJECT JOTA: COL

9 January 1995

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DAY SEMINAR: 21 FEBRUARY 1995

PRELIMINARY PROGRAM

CHAIRMAN: Dr P.B. Nel

0800 - 0820       Opening   -   CSANDF

0820 - 0830       International Status of CBW   -   Dr B Davey

0830 - 0900       SANDF CBW Defence policy   -   SG

0900 - 0915       Management mechanisms   -   SG

0915 - 0945       Research   -   Mr R Louw

0945 - 1015       Law on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction   -   Mr D. Smith

1015 - 1045       Tea

1045 - 1115       Effect of Chemical Weapons Convention on SANDF and Armscor   -   Dr B Davey

1115 - 1130       Biological Weapons Convention

1130 - 1200       Questions and discussion

1200 - 1300       Lunch

1300 - 1400       Move to Walmanstahl

1400 - 1600       Demonstration: Effect of NGT

Equipment

Staff - and vehicle decontamination

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GG/UG/302/6/J1282

MINUTES OF THE CO-ORDINATING MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF PROJECT JOTA HELD ON 29 MARCH 1994 IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE.

The following people attended the meeting:
Gen GL Meiring                         Chief of the Defence Force
Lt Gen DP Knobel                      Surgeon General
V Adml A Malherbe                    Chief of Staff of the Army
Lt Gen B Raubenheimer Chief of Staff Finance
Gen Maj Verbeek                       Acting Chief of Staff Intelligence
Col BP Steyn                            Project Officer

ITEM 1: MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

1. The minutes of the previous meeting are approved.

ITEM 2: MATTERS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES

2. Para 3 Destruction of samples.  The Surgeon General will find out from the Attorney General the outcome of their investigation and the current situation.

3. Para 5 Data Capturing.  The Surgeon General confirms that the process is complete and that the disks are in a small safe in a walk-in safe in the office of his Personal Staff Officer. Only the SG and Col Steyn have the keys to the safe. The following is decided:

a.  The disks should be copied after 4 years of safekeeping so that the information is not lost through ageing.

b.  Gen Maj Verbeek is tasked with determining the security of the safes.

4. Para 7 Water cannon.  Col Steyn reports that the first two will be delivered on 13 April 1994 and the last 2 on 20 April 1994. Only 3 X 5000 L bladders are available in the SADF, therefore steel tanks will have to be built onto the last two vehicles. Training is making progress. Problems are experienced with regard to finding the ingredients for the decontaminant, there is only enough for one application.

5. Para 11 Disposal.  Col Steyn reports that the disposal is complete and that the documentation will have to be finalised.

6. Para 12 Retrenchments.  These are complete and the final audit is being done.

7. Para 16 Money overseas.  The SG reports that he spoke to Gen Regli of the Swiss Intelligence Service and that he has confirmed much of brig Basson's affidavit and will assist in getting the documents back. The SG is however convinced that the money is lost. He says that the case against Basson should be completed on 22 April 1994 and that the bail money should then be paid back.

8. Para 17 Expenses made by brig Basson.  Adv Marlow’s claim has been paid out, brig Basson’s claim has not yet been received.

ITEM 3: DECLARATION FOR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

9. The Surgeon General reports that National Intelligence has informed him that the USA and UK are not satisfied with the Declaration which South Africa made last year and will seek a meeting with the State President to emphasise the need for the 1994 declaration to be more substantial. He proposes that more detail be provided about RRL and that, if necessary, the identity of RRL be announced. This proposal is accepted.

ITEM 4: PROTECHNIK TAKE-OVER

10. The Chief of Staff Army reports that the Armscor management has not yet discussed the matter, but that they are apparently willing to go ahead with negotiations provided that they get certain assurances from the SADF. The following is decided:

a.  The separation of the continued procurement contract with Technotek from the purchase of Protechnik.

b.  The SADF must pay the contract cancellation- the discontinued section - however, Armscor must negotiate about it first. Armscor will use own funds to buy Protechnik.

c.  The Defence R+D Council will award contracts at the same value to Protechnik for as long as it remains possible.

d.  The SADF will stand in for retrenchments resulting from a lack of finances to Protechnik by the DRDC.

e.  Due to the fact that this is a reduced Defence Command Council, the decisions are seen as coming from the DCC.

f.  The Chief of Staff Army and col Steyn have to inform Armscor of these decisions.

ITEM 5: NEXT MEETING

11. The next meeting will take place at the end of April.

signed by:

(B.P. STEYN)

PROJECT OFFICER PROJECT JOTA: COL

handwritten commentary:  With regard to par 3 the State President requested personal involvement in the matter of the optical disks, he wants joint control with the SG. This was carried out.

signed by:

(D.P. KNOBEL)
PROJECT MANAGER PROJECT JOTA: LT GENL

signed by:
(G.L. MEIRING)
CHIEF OF THE SADF: GENL

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GG/UG/302/6/J282

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF PROJECT JOTA HELD ON 25 JANUARY 1994 IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE

The following people attended the meeting:
Gen GL Meiring                         Chief of the South African Defence Force
Lt Gen Pretorius                        Head of the Army
Lt Gen DP Knobel                      Surgeon General Project Manager
V Adml A Malherbe                    Chief of Staff of the Airforce
Lt Gen B Raubenheimer Chief of Staff Finances
Mr Van Heerden             Representative of the Auditor General
Col BP Steyn                            Project Officer

ITEM 1: WELCOMING

1. The CSADF welcomes everybody and the SG says that the purpose of the meeting is to brief members of the Co-ordinating Control Committee about the current status of the project and to obtain some advice regarding certain activities.

ITEM 2:             THE PREVIOUS MEETING

2. Para 2.  The briefing to the Minister of Defence is completed.

3. Para 3.  The samples were destroyed and the problems relating to the certificates were solved. The SA Narcotics Bureau investigated the trading in controlled substances and handed in its report to the Attorney General. He has not reacted yet.

4. Para 4.  Brig Basson and Mr Theron still have to do a value estimate of the products destroyed after which a certificate of value must be presented to the CSADF for signing. It must then be handed over to the Auditor General.

5. Data capturing.  Col Steyn reports that all data capturing is complete.

It is decided that:

a.  Only technical information will be destroyed.

b.  The place of safekeeping for the data will be decided on at a later stage.

c.  The Surgeon General should make sure that all relevant information is correctly captured on disk and that all technical documents are destroyed.

d.  The documents that are currently in the possession of D J Truter and J Theron should be given to the Chief of Staff Finances.

e.  The hardware will not be provided now but will be made available later if necessary.

6. Foam research.  Col Steyn reports that the research into foam has been discontinued due to the possibility of a too low success rate.

7. Water cannon.  Col Steyn reports that the demonstrator is ready for demonstration. He confirms that the project results will only be the demonstrator and the engineer drawings of the system. It appears as if the system will be larger and more complicated than was initially thought and that an additional R 55 100 will have to be added to the budget for the financing of the whole design. Col Steyn reports that project funding is available but that the budget does not provide for it. He requests that the money be made available for the project. The CSADF asks if the demonstration model could be used in an operational situation if necessary. Col Steyn confirms the technical possibility of this, but states that the operators will have no protection whatsoever in such a situation.

a.  Col Steyn is instructed to co-ordinate the date for the demonstration with the Chief of the Army.

b.  The extension to the budget is accepted in principal, but an official request will have to be submitted to the Chief of Staff Finances for final approval.

c.  Col Steyn is to make sure that the demonstrator could be used if necessary.

8. Para 11.  The Army has removed all the NGT from the SAMS and it is now stored (by the Army) in 91 Ammunition Depot.

9. Para 12.  Delta G was taken over by Sentrachem. The SG has assured Mr Job of Sentrachem that the State is no longer involved in Sentrachem. They are willing to conduct future business with the SADF.

10. Ownership of Delta G and RNL (Para 13).  Completed.

11. Para 15.  Col Steyn reports on the current state of disposal. The Disposal Board was established and is represented by cdore Visser (CSA), brig Coertzen (CSF) and col Steyn. The disposal is dealt with in a similar fashion to that of the CCB.

12. Retrenchments.  Col Steyn reports that the three ladies have been retrenched. Some of them demanded to be paid out interest on the money that they have lost due to the delayed retrenchments. It is decided that they should be paid out. Col Steyn must get a final decision from the CSF on the matter.

ITEM 3: MONEY OVERSEAS

13. Swiss Bank account.  Col Steyn reports that this money (one account only) is a guarantee on the payment for masks manufactured by Huber and Suhner as well as for royalties still owed to them. It is decided that the account will be closed after payment in February 1994. The royalties for 1994/95 will also be paid in full, which will bring about a saving of SF 55 000.

16. Money frozen in Switzerland.  SG states that brig Basson was unable to get the money back from Switzerland and that he is unable to access his documentation in this regard since it was confiscated by the Swiss police when he was arrested. He also says that National Intelligence have verbally informed Basson that they would like to conclude the matter. He will get the written report. The SAP has already handed over their dossier to the Attorney General and they are waiting for his decision. The Office for Serious Economic Offences (OSEO) investigation is making progress, but they have not yet completed it. They are also still awaiting a decision from the Auditor General, however, he still has a few questions in this regard. The following is decided:

a.  The SG to meet with Mr van Heerden, Mr Theron CSF and Brig Basson to get answers to these questions.

b.  Brig Basson to provide the chronology of events that are still unexplained.

c.  All parties to meet and to conclude the matter.

d.  SG to report back at the next meeting.

ITEM 4: EXPENSES MADE BY BRIG BASSON

17. Expenses.  SG says that up to this point brig Basson has paid for all his expenses and that v/adml Murray had previously told him that these expenses should be paid by the State. He also says that Adv Marlow has already laid a claim with regard to his expenses. Decisions:

a.  In principle, both have the right to lay a claim. However, these claims will have to be dealt with in the correct fashion and the State Attorney will have to be consulted. The SG hand over Adv Marlow’s claim to the CSF.

b.  The SG to get hold of brig Basson’s claim as soon as possible in order for it to be dealt with.

c.  The project has to fund these claims. Additional funds will have to be asked for if necessary.

18. Legal expenses.  The SG reports that the people who were subpoenaed as witnesses by the OSEO now claim their legal expenses from brig Basson. Mr van Heerden points out that they can only claim for food and travel and that the OSEO should pay for it. His recommendation is approved.

ITEM 6: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

19. The SG reports on the state of the work groups and the RSA and his staff’s involvement in The Hague. He says that dr Brian Davey has been offered a position at the OPCW (Organisation for Protection against Chemical Warfare). He also says that the Department of Trade and Industry declines to make any further funding available for the travel costs of SADF members. He will discuss it at a meeting with dr Lamprecht (Trade and Industry) and Mr Shearer (Foreign Affairs). If they are unable to come to an agreement, the matter will be referred to the DG.

20. Declarations.  Col Steyn says that the contents of the RSA declaration for 1995 will have to be attended to, especially with reference to the 155mm rounds. The CSADF says that it will have to wait until July 1994.

ITEM 7: GENERAL ISSUES

21. The CSADF states that he is still awaiting a report on the Protechnik take-over.

22. The next meeting will take place in a month’s time.

signed by:
(B.P. STEYN)
PROJECT OFFICER PROJECT JOTA: COL

signed by:
(D.P. KNOBEL)
PROJECT MANAGER PROJECT JOTA: LT GENL

signed by:
(G.L. MEIRING)
CHIEF OF THE SADF: GENL

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TOP SECRET

GG/UG/302/6/COAST/5/1

Telephone: 671-5413
Enquiries: Brig W. Basson

SAMS Headquarters
Private Bag X102
Hennopsmeer
0046

21 November 1989

APPROVAL FOR DESTRUCTION OF PROJECT DOCUMENTATION: PROJECT COAST

INTRODUCTION

1. Since 1981 project COAST has been run as a highly sensitive project.

2. For the last few years the project has been managed from a central office known as Project Chancellor. All management, technical, scientific and operational documentation was kept at this office.

3. The Project Officer requests that a part of the project documentation be destroyed.

4. The following reasons are given for the request:

a.  The large amount of space needed to store the documents and the difficulty in ensuring security.

b.  Some of the documents are no longer relevant since there has been a change in the philosophy behind the project.

c.  The future direction of the development of the project renders some of the documentation irrelevant.

5. The implications are as follows:

a.  By destroying some of the documentation more security is afforded to the project

b.  Since most of the technical documentation is lodged with the sub-projects no information or capabilities will be lost.

6. The sub-project companies have already been ordered to destroy any documentation that could link them to the SADF - i.e. those containing signatures and names.

7. Only documentation relating to the activities of the previous two years will be kept for purposes of auditing and project management. This information can easily be stored in the safe.

REQUEST

8. Authorisation is requested for the destruction of all project documentation stored at the central office (CHANCELLOR) that was generated before the end of the financial year ending March 1988.

signed by:
(W. BASSON)
PROJECT OFFICER: BRIG

signed by:
(D.P. KNOBEL)
PROJECT LEADER: LT GENL                           APPROVED

handwritten note:  No objection, provided that the necessary approval is obtained from the Minister of Finance (Treasurer).

signed by:
(J.W. VAN HEERDEN)
DEPUTY AUDITOR: SPECIAL ACCOUNTS                    dated 18/01/1990

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Ref. nr: HSF/UG/302/6/C123

Enquiries: Brigadier G.L. Coertzen
Tel nr: 3226641 X 306

Genl M.A. de M. Malan,                        Chief of the SA Defence Force
SSA, OVDG, SD, SM, LP                     (Dept. Finances)

Minister of Defence                               Private Bag X175
P.O. Box 47                                         PRETORIA
CAPE TOWN                                       0001

8000                                                    15 February 1991

The honorary Minister

APPROVAL FOR THE RUNNING OF FRONT COMPANIES: PROJECT COAST: APRIL 1991 TO MARCH 1992

1. The establishment of front companies is necessary for the thorough covert and clandestine running of Project Coast. These private organisations are established as private companies and closed corporations according to company law.

2. The organisations are:

a.  D. Johan Truter Financial Consultants cc.  This company manages the canalising of funds, internal auditing as well as the general administration of the Project. This includes insurance services, medical funds and pensions. These services are delivered to all the group members.

b.  Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (Pty) Ltd.  This company is responsible for biological research and production.

c.  Infladel (Pty) Ltd.  This company currently finances the biological research facility.

d.  EGC (Properties) Ltd.  This company acts as the owner of the biological research facility and premises.

e.  Sefmed Information Systems (Pty) Ltd.  This company runs the technical information system of the project.

f.  Randjespark Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd. This company acts as the owner of the chemical research building and premises.

g.  SA Working Dog Distributors cc.  This company was established to manage the proper out-phasing of the Roodeplaat Breeding facilities. The dogs that weren't sold were taken over by this company and will be managed here for the rest of their working lives.

3. There are no existing cessions on shares of the abovementioned companies. The interest of the State is protected because the nominated parties had to sign undated share transfer certificates when the shares were issued. Thereby the individuals involved legally waived their right to ownership.

4. The signed certificates of transfer are being stored in the safe of Mr P. Theron, project auditor and senior partner in the firm Coopers Theron du Toit. He will either destroy them or make them available to the parties involved if the Minister of Defence or the CSF instructs it.

5. Delta G Scientific (Pty) Ltd, one of the previous front companies, was privatised during 1990 and is therefore no longer a front.

6. Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (Pty) Ltd will be privatised during 1991 and will therefore no longer be a front.

7. Due to budget cuts the Biological project was nationalised and the assets of the Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises (Pty) Ltd will be sold and the company deregistered.

signed by:

(A.J. LIEBENBERG)

CHIEF OF THE SA DEFENCE FORCE: GENERAL

GLC/EEMT/C703

Approved

signed by:
(M.A. DE M. MALAN)
MINISTER OF DEFENCE

19 February 1991

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TOP SECRET

Only Copy

HSF/UG/302/6/C123

Telephone: 6715413

Enquiries: Brig W. Basson

Chief of the SA Defence Force
Private Bag X414
Pretoria
0001
19 August 1991

Genl M.A. de M. Malan, SSA, OVDG, SD, SM,
Minister of Defence
P.O. Box 47
CAPE TOWN
8000

The honorary Minister

AUTHORISATION FOR THE SALE OF ASSETS:  PROJECT COAST

PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to obtain the authorisation for the sale of a further section of the infrastructure and capacities of project COAST, namely the biological research, development and production facility to the management and staff of the company on certain conditions.

2. This sale of assets form part of the ten-year plan of project COAST and contributes to the ending of all direct connection between the SADF/State and the facilities created by project COAST.

CHRONOLOGY

3. This presentation will provide a description of the biological facility that will be sold off. The management, the physical environment and financial status will be analysed. A motivation for the sale, the sales conditions and a recommended mechanism will be given. The presentation will conclude with a summary of the approvals needed.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BIOLOGICAL FACILITY

BACKGROUND

4. Roodeplaat Research Laboratories was established in 1984 as a part of project COAST. At that stage (and still today - with the exception of RRL) there was no existing organisation in South Africa to deal with the technical aspects of biological warfare.

5. Individual scientists with the scientific abilities did exist, but they did not have the ability to apply their knowledge in the military field. Furthermore, there were no established facilities that provided for the highly contagious and dangerous biological products to be developed. The only existing sophisticated high grade isolation units that worked with P4 biological material (e.g. the National Institute for Virology at Rietfontein) were Internationally supervised and therefore not suitable for sensitive military work

6. The management of project COAST collected a number of scientists who were willing and able to address the field of biological warfare. In 1986 sophisticated facilities were built for the development of dangerous biological materials. The facilities were fully functional by the end of 1988. Very soon it became clear that security was of the utmost importance. The nature of the research as well as the research premises were to be treated with great sensitivity. For this reason the research centre was run as a private concern with commercial cover. RRL thus studied the field of biological warfare while competing in the open biological market. Needless to say the involvement in the open market was very limited.

7. The security valuation also determined the careful placing of the facility. It would attract too much attention in an area that was far away from everything. On the other hand, it also had to be placed in the ideal climatic conditions. The primates (mainly baboons) are used as experimental animals in this field of research. If it were too cold, special housing units would have to be built for the baboons. An area just north of the Magaliesberg seemed to be the ideal place. A farm was chosen on the north side of the Roodeplaat dam and this is where the RRL facility was established. A philosophy of “overdesign” was adopted. An accident or leakage of biological material had to be prevented at all costs by correct design and the proper procedures. Thereby the facility could be placed amongst other agricultural units without risking an environmental disaster. However, in a biological environment the danger factor to the researcher is much higher and RRL had to develop special techniques to deal with this problem. Security was emphasised by establishing of a proper commercial front.

MANAGEMENT

8. The laboratory was managed by a board of directors appointed by the project management. This board of directors were, like any other board of directors, responsible for the total management and running of the company (acc. to company law).

9. Until January 1989 the management of COAST had a direct role in the direction of the company through attendance at the directors meetings. During this time a system of directives and a management policy was drawn up according to directives issued by the CSADF and based on norms already accepted by Armscor. At this stage direct involvement in the management of the company was stopped for security reasons. The staff of the company was growing and due to the fact that only the directors and a few senior scientists were aware of the real nature of the work, direct SADF involvement could lead to all sorts of problematic questions.

10. From the beginning of the 1989 financial year the company was managed by the board of directors according to the approved policy. Indirect control was exercised through monthly meetings and consultations with the Managing Director.

11. The appointed Managing Director was dr D. Goosen. He was appointed in 1985 from the Experimental Animal Centre at the University of Pretoria. In 1986 he was replaced by dr W.P. Swanepoel from the SA Defence Force. The Director: Personnel and Administration, Mr D. Spamer, was appointed from the University of Pretoria as well as the Director: Research, dr A. Immelman. The Director: Experimental animal centre, dr S. van Rensburg, was appointed from the Medical Research Council.

PHYSICAL FACILITIES

12. The laboratory and the production facility is situated at the northern outlets of the Roodeplaat dam. The design of the facility is highly sophisticated. Multipurpose, flexibility and safety in the field of biological warfare research is accentuated in the design. Most of the biological processes can be executed under the safest possible conditions.

13. The facilities built on the seventy-hectare premises are:

a.  Administrative building.

b.  Experimental Animal Centre with an animal clinic.

c. Toxicology laboratory.

d.  Analytical chemistry laboratory.

e.  Microbiology laboratory and microbial culture centre.

f.  Pharmacology laboratory.

g.  Own utility services (electricity, steam, vacuum, cooling)

14. An extremely sophisticated integrated security system was installed into the facility. It was necessary due to the nature of the products being worked with. The security situation at RRL was hindered by the growing anti-vivisectionist group in SA. These people have on previous occasions attacked a number of animal laboratories overseas and caused a lot of physical damage to buildings, equipment and animals. Therefore RRL had to be constructed in such a manner as to be protected against this kind of problem.

15. The procured equipment, clothing and facilities had to be of the best quality because the sterilisation procedures are extremely corrosive.

COMMERCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE OF RRL

16. RRL attracted a lot of attention in the commercial sector. The most pertinent reasons for this are:

a.  The size and nature of the facility that was established to ensure good results caused some commercial “jealousy”.

b.  The relatively easy way in which RRL solved complicated biological issues without being obviously part of the commercial market, made a lot of competitors suspicious of the real position of RRL.

c.  Quite a number of foreign researchers who were doing life science research in SA and who used other facilities (e.g. Universities) for their work, had moved their contracts to RRL.

17. All this interest in RRL lead to the private sector making enquiries about the financing of RRL. It was however not possible for Project management to create a legitimate financier for RRL. RRL financial statements show clearly the low capital shares with a very high loan commitment of R22, 469 million.

18. This situation did not cause a breach of security (no financial links to the State could be proved) but the situation created a great deal of stress for the management of the company.

19. Another aspect of the commercial security cover that created a great deal of stress for the management of RRL, was the potential loss of credibility for the management if the connection to the State was to be made known. The danger of this situation would be that the co-contractors of commercial projects would withdraw from the projects. This could also lead to legal steps and claim damages against RRL.

RRL’S UNSTABLE WORKING ENVIRONMENT

20. The members of the management team who were informed about the real status of RRL also experience stress due to the uncertainty of their future. It is not so much the uncertainty of their future, but a feeling of helplessness in influencing the future. They feel exposed to the mercy of a system that they have very little contact with (because of security reasons). It was not possible, for security reasons, for the project officer to meet with the scientists more than once a month in order to assist them with a client.

21. The downscaling of production and research contracts also creates uncertainty for the senior personnel with regard to their future. The possibility of retrenchments to adapt to the lower turnover remains a problem for them - this in spite of repeated assurances to the contrary. It is also often a problem for the scientists of RRL (who are not trained to think strategically) to keep perspective in the light of the renewal of Western attempts to ban chemical and biological weapons. It appears to them that South Africa should abide by these calls. The fact that no country involved is really weighing up the possibility of moving away from biological weapons is not clear to them.

22. The scientists at RRL are highly sought after in the field of microbiology, chemistry and pharmacology and are often presented with attractive offers from the private sector e.g. NCP, Bayer, Hoechst, SA Druggists etc. These offers usually present a bigger sense of stability and security. The share option schemes that are standard in these compensation packages offer the scientists a greater sense of “participation” and decision-making in their future.

FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

23. Until the end of the 1989 financial year (i.e. up to completion of the establishing of the facility) all financing of the company was undertaken by the SADF and no profits or losses taken into account. Very little was earned from other sources and all income and losses were accounted to the account of the project.

24. From the beginning of the 1989/90 financial year the system of financing was changed. The size of the company’s loan account against the State was determined and this loan account was closed. Research and production projects were identified and contracts entered into. Payments would be made on completion of contractual obligations.

25. The total loan amount made available at that stage was fixed at R22,469 million.

26. The first possibilities for privatisation were already at this stage being investigated. Contact was made with a number of financial institutions as well as with a few companies already operating within the biological field. The purpose of these investigations was to find a process for settling the loan account by “selling” the company. These efforts were basically unsuccessful for the following reasons:

a.  The difficulty of the negotiations due to the security implications were the true facts to be made public. The shareholders were not truly the shareholders and the source of the loan could not be made exposed.

b.  None of the options guarantee that the SADF will be able to continue specific research and production.

c.  The size of the loan account and possible income did not make it a financial proposition.

d.  The company did not have a good “trading history”.

INITIAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS

27. A number of options were considered for the two above-mentioned problems. To improve the commercial coverage of RRL it would be advisable to get “partners”. Discussions were held with large biological institutions that expressed the need for a RRL for their own research and development and had the money for obtaining such a share. This group included Ciba Geigy, Sandoz, Roche, SA Druggists and NCP.

28. The result of this research was always the same:

a.  Each of these organisations expressed an urgent need for an organisation such as RRL for their own research and development.

b.  They did not have a problem with the financial implications of such a partnership.

c.  However, they all expressed their dissatisfaction - they did not like the idea of a joint effort.

29. Efforts to involve other financiers e.g. banks, were also unsuccessful. The financial statements of RRL are not looking good. The large loan account (R22,469 million), a turnover of +- R11 million per year and an accumulated loss will not easily attract any financier. There was however interest shown if a running business could be maintained.

30. It became clear that, if partners from the outside were to be involved, it would without doubt affect the security of RRL. Any bank deciding to finance such a huge venture would want to be presented on the board of directors of RRL, so would a partner from the biological industry want presentation. An additional problem with a biological industrial partnership would be that of priorities - which contracts will get priority - the SADF or the partner

31. The following conclusions are made:

a.  It would be undesirable to bring in a partner from the biological industry due to the implications for security and productivity of the project.

b.  The financial/security cover that is needed can only be provided by a financial institution if a restructuring of the balance sheets of RRL is to be done.

c.  If the balance sheet restructuring can be done, there will be a large amount of interest from financiers (i.e. if the running concern can be insured).

32. A successful commercial coverage for RRL will partly ensure a more stable working environment for the informed senior personnel. This is however less true for people who do not have the opportunity to participate in the process of management. It would therefore be ideal from a security as well as a “participative” point of view if it would be possible to create a system that would provide the finances for management in order to obtain ownership of RRL.

33. It was therefore clear that it was necessary for the situation to be modified to facilitate the process of privatisation, by:

a.  restructuring the balance sheets to distribute the financial burden into manageable packages.

b.  guaranteeing the research if it became necessary to obtain a “hold” on the buyers.

c.  ensuring the successful continuation of the military research together with the commercial diversification if the current management and the senior scientists were to be maintained.

34. With the restructuring of the balance sheets in October 1990 the company was restructured (with the permission of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue) and two companies were established:

a.  A property company to own the land, the building and the utilities.

b.  An operating company to own the equipment and production installations.

35. The current situation of the property company is:

a.  It is called EGC (Pty) Ltd.

b.  The book value of the property is R10,22 million (i.e. the size of the loan account against the state).

c.  The shares in the company are held by a COAST front company and the company has a loan account of R10,22 million against the SADF.

d.  The company is currently earning a rental income from the operating company at a tariff that was established by the auditors.

e.  This rental income is then ploughed back into Project COAST.

36. The current situation of the operating company is:

a.  The company is called Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (Pty) Ltd.

b.  The approved shares capital is R1 000,00, that is one thousand shares at R1,00 each.

c.  One thousand shares at R1,00 each were issued, twenty percent to each of the three directors and forty percent to the managing director.

d.  These shareholders act as nominees and blank share transfer certificates were signed and are in safekeeping at the offices of the Auditor.

e.  The company has a loan account of R12,249 million against the SADF.

MOTIVATIONS FOR PRIVATISATION

37. It is obvious that the SADF has created a unique, sophisticated facility which meets all the specialised requirements of a CBW research unit with a limited production capacity.

38. It is also obvious that the future of the facility as a CBW research unit depends on the security of the activities and the financing of the facility.

39. It is furthermore clear that the security cover can only be maintained if the company avoids a thorough financial and commercial investigation.

40. To avoid such an investigation it will be necessary for the financial structure of the company to be normalised and to enter the commercial market. This process of normalisation and marketing can only happen if the company shares are in private hands.

CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATISATION

GUARANTEED FUTURE USE OF THE FACILITY

42. If the company shares are in private hands, the danger exists that the facility will lose its original purpose. This might happen because:

a.  The commercial projects are financially much more attractive than the military research.

b.  The staff who are involved in the company does not have a positive attitude towards the CBW concept.

c.  Due to moral and ethical pressure from co-shareholders and unions, the new shareholders are no longer willing to risk being linked with military biological research.

43. It is therefore clear that privatisation can only be recommended if the assurance is given that future research and production will conform to the future strategy and need requirements.

PEACE OF MIND FOR EMPLOYEES

44. Recent events regarding sensitive projects as well as misconceptions in the media and the community around the changing threat against the SADF caused a general unease amongst the key personnel of RRL. Most of these people gave up their careers to be able to spend all their time and energy on the project. The abovementioned unease led to these people demanding more control and a say in their own future. This can only happen if they get representation on a management level.

45. If privatisation goes ahead in an unorderly fashion and they lose any say in their own functioning, careers and future, it may lead to large scale dissent in the ranks and security breaches may follow.

46. Therefore privatisation can only be recommended if a mechanism is put in place whereby the key personnel will have peace of mind and remain personally involved. This implies that they obtain “ownership” or that they make peace with their situation.

CHRONOLOGY

47. The fact that the current shareholders are not able to negotiate for financing makes it obvious that they were up to this point unable to obtain partners or other shareholders. Tentative discussions were held, but the company’s unfavourable trade situation has made it impossible for agreements to be negotiated.

48. A period will have to be determined for the current management and shareholders to establish a trading history in order to enable them to obtain financing or to persuade partners to participate. A five-year period is suggested. A medium to long-term relationship between the SADF and the biological unit will have to be maintained (at arm length however) until it can be phased out.

MECHANISM FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS

49. Due to the security evaluation of the project it is not possible for the government or any of its officials to become involve in negotiations or documentation where there is a third party involved. It will immediately lead to suspicion around the activities at RRL. If RRL activities are made public at all, it will be very hard for the SADF to continue with future research in the CBW field.

50. It seems therefore that any sales of assets will have to be preceded by an interim phase where the shares are legally transferred to the current people involved. They will then negotiate with the SADF on legal terms.

PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR PRIVATISATION

51. It is then determined that any privatisation process will have to conform to the continuous functioning of RRL on the one hand, and the maximal potential for COAST to reach its objectives on the other hand.

52. To meet these requirements, it is recommended that the following basis system be implemented:

a.  EGC (Pty) Ltd remains the property of the SADF for the time being

b.  The RRL shares are sold at nominal value to the management and staff of RRL.

c.  The outstanding loan account of R12,249 million against the state are taken over by the management and staff, either directly or by means of a mediator.

EGC (PTY) LTD

53. The current book value of the property is R10,22 million. It is recommended that the state continues ownership of the property by means of shareholding by a COAST front company, Infladel (Pty) Ltd (INFL).

54. EGC then signs a lease agreement with RRL wherein RRL rents the premises for the amount of 8% of the book value per year, escalating with 8% per year.

55. RRL is responsible for the maintenance and insurance of the premises.

56. It is further recommended that RRL gets the first option (valid for 20 years) to buy the premises at a negotiable price.

57. It is recommended that an agreement be made with RRL to cancel the lease if there is no quid pro quo (e.g. the guaranteed continuation of CBW research. This effectively introduces an extra controlling precaution to the process.

SHAREHOLDING IN RRL

58. The management and senior personnel of RRL made their own evaluation and decided that they wanted the opportunity to get full control of the operating company. According to their evaluation there will initially be two chief shareholders:

a.  Van Zyl and Partners (Pty) Ltd (VZP) (75%)

b.  RRL Employees Trust (Share Trust) (25%).

59. Van Zyl and Partners (Pty) Ltd (VZP).  The current managing director of RRL is the representative owner of this company. The company will be the “holding company” of RRL for further possible negotiations. Dr Swanepoel, the managing director of this company, takes the biggest share in relation to his personal risk. VZP will initially own 75% of the shares of RRL.

60. RRL Employees Trust (Share Trust).  This Trust was created to orchestrate the transfer of shares to the rest of the management and key personnel. It is recommended that the Trust initially keeps 25% of the shares in RRL. If there is a restructuring of RRL shares, five million shares of R0,01 each will be issued. The Trust will then take up 1 250 000 of these shares at a premium. It is suggested that the majority of these shares are issued to the management and key personnel. A number of unissued shares will be kept in the Trust as reserve. These shares will be financed by a loan account of the Trust and are paid by the members of staff through a trade barrier agreement linked to a compulsory service term of 3 years from the time of issue. The Trust then also has the option to, as the loan is being redeemed, to raise its share percentage to 49% of the RRL shares.

61. The final amount of shares issued by the Trust and kept in reserve for future appointments will only be determined after the employees have finally indicated the amount of shares they are interested in. The final date for the current employees to do this is 30 July 1991. It appears as if the majority of the senior management and research personnel will take up their share options.

OUTSTANDING LOAN ACCOUNT

62. The staff and management of RRL felt that the outstanding loan account was to be transferred to VZP. VZP would then carry the risk of the loan redemption and dr Swanepoel would then be able to negotiate with financiers and possible partners to orchestrate this.

63. This -the negotiations and the process of diversification of RRL - will not happen overnight. It is recommended that an interest free loan to be paid back over three years be granted to VZP in order to obtain finances. Appendix A shows the group structure and funding situation after the implementation of these recommendations.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SALE

64. It appears as if the sale of RRL (Pty) Ltd can be executed by the following agreements and authorisations:

a.  A sale agreement with regard to the selling of RRL shares.

b.  A loan agreement between VZP and INFLADEL.

c.  Permission for the destruction of signed share transfer certificates with regard to RRL.

d.  A lease agreement between RRL and EGC.

e.  An agreement that allows RRL the option to sell EGC.

f.  A Trust agreement, the WPS Trust that entrenches the key position of dr Swanepoel by providing for his untimely death.

64. The pertinent elements of these agreements will now be discussed.

SALES AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO SHARES IN RRL

65. This agreement provides for the sale at nominal value of the one thousand shares issued at R1,00 each. The selling agent is INFLADEL, representative owner of the shares for the state. The buying agents are the nominated share holders namely dr W.P. Swanepoel, Mr D. Spamer, dr A. Immelman and dr S. van Rensburg.

66. The selling of the shares to the parties involved is subject to the redivision of shares in prescribed percentages that gives 75% to VZP and 25% to the RRL Employees Trust with rights to the RRL Employees Trust to expand its share holding to 49% of the total shareholding in RRL as soon as all debts have been settled with VZP.

67. The sale is furthermore subject to the signing of an admission of guilt agreement between VZP and INFLADEL. VZP owes INFLADEL the amount of R12,249 million.

68. The sale takes effect on 1 March 1991.

LOAN AGREEMENT BETWEEN VZP AND INFLADEL

69. The purpose of this agreement is to ensure that the total loan amount owed by RRL to the state with regard to money received by the state be redeemed before 1 March 1989.

70. This amounts to R12,249 million. The RRL loan is being taken over by VZP in terms of RRL shares that were sold to VZP.

71. In terms of the agreement VZP owes the state R12,249 million. This loan covers a period of 8 years of which the first three will be interest free. Thereafter the loan account will be charged according to the official interest rate in terms of the Income Tax Law. This agreement takes effect on 1 March 1991.

PERMISSION FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF SIGNED SHARE TRANSFER CERTIFICATES

72. Currently the four directors of RRL are the nominated shareholders or the representative owners of the RRL shares. This is because the shares are registered in their names, but at the issuing of the shares all four directors signed undated share transfer certificates. These items are being safekept by the Auditor of RRL in the name of the state.

73. The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Defence will have to authorise the destruction of the certificates

LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN RRL AND EGC

74. This agreement will ensure that RRL can continue with research, development and production in order to satisfy the needs of the SADF.

75. A clause in this agreement determines that the agreement can be cancelled on three months notice if RRL does not achieve satisfactorily with regard to the research and production contracts between RRL and INFLADEL.

76. A further clause determines that for the first five years of the lease agreement no changes may be made to the structure of the lawful share holders who either directly or indirectly own RRL. This may only happen if it is permitted by INFLADEL.

77. The last two paragraphs describe a system of precautions which will ensure continued research and production for the SADF as long as there is a need for it.

78. The agreement specifies that the lessee will be responsible for the maintenance and insurance of the premises, as well as tax payments and other usual statutory expenses.

79. The lease agreement provides for an initial period of 5 years and offers the lessee the option to lease for another five years. During the first ten years the rent will escalate from R816 700,00 in the first year with 8% per year. After this ten-year period the lessee will have the option to rent the premises for a next ten years at official rates.

80. The lease agreement takes effect on 1 March 1991.

OPTION FOR RRL TO BUY EGC

81. This agreement will allow RRL to buy shares (currently owned by INFLADEL) in EGC and therefore also the land and buildings that are currently being used by RRL.

82. This agreement will finally allow the state to cut off all direct connection with the biological facility. This also offers RRL the opportunity to become independent and self-sustaining.

83. This option is valid for 20 years and takes effect on 1 March 1991. It will be executed as follows:

a.  For the first five years, a call option of RRL which INFLADEL is allowed to refuse.

b.  For the first fifteen years, a call option that INFLADEL will not be allowed to refuse.

c.  At the end of the twenty-year period, a put option by INFLADEL which RRL will not be allowed to refuse.

The agreement specifies that the current value at the time of sale be accepted as the purchase price.

The agreement also specifies that the loans incurred between VZP and INFLADEL be redeemed before or during a period of six months after the sale.

RRL EMPLOYEES TRUST (SHARES TRUST)

85. The purpose of the Trust is to make shares available to the employees without putting a tax burden on them. This agreement provides for the Trust to receive shares on a loan account from RRL.

86. These shares are issued to the management and employees (up to level 6) of RRL through a trade barrier agreement that they all sign with the company. This agreement specifies that they will remain at RRL for a minimum period of three years. If they leave early, a penalty clause is activated and they lose the shares and have to pay a fine.

87. If they remain in the service of RRL for the first three years they obtain ownership of the shares. If they die or retire the shares will have to be put up for sale to the Trust within the first 30 days. It is therefore not possible for the shares to be sold to another party without the permission of the Trust.

88. The following Trustees are recommended:

a.  Dr W.P. Swanepoel

b.  Mr P. Theron - the company auditor

c.  Mr D. Spamer - Director: Finances and Personnel at RRL.

89. This Trust will initially have the right to 25% of the shares in RRL. If RRL pays its debts to VZP, the shareholding can be expanded to 49% of the shares in RRL. The Trust will not issue all the shares, but will keep, some in reserve for new appointments or to offer to existing shareholders.

90. A large number of employees have already shown interest in taking up shares in RRL.

THE WPS TRUST

91. The interests of the SADF will be protected through the controlling RRL shares held by dr Swanepoel. If dr Swanepoel should die or become unfit for the post, the possibility exists that the interests of the SADF will no longer be served and the SADF will lose the money that it is still owed.

92. To provide for this, the shares of dr Swanepoel are kept in VZP in the WPS Trust. Dr Swanepoel is the managing trustee and beneficiary of the Trust. It is suggested that Mr P. Theron and mr D.J. Truter be appointed as co-trustees. In the event of dr Swanepoel’s death or incompetence Mr Theron will become the controlling trustee and will appoint a third trustee.

93. These trustees will then act on behalf of family insofar as property and voting rights are concerned. His family will not be able to appoint or remove trustees. This way the SADF will remain in control for as long as it will be necessary. As soon as VZP has paid off its debt to INFLADEL, the trust precautions no longer apply and dr Swanepoel gets full control.

94. In the event of the death of Mr P. Theron, the Trust provides for his substitution by a senior partner of the firm Coopers Theron du Toit, as appointed by mr Theron.

REQUESTED APPROVALS

95. The following approvals are requested:

a.  Approval for the concept for the sale of assets as suggested in this document.

b.  Approval for the transfer of the shares at nominal value to the management as well as related conditions suggested in this document - to be executed on 1 March 1991.

c.  Approval for the destruction of the signed share transfer certificates as suggested in this document.

d.  Approval for the recommended restructuring of RRL shares as suggested in the document. This includes the joining of VZP and any related company

e.  Approval for the transfer of the current RRL loan account to VZP on 1March 1991 under the conditions suggested in this document.

f.  Approval of a lease agreement between RRL and EGC.

g.  Approval of the option agreement between RRL and EGC (for RRL to buy EGC).

h.  Approval for the order as well as directives to be issued to the Chief of Staff Finances of the SADF with regard to the sale of the specific asset for the process to be implemented.

signed by:
(A.J. LIEBENBERG)
CHIEF OF THE SA DEFENCE FORCE: GENERAL

signed by:
(M.A. DE M. MALAN)
MINISTER OF DEFENCE

signed by:
(B.J. DU PLESSIS)
MINISTER OF FINANCE

____________________________________________________________

APPENDIX A TO HSF/UG/302/6/C123

DD AUGUST 1991

GROUP STRUCTURE AS DRAWN UP FOR 1 MARCH 1991 AND TO SERVE AS A FURTHER STEP AFTER THE APPROVAL AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MORATORIUM APPLICATION

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TOP SECRET

Reference: 8/10/9/3

Enquiries: J.E. van Heerden
Telephone:  323-7149

The Director -general
Department of Foreign Affairs
Private Bag X152
PRETORIA
0001

handwritten note:    11/10/91
AG/G (5)
For your information please

DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS IN RELATION TO PAYMENTS FROM THE SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF SA (ACT NO. 108 OF 1979) AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ACT NO. 38 OF 1967)

1. The Minister’s qualified authorisation on 13 September 1991 namely “Approved on the conditional approval of the Auditor General and on the condition that we have the authorisation” refers. The following comments are made:

2. Paragraph 3.1(a) of the Recommendations for the application of secret funds issued by the Department of Finance with the reference nr. TJ40/10/1 dated 3 September 1990, states inter alia that “Unless the Minister has approved any specifications regarding payments from secret funds, the prescribed specifications of the Financial Regulations and the Treasury -instructions apply. Any deviation from this regulation must be brought to the attention of the responsible Minister who has to approve it.” In the absence of any specific approval of your Minister in this regard, the      as contained in Chapter M of the Financial Guide apply.

3. If there is in your opinion, under certain conditions sufficient motivation to deviate from the period of disposal as mentioned in Chapter M of the Financial Guide your Minister will have to approve it. Such an approval will have to take place in accordance with sub-sections 2(2) and 2 respectively of the above-mentioned Special Acts.

4. As was already mentioned in the letter from this office on 20 December 1990, this office did not object to the destruction of the documents on the condition that a specially chosen auditor from this office audits the documents and a responsible official issues a certificate similar to the one described in the Treasury -instruction M1.3.2, Appendix

5. It must further be noted that all documents relating to expenses that do not yet make out a final debit against the account e.g. advanced payments, cannot be destroyed. It is also necessary for documents/documentary evidence relating to the following, to be safekept:

- Assets that are not finally disposed of

- Shareholding in institutions not belonging to the State e.g. companies and closed corporations

- Any form of outstanding loan or debit

- An unfinished project running for longer than one financial year and which has not yet been authorised.

6. With regard to the condition “directly after auditing” in the second paragraph of the approval mentioned it is important to note that the auditing cycle only expires after the Joint Committee on Public Accounts has discussed the report issued by this Office on Secret Funds and any decisions are made on these matters. No fixed dates can be determined at this stage due to the fact that the nature of the Committee gatherings will determine the duration of time. The Auditor’s approval will necessarily depend on the final conclusions of all outstanding audit enquiries with regard to a specific book year.

7. It is however suggested that the issue be discussed with the Director-general of State expenditure. A copy of this report will be handed over to the above-mentioned party.

The Director -general
Department of Foreign Affairs
Private Bag X152
PRETORIA
0001

FOR ATTENTION: MR E. POTGIETER

Copy for your attention. A similar authorisation was given by you in the case of the SADF with the reference nr TB1/1/1/UG dated 12/9/1988.

A handwritten note indicates that was the CCB.

AUDITOR GENERAL

handwritten note:  Copy to Mr K. Koekemoer

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TOP SECRET

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
PRIVATE BAG X367
0001
PRETORIA

T1/202/1/10/1

25 March 1992
Extension: 0451
Enquiries: Lt Genl C.P. van der Westhuizen

PROJECT JOTA

1. Project Jota is managed by the Surgeon General with brig (Dr) Wouter BASSON as the project officer. The purpose of Project Jota is to provide the SADF with the necessary offensive and defensive capabilities in the field of chemical and biological warfare.

2. To provide brig Basson with support the following organisations are involved:

a.  JOHN TRUTER FINANCIAL CONSULTANTS: The company is a closed corporation with D. J. Truter as the owner. It handles the financial aspects of Project JOTA.

b.  CENTURION SECURITY: The company is managed by Johan THERON. It handles all the security aspects of project JOTA. Mrs Rita ENGELBRECHT and one field worker handles the security clearances of the project members.

c.  BR HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD: Christopher Baden MARLOW is the director and through this company acts as a legal advisor to project JOTA.

3.An organigram is provided of the companies officially involved in project JOTA.

PROJECT JOTA

BSI/MEDCHEM

(Controlling organisation)

4. Relevant facts about these company/organisations:

a.  BSI/MEDCHEM : This is the controlling organisation of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC and has the role of a database for chemical and biological warfare (CBW). Mr (dr) Phillip Albert MIJBURGH is the director of the company. Full registrative details of this company are stored with the chief registrar.

b.  VAN ZYL AND PARTNERS: This company controls the biological aspect of project JOTA. RRL resorts under this company. Dr Wynand SWANEPOEL is the director of the company. Dr SWANEPOEL manages RRL through VAN ZYL AND PARTNERS.

c.  PROTECHNIC: This company is responsible for the contractual testing of commodities in offensive and defensive sides. Dr Wynand SWANEPOEL and dr Jan LOURENS are the chief orchestrators of this.

d.  TECHNOTEK: This company is responsible for the procurement and production of protective clothing for chemical warfare for the project itself, for the SADF and for ARMSCOR. The director of the company is Mr Charles VAN REMOORTRE. A certain Mr Barnard Paul Charles Maric ZIMMER is also indicated as a company director.

e.  LIFESTYLE MANAGEMENT SERVICES: The three company directors were/are, dr J.J. KOORTZEN, dr P.A. MIJBURGH and dr B.J. DAVEY. The company conducts defensive research in the CBW field and works on contract. It also provides medical assistance to RRL and DELTA G SCIENTIFIC.

5. DELTA G SCIENTIFIC resorts under BSI/MEDCHEM. The company is privatised and does contractual work for MEDCHEM and GG. The director of the company is dr P.A. MIJBURGH and dr L.B. PITHEY is the executive official.

6. VAN ZYL AND PARTNERS is the controlling organisation of Rrl which is the biological research facility for CBW. The directors are dr W.P. SWANEPOEL, mr D.W. SPAMER, mr S. JANSE VAN RENSBURG, dr A. IMMELMAN and mr T.J.R. VILJOEN. (However, according to the company registrar, mr VILJOEN resigned on 30 June 1990).

AFFILIATIONS

7. During an investigation conducted by (DMS) and counter-intelligence several affiliations which were unclear, were discovered. The reason for the unclarity was partly due to allegations made by various sources and the confusion around the precise outlay of the project and the involved organisations. Clarity about these matters was sought from dr BASSON and he provided satisfactory answers and explanations.

8. Dr BASSON explained the situation around AEROMED SERVICES. AEROMED SERVICES is not part of project JOTA although the company provides aeroplanes for the project members for overseas trips as well as for the transport of certain chemical commodities used by the project which cannot be imported through any other channels. An American friend of dr BASSON, mr David Allen WEBSTER once approached BASSON regarding a financial investment that he wanted to make in SA. Due to the fact that mr WEBSTER had often travelled to SA and that that he owned a Kingair, he wanted to invest the money in an aviation company. On request of mr WEBSTER dr BASSON suggested two available directors for the running of AEROMED SERVICES. They were Tjaart Johannes Retief VILJOEN and Wynand SWANEPOEL.

9. The aeroplanes that were used by AEROMED SERVICES, the Senecca, Jetstar and Kingair, belongs to a company called WPW INVESTMENTS. This company belongs to mr WEBSTER (In the initial stages of the project WPW was used as an importing channel for certain technical appliances).

10. Another friend of dr BASSON, mr BLUCHER from Germany, also owns shares in the company. The company that was initially directed by Antoinette Petro LOURENS (she resigned) and T.J.R. VILJOEN, was initially known as SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED.

11. WPW INVESTMENTS and AEROMED SERVICES are currently negotiating the purchase of sales. The people involved in the negotiations are mr WEBSTER and the legal advisor to project JOTA Adv. Christopher Baden MARLOW. The process of the transfer of shares is under way and the status of the developments is not clear.

12. Dr Wynand SWANEPOEL acted as the director of another company owned by mr D.A. WEBSTER, called WISDOM PROPS (PTY) LTD. Dr WEBSTER’S house that was built in Arcadia which dr BASSON and Jacques PAUW telephonically asked about, is registered under the name of the company. The situation here was that dr SWANEPOEL had bought a moratorium in the name of dr WEBSTER at the amount of 7-8 million rand for the establishment of his companies in SA. WISDOM PROPS (PTY) LTD was changed to WAAG ‘N BIETJIE BOERDERY and another company, PARTNERS AND TRAVELLERS was registered. According to dr BASSON this company was reasonably profitable but after incidents of fraud were discovered it was decided to close the company down. (Commentary: The Russian aviation company AEROFLOT is going to use the offices that are currently still being used by PARTNERS AND TRAVELLERS).

13. Mr T.J.R. VILJOEN closed down the ROODEPLAAT BREEDING FACILITIES (RBF), he received a package from RBF and then established PRETOKON (PTY) LTD. This company gives financial advice and is not connected to Project JOTA.

14. According to dr BASSON the company PROTEA CHEMICALS that is situated close to BETHLEHEM and of which dr Willie BASSON is the director, also has no connections with Project JOTA. Dr BASSON stated that at one stage PROTEA CHEMICALS had a two-year contract for the development of defensive commodities with regard to CBW. Dr Willie BASSON who was previously employed by DELTA G SCIENTIFIC negotiated with PROTECHNIK about the development and the procurement of gasmasks. With the exception of this arrangement there were no other contractual agreements and no other link to dr Willie BASSON. Dr Willie BASSON does however see some of the chief organisers of the project on a social level.

15. Dr Phillip Albert MIJBURGH expanded his private interests by becoming involved in several other companies. One of these companies is KOWALSKI INTERNATIONAL, an import-export business. Dr MIJBURGH bought 50% of the shares in the company and directs it together with dr Z.E. KOWALSKI who is of Polish decent. The company strives to establish trade relations with Eastern European countries. The company trades inter alia in safety equipment for mines and machinery spare parts. According to dr BASSON dr KOWALSKI or KOWALSKI INTERNATIONAL has none whatsoever connections to or has no knowledge of the project activities of dr BASSON and dr MIJBURGH.

16. Dr BASSON also explained the involvement of the young Russian SERGEY V. EVSTIGNEEV in BASSON’s last visit to MOSCOW. According to dr BASSON EVSTIGNEEV had fled Russia and had gone Britain before he obtained a temporary working permit in South Africa. Mr KOWALSKI of KOWALSKI INTERNATIONAL employed the young Russian, who had an excellent flair for languages. Dr BASSON had (presumably) heard from Dr MIJBURGH about the Russian who was able to speak some Afrikaans after only six months in South Africa and he decided to take him with to Russia to act as a translator. Dr MIJBURGH, who accompanied BASSON on this trip to establish trade relations with Russia also made use of the translatory skills of EVSTIGNEEV. Dr BASSON used the bona fide visit of dr MIJBURGH as a cover for his activities. They used the Jetstar of WPW through AEROMED SERVICES.

17. A number of allegations were made by members of ARMSCOR or members who were through ARMSCOR involved in similar projects. The projects alluded to are Project ACADEMIC and Project GALVANIZE of the SA Airforce and the CS Army respectively. These two projects were involved in the defensive aspect of CBW. Members of the projects, in conjunction with ARMSCOR, were in contact with the defensive aspect of Project JOTA. The members did however also have knowledge of project JOTA and started asking questions about the project. The questions were e.g.: “Where is the proof of the DCC’ approval of the project” and “What is the staff target of project JOTA” and “Why does project JOTA buy gasmasks elsewhere if they can be purchased by Armscor at a much lower price”. Dr BASSON explained that due to the sensitive nature of Project JOTA ARMSCOR was not supposed to know that the project deals with both the defensive as well as the offensive aspect of CBW and he could also not reveal to them that the purchase of the defensive aspects are used for the offensive research purposes of the project. The companies TECHNOTEK and PROTECHNIK are the chief purchasers/producers of defensive commodities e.g. gasmasks and protective clothing. Dr BASSON also said that in the initial stages of the project TECHNOTEK was used for the import of the necessary technological equipment. A Belgian Mr “Jean Pierre BERNARD” was responsible for this task.

18. Dr BASSON is aware of the allegations made about him by dr MEYER to the journalist Jaques PAUW. It is clear that dr MEYER and dr BASSON don’t see eye to eye. Dr BASSON says that dr MEYER has absolutely no connection to Project JOTA and that he only knows him through his ex- wife.

19. Mr Karel KOEN who ran the company SA WORKING DOGS which had at some stage been a part of the project, established his own company called VIDEOTRONIC. Dr BASSON says that Karel KOEN has no current involvements in the project and that the last payment was made to him in March 1992.

20. After the closing OF ROODEPLAAT BREEDING FACILITIES, Dr Wynand SWANEPOEL negotiated with the Department of Public Works the selling of the land on which RBL was situated and that has been expropriated by the state in the interim, to the SAP. According to dr BASSON, the Directorate followed this modus operandi to avoid offers from private tenders and to explain the SAP’s sole rights to the land.

21. According to dr BASSON, Jerry BRANDT who owned LABCHEM (that does no longer exist) and mr L.B. PITHEY (the executive official of DELTA G) were ‘alienating’ (vervreem) certain chemicals from DELTA G. The situation was discussed with genl-maj D.R. VIRBEEK (C DIR CI) and genl-maj R.A. KNIPE (dep-genl). Dr BASSON says that the situation is now under control but that he requested Sub section Counter Intelligence to assist him in the monitoring of the PITHEY-situation.

22. Dr BASSON states that genl-maj Lothar NEETHLING was fully briefed about Project JOTA. They (dr BASSON and genl NEETHLING) use each other as sounding boards for the development and use of certain commodities. Dr BASSON however says that due to the court case around the CCB-activities that involves genl NEETHLING, it is possible that he (NEETHLING) has become embittered and can be seen as a “wounded lion”.

23. According to dr BASSON dr Ben STEYN was fully briefed about Project JOTA and if anything were to happen to dr BASSON, dr STEYN would be in a position to take over as project officer.

24. Charl JACKSON's court action against RRL in the Industrial Court is still under way. It is believed that the situation will drag on for several months.

25. According to dr BASSON no members of the Medical Faculty at the University of Pretoria are involved in the project.

26. According to dr BASSON the only possible connection to SENTRACHEM, which is affiliated to the Sanlam-group, is when genl Magnus MALAN approached the director of SENTRACHEM regarding the possible sale of DELTA G SCIENTIFIC and SENTRACHEM. This however never took place.

27. BASSON denied any current involvement of dr Deon ERASMUS and Antionette LOURENS in Project JOTA. Dr BASSON thought that Deon ERASMUS and co. were in Canada but he could not be sure of this.

28. The Seneca of Special Forces was purchased by WPW INVESTMENTS for dr WEBSTER by the instrumentality of dr BASSON.

signed by:

(C.P. VAN DER WESTHUIZEN)

CHIEF OF STAFF INTELLIGENCE: LT GENL

DISTR

For Action
CSADF (Exclusively)
For Info
Surgeon General (Exclusively)
Intern
TI/202/1/10/1

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TOP SECRET

HSF/UG/302/6/C123/5/1

Telephone: 322-6641

Extension:  360/1
Enquiries: Genl maj B.S. Raubenheimer

Chief of the SA Defence Force
Dept Finances
Private Bag X175
PRETORIA
0001
1 June 1992

Surgeon General  (For attention Brig Basson)

DISPOSAL: PROJECT COAST DOCUMENTS

1. Your letter of May 1992 requesting authorisation for the destruction of Project COAST documents after completion of the audit for the specific financial year, refers.

2. Attached please find a copy of page 3 of a letter from the Chief of the Defence Force endorsing that the request is denied.

signed by:

(GENL MAJ B.S. RAUBENHEIMER)
CHIEF OF THE SA DEFENCE FORCE: GENERAL

/svc/projcoast

Attachment:

c. Documentation that refers to the following aspect, must be safekept:

i.  Assets that are not fully distributed.

ii.  Shareholding in institutions that are not State controlled e.g. companies and closed corporations.

iii.  Any form of outstanding loan or debtor.

11. After ministerial authorisation is obtained, authorisation from the Auditor General will have to be obtained.

AUTHORISATION REQUESTED

12. Authorisation is requested, in terms of paragraph 3(a) of the Recommendations for the Application of Secret Funds as issued by the Department of Finance with reference nr TJ40/10/1 dated 3 September 1990, for the destruction of Project COAST documentation for the specific financial year after completion of the auditing process for the specific year. This authorisation will also bear reference to the beginning of Project COAST in 1982 and will include all documentation with regard to the project that is being safekept by the SA Defence Force, the Auditor General and the State Attorney.

13. The destruction will be executed subject to the conditions laid out by the Auditor General in this document.

(A.J. LIEBENBERG)
CHIEF OF THE SA DEFENCE FORCE: GENERAL

wB/SvW

handwritten note: 1. This is not recommended at this stage.

2. We shall have to wait for directives to be issued by “KIK”. This soon will be done. **

signed by genl LIEBENBERG

**(researcher’s note: “KIK”: This may refer to the Co-ordinating Intelligence Committee. At the time that Leibenberg signed the letter he was the head of the Defence Force.)

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TOP SECRET

March 1994

FURTHER BACKGROUND INFORMATION WITH REGARD TO THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROJECT FOR THE STATE PRESIDENT.

1. The project functioned from 1983 to 1992 after which time it was closed.

2. All research was conducted at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories. From 1983 to 1990 all the work was done on an informal basis and no official contracts were signed. From 1990 official research contracts were signed through Armscor and Protechnik. The SADF never entered into any contract with RRL directly.

3. All official projects were defensive in nature. The scientists did grow organisms and some genetic changes were made to organisms, but this was for the development of vaccines and antidotes. With the closing of the project all the organisms were destroyed, with the exception of one that is used for the development of an enzyme against organophosphates

4. As far as we know, officially no biological agents were used offensively.

5. In November 1983 Roodeplaat Research Laboratories was established with State funding and functioned in that capacity until privatisation in September 1991. They also did private work during this period in order to generate extra funds. After privatisation they were mainly dependent on private contracts for an income. The company closed down in March 1994 due to a lack of funding. Most of the movable assets area already sold, the land and the buildings are still up for sale.

6. The only work that is still being done for the SADF/Armscor, is the development of the enzyme referred to in paragraph 3. This is being done by a few scientists who have created a closed corporation in their own names. It is highly unlikely that the work will continue in the new financial year.

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Reference: CS PLAN/DMO/UG/302/6/A576
Telephone: 291-2050
Enquiries: Col M.F. Botha

Chief of Staff Planning
Private Bag X101
Pretoria
0001

21 September 1987

MEMORANDUM
From: CS Plan
To: Defence Command Council

ORDINANCE TARGET: PROJECT ACADEMIC
PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this presentation is to obtain the approval for the ordinance target for a project to establish a defensive chemical and biological warfare programme in the SA Defence Force.

SUMMARY

2. Approval is sought for:

a.  The continuation of the feasibility study.

b.  The appointment of the SA Army as co-ordinating/controlling institution.

c.  The composition of a project team with the SA Army as the chair/co-ordinator and representatives of the other defence force divisions and Special Forces.

d.  That the feasibility study and further development be conducted on the factual basis of fulfilling a need of the SA Army and that budget action should be supported by the whole of the defence force as well as Special Forces.

e.  That only the operational aspects of application of chemical and..........

(pages missing)

10. The recommendation is that the DCC approves the following:

a.  The continuation of the feasibility study.

b.  The appointment of the SA Army as co-ordinating/controlling body of the project, and to involve other defence force divisions, Special Forces and divisions of staff where necessary in the further development of the project.

c. The composition of a project team with the SA Army as the chair/co-ordinator (project leader) and representatives of the other defence force divisions and Special Forces.

d. For the feasibility study, the further development and the eventual establishment of a CBW capacity within the SA Defence Force, to be conducted against the background of the need for the SA Army to have such a capacity, and that the budget action and availability of funding, as recommended by the project team, be supported by the whole of the defence force and Special forces on a pro rata basis.

e.  That the project only deals with the operational aspects with regard to chemical and biological defensive precautions and that the Surgeon General should be responsible for a separate project to deal with the establishment of applied research laboratories and other medical aspects. An order should be issued to the SG in this regard.

signed by:

CHIEF OF STAFF PLANNING: LT GENL
MFB/157/mb(4)

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TOP SECRET
PAYMENTS OF COAST PROJECTS: FLOW OF FUNDS
(organigram)

PROJECT COAST : CODES FOR OBJECTIVES

01 : Establishment of facilities for CBW research.
02 : Establishment of security cover and systems for CBW research.
03 : Establishment of security systems for CBW research.
04 : Conducting CBW research.
05 : Establishment of an industrial CBW capacity.
06 : Running of a CBW technical information system.
07 : Conducting CBW operations.
08 : CBW operational support to the security forces.

PROJECT COAST : SUB-OBJECTIVES

01 : Establishment of research facilities

01/01 : BLUET
01/02 : KASSA
01/03 : Other

02 : Establishment of security cover

02/01 : BLUET
02/02 : KASSA
02/03 : ROT
02/04 : Other

03: Establishment of security systems

03/01 : Emergency service : LSM
03/02 : Emergency service : Equipment-Medical
03/03 : Emergency service : Equipment-Special
03/04 : Emergency service : Communication
03/05 : Emergency service : Vehicles
(handwritten): 03/06 : Emergency service : Training

04: Conducting of research

04/01 : BLUET
04/02 : KASSA
04/03 : Protea Chemicals
04/04 : Protechnik
04/05 : LSM
04/06 : QB Labs
04/07 : LANNIUS
04/08 : Admin/Financial Services
04/09 : Other

05 : Establishment of an industrial capacity

05/01 : BLUET
05/02 : Technotek
05/03 : Protechnik
05/04 : QB Labs
05/05 : Other

06 : Running of a CBW technical information system

06/01 : BLUET
06/02 : KASSA
06/03 : ROT
06/04 : CHANCELLOR
06/05 : Protechnik
06/06 : LSM
06/07 : AP
06/08 : Visitors
06/09 :Other

07 : Conducting CBW operations

07/01 : CHANCELLOR
07/02 : Chris
07/03 : Koos
07/04 : Mielie
07/05 : Hekkies
07/06 : Barries
07/07 : Konvensioneel
07/08 : Other

08 : CBW Operational support to Security services

08/01 : Training
08/02 : Defensive Equipment
08/03 : Offensive Equipment
(handwritten) : 08/04 : Other

PROJECT COAST : TARGET CODES

01 : Establishment of research facilities

01/01 : BLUET
01/01/01 : (handwritten) : Building program
01/01/02
01/01/03
01/01/04

01/02 : KASSA
01/02/01 : (handwritten) : Building program
01/02/02
01/02/03
01/02/04

01/03 : Other
01/03/01 :
01/03/02
01/03/03

02 : Establishment of security cover

02/01 : BLUET
02/01/01 : Project Fires
02/01/02 : RPH
02/01/03
02/01/04
02/02 : KASSA
02/02/01 : Chu PM
02/02/02 :
02/02/03
02/03 : ROT
02/03/01 : Establishment of facilities
02/03/02 : Operation
02/03/03 : Research/Product development
02/04 : Other
02/04/01 :
02/04/02 :
02/04/03

03: Establishment of security systems

03/01 : Emergency service : LSM
03/01/01 : Medical Emergency Services
03/01/02 : Industrial Emergency Services
03/01/03
03/02 : Emergency service : Equipment-Medical
03/02/01 : 7 Med Bn Gp
03/02/02 : CHANCELLOR
03/02/03 : Other
03/03 : Emergency service : Equipment-Special
03/03/01 : 7 Med Bn Gp
03/03/02 : CHANCELLOR
03/03/03 : Other
03/04 : Emergency service : Communication
03/04/01 : Radio telephones:CHANCELLOR
03/04/02 : Radio telephones:7 Med Bn Gp
03/04/03 : Radio telephones:CHANCELLOR
03/05 : Emergency service : Vehicles
03/05/01 : Vehicles:CHANCELLOR
03/05/02 : Vehicles:7 Med Bn Gp
(handwritten): 03/06 : Emergency service : Training
03/06/01 : Training in operational health

04: Conducting of research

04/01 : BLUET
04/01/01 :(handwritten:)21-9010-88  Database
04/01/02 : (handwritten:)42-9005-88  B2 Analogue
04/01/03 : (handwritten:)42-9093-89
04/01/04 : (handwritten:)42-9101-89  FBHA
04/01/05 : (handwritten:)42-9001-88  003 Derivatives
04/01/06 : (handwritten:)42-9003-88 Analogues
04/01/07 : (handwritten:)45-9008-88  Peptide Antiviral agent
04/02 : KASSA
04/02/01 :
04/02/02 :
04/02/03 :
04/03 : Protea Chemicals
04/03/01 : Material qualification
04/03/02 : Threat Definition
04/03/03 : Ion Mobility Detector
04/03/04 : Respiratory Protection
04/04 : Protechnik
04/04/01 : CB Tactical Evaluation and Planning model
04/04/02
04/05 : LSM
04/05/01 : (handwritten:) Physiology
04/05/02 : Psychological Impact
04/05/03 : Verification
(handwritten:) 04/05/04 : Skin decontamination-Toxicity
(handwritten:) 04/05/05 : LSM Data mon.
04/06 : QB Labs
04/06/01 :
04/06/02 :
04/06/03 :
04/07 : LANNIUS
04/07/01 :(handwritten:) Operation
04/07/02 :
04/08 : Admin/Financial Costs
04/08/01 : Project JAUNT
04/08/02 : CHANCELLOR
(handwritten:) 00/00/00/01  Fixed assets

02  Salaries

03  Rent

04  Vehicle costs

05  Gen. admin

06  Data and information

04/09 :Other

04/09/01

The document is undated. It is classified TOP SECRET. No author is apparent nor recipient. Basson's handwriting appears on page 3 and 4. The first page sets out diagrammatically the structure of the programme. Code names are used. Codes are also given to the project goals including:

Establishment of facilities for CBW research
Establishment of security covers and systems for CBW research
Establishment of security systems for CBW research
CBW research
Creation of an industrial capability with regard to CBW
CBW technical information system
Carrying out of CBW operations
CBW operational support to the security forces

The rest of the document provides code-names for each of the sub-sections which fall under these main headings. Under the heading CBW operations (page 2) a list of code-names appears, including: CHANCELLOR Chris Koos Meilies Hekkies Barries Conventional and Other project; Project; Basson; Codes; Finances; Operation; NOT IN FILE
Top secret document Financial document

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD

H-CODE SERIES : 1986
CODE PROJECT
86/H/01/30 Isolation of Monensin
86/H/02/30 Isolation of Lasalocid
86/H/03/30 Making up of Application formulations - Paraoxon
86/H/04/30 Synthesis of Paraoxon
86/H/05/70 the effect of mannan on semen parameters
86/H/06/50 Determining the toxicity levels of Nitroxynil
86/H/07/30 Development of new psychotropic agent of the BZ type
86/H/08/30 Isolation of M11352
86/H/09/30 Synthesis of Paraoxon (100-150g)
86/H/10/50 Toxicity of Brodifakum
86/H/11/50 Determining the toxicity of Nitroxynil in Primate
86/H/12/30 Isolation of Ivermectin from Injectable Ivomac
86/H/13/30 Establishing a database for organophosphates
86/H/14/30 Establishing a database for psychotropic agents
86/H/15/50 Determining the toxicity of Sesbanimyde
86/H/16/30 Stability of a PO/Nicotine combination
86/H/17/30 Tobacco as an application route
86/H/18/30 Isolation of Aldicarb
86/H/19/80 The development of a fertility test model for baboons
86/H/20/80 The development of heart function evaluation techniques for baboons and dogs
86/H/21/50 Evaluation of the different treatments for Brodifakum poisoning in primates.
86/H/22/50 Determining the effect of heat treatment of Brodifakum on mammals.
86/H/23/50 Determining the toxicity of a PO and Nicotine combination in the dog.
R/86/H/24 Biological explosives detector
86/H/25/50 Determining the toxicity of Akonitine in blue-apes
86/H/26/30 Stability of Aconitine in a solution
86/H/27/70* Effect of lonydamine on semen parameters
86/H/28/50* Toxic evaluation of salitrane
86/H/29/70 Effect of monensin on semen parameters
86/H/30/60 The preparation of the alfa toxin of Clostridium perfringens Type A
86/H/31/50 Identification of unknown substance
86/H/32/30 Isolation of Salinomysin from Salocin
86/H/33/30 Synthesis of a Cyclic Fosforester
86/H/34/50* Application routes of PO
86/H/35/30 Development of analytical methods:
chromatographic determination of Akonytine
Alkaloids in formulations, biological liquids and animal tissue
86/H/36/30 Development of analytical methods:
chromatographic determination of the tetracyclin antibiotic and structural analogues in formulations, biological liquids and animal tissue
86/H/37/30 Development of analytical methods:
chromatographic determination of Monensin and related antibiotics formulations, biological liquids and animal tissue
86/H/38/70 The evaluation of the anti - fertility potential of hCG-Derivatives
86/H/39/70 The evaluation of the anti - fertility potential of LDH-C4 combinations
86/H/40/70 The evaluation of the anti - fertility potential of LDH-C4 inhibitor combinations.

ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD

H-CODE SERIES : 1986
CODE PROJECT
85/H/!/40 Toxicity of ionophore antibiotic in baboons
85/H/2/40 Literature evaluation of methods to determine toxins water
85/H/3/40 Investigating methods to determine toxins in water
85/H/4/40 Toxicity of paraoxon in baboons after oral application
85/H/5/70 Reproductive immunology - State of the Art
85/H/6/70 Biological Explosives detector
85/H/7/40 Literature study of toxicity of ionophore antiobiotic.
85/H/8/40 Literature study of toxicity of nitrophenol and salysilanylides
85/H/9/80 Evaluation of methods for measuring the impact of explosives
85/H/!0/70 The isolation of Sertolicells from testes and the method to rouse a body response
85/H/11/70 Carcinogenic and chronic toxicity of Fusarium moniliforme

R 1 - RRL Effect of Lonidamine on semen parameters
R 2 - RRL Toxic evaluation of Salitrane
R 3 - RRL Application routes of PO (the same as R0028)
R 7 - Res + Dev Toxicity of Salinomysine
R 8- Res + Dev Chromatograhic det of Phenylsiltrane
R 9 - Res + Dev Determining the toxicity of Metomil in mammals
R 10 - Res + Dev Synthesis of Lonidamine
R 12 - RRL Collecting bacteria and yeasts for RRL collection
R 16 - Res + Dev Extraction of Brodifakum from Cooper’s Finale
R 18 - Res + Dev Cloning gene coding spermspecific antigenes
R 19 - Res + Dev Cloning gene coding sertolicellspecific antigenes
R 20 - RRL a. To evaluate the toxicity of trichlorphon
R 20 - RRL b. To determine the effect of certain agents on AChE and alisterasis
R 23 - Res + Dev Synthesis and continuous supplication of Paraoxon
R 25 - Res + Dev Organotin verb: chemical synthesis, chem and physical characteristics
R 26 - Res + Dev Determining the toxicity of ALDC in baboons
R 28 - Res + Dev Evaluation of different formulations of PO
R 33 - Res + Dev Characteristics, application and analysis Vit D3 (cholecalciferol)
R 41 - RNL Determining anti-zona pellucida antibodies Eliza
R 43 - RNL Purification of N-methyl-4-piperindenil-benz
R - RNL Evaluation of the immediate effect test prod mouse zooids
R 46 - Res + Dev Synthesis of Isobenzan
R 49 - Res + Dev Aldicarb from Temik on demand
R 51 - Res + Dev Collecting of information on chemical characteristics freons
R 55 - Res + Dev Synthesis of TMD
R 56 - Res + Dev Analysis of Cosmos
R 57 - Res + Dev Conversion of T10Ac
R 63 - Res + Dev Immunological response after imm S-peptide
R 64 - Res + Dev Semen evaluation of M-peptide immunisation
R 65 - Res + Dev Neutralising ability biological effect hCG
R 67 - Res + Dev Elisa M-peptide carrier conjugate
R 68 - Res + Dev Synthesis of the M-peptide
R 69 - Res + Dev Connecting S-peptide production
R 70 - Res + Dev Connecting M-peptide production
R 71 - Res + Dev Elisa determining S-peptide carrier conjugate
R 72 - Res + Dev Synthesis and characteristics of PSM
R 74 - Res + Dev Immunisation baboons M-peptide carrier conjugate
R 75 - Res + Dev Development protocols selected organosilicone
R 76 - Res + Dev Synthesis 4-isopropyl - code TPO
R - Res + Dev Synthesis 7 - code MEQ
R 78 - Res + Dev Determination of perineal swelling and fertility of normal baboons
R 79 - Res + Dev Testing of products for Research development
R 80 - Res + Dev Stability tests on gr negative bacteria
R 82 - Res + Dev Diverse chemical services
R 83 - Res + Dev Monofluoro acetic acid, etc.
R 84 - Res + Dev Preparation Staphylococcus aureus
R 87 - Res + Dev Isolation of bacteria - organic phosphates detox
R 88 - Res + Dev Diverse chemical services
R 90 - Res + Dev Evaluation of toxicity of JIG
R 91 - Res + Dev Preparation Bacillus anthracis resistivity
R 93 - Res + Dev Model for the evaluation of substance Cosmos
R 94 - Res + Dev Plannproject on group agents (Cabbage) (Dieldrin 1) (Isobenzate)
R 103 - Res + Dev Duration of aprofen protection
R 104 - Res + Dev Effect of Phenobarbutal on toxicity of Delnav
R 107 - Res + Dev Microsurgery
R 111 - Res + Dev Growing and dry-freezing of Vibro cholera EL Tor Inaba
R 113 - Res + Dev Cloning alfa toxin gene Clostr perfringens
R 114 - Res + Dev Use of organophosphates through bacteria
R 117 - Res + Dev Planning project toxin study Aprophen (Aspro)
R 119 - Res + Dev Isolation fo Sertolicells in effect of immunisation
R 124 - Res + Dev Freeze-drying of anaerobic organisms
R 126 - Res + Dev The prophylactic application of aprophen primates
R 132 - Res + Dev The analysis of biological samples (APA)
R 133 - Res + Dev Determining the effect of the application of FCA on metabolites.
R 169 - Res + Dev Determining the toxicity of substance Mushroom prep Microbiol.
R 174 - Res + Dev CER Investigate characteristics, synthesis, stability of cholinestarysis reactiv.
R 179 - Res + Dev Determining the toxicity of NUTS in dogs and primates
R 182 - Res + Dev Eval. the effect deglycosided tests products
R 187 - Res + Dev Evaluation of nuclear magnetic resonans - mannane
R 194 - Res + Dev Aprophen as therapeutic agent @ organophosphate exposure
R 195- Res + Dev Use APE: therapeutic agent, prophylactic comb HI-6
R 214 - Res + Dev Plannproject calming effects of TRIAM
R 236 - Res + Dev Qual and quant analysis of biological reactive agents
R 239 - Res + Dev Investigation isolated muscle/inhibition therapy organophosphate
R 240 - Res + Dev Investigation breakdown organophosphates Flavobacteria ATCC 1275
R 243 - Res + Dev Synthesis and properties of numbr organosilicon compound
R 261 - Res + Dev Establishing brain cell cultures for evaluation of cell functions
R 262- Res + Dev Literature study: Breakdown of organophosphates
R 268 - Res + Dev Production monoclonal antibody for E-toxin
R 269 - Res + Dev Production monoclonal antibody for anti-cholinest
R 273 - Res + Dev Acetylcholin antibody producing cellines
R 276 - Res + Dev purchase, maintenance, of brain and liver cells
R 278 - Res + Dev Technique development of brain cell cultures
R 279 - Res + Dev Detailed SWP immunofluorensic evaluation of microtubuli
R 280 - Res + Dev Determining the toxicity of water sample in rats
R 282 - Res + Dev Determining cardiotoxicity of substance MONTY (Narasin)
R 285 - Res + Dev Pathogens org involved in unusual break outs local population
R 286 - Res + Dev Literature study: Methods protection personnel and
R 288 - Res + Dev Literature study: Microorganisms to organophosphate
R 289 -DrAImmelman Toxic effect fibroblasts
R 299 - Res + Dev Breakdown organophosphate: ATCC 12775 - Baked, soil, thickened
R 309 - Res + Dev Synthesis of Azoprophen
R 318 - Res + Dev Technique application microtubuli SWP on Neuroncells and Astrosites
R 321 - Res + Dev Brain cell microtubuli evaluation after in vit exposure to
R 322 - Res + Dev Literature study: Cal det on brain cell cultures S-100
R 323 - Res + Dev Isolation of Maduramicin from Cygro
R 338 - Res + Dev Purchase, maintenance, and defrosting of brain-
R 350 - Res + Dev Cl perfringens type B
R 351 - Res + Dev Cl perfringens type A
R 357 - Res + Dev Det of in vivo tox/rats with soil, baked, taffy
R 358 - Res + Dev Det of in vivo tox of substances xTPO in rats
R 385 - Res + Dev no information
R 42 - RRL Isolation zona pellucida protein pig ovaries
R 45 - RRL Evaluation short and long term test products litter of mice
R 47 - Res + Dev Growth, freeze-drying and availability of pathogens
R 58 - Res + Dev Synthesis of VX
R 66 - Res + Dev Immunisation baboons S peptide carrier conjugate
R 118 - Res + Dev Literature study: after alternative sperm -antig
R 127 - Res + Dev Synthesis of aprophen
R 129 - Res + Dev To the effect of acute toxicity of selsun on primates and dogs
R 150 - Res + Dev Determination of minimum dosage aprophen for protection
R 176 - Res + Dev Produce antiserum for sperm after sialidysis treatment
R 197 - Res + Dev Literature study use protamines alt sperm antigenes
R 70 - Res + Dev
R 57 - Res + Dev
R 63 - Res + Dev
R 64 - Res + Dev
R 65 - Res + Dev
R 67 - Res + Dev
R 68 - Res + Dev
R 69 - Res + Dev
R 70 - Res + Dev
R 57 - Res + Dev
R 63 - Res + Dev
R 64 - Res + Dev
R 65 - Res + Dev
R 67 - Res + Dev
R 68 - Res + Dev
R 69 - Res + Dev
R 70 - Res + Dev
R 57 - Res + Dev
R 63 - Res + Dev
R 64 - Res + Dev
R 65 - Res + Dev
R 67 - Res + Dev
R 68 - Res + Dev
R 69 - Res + Dev
R 70 - Res + Dev
R 57 - Res + Dev
R 63 - Res + Dev
R 64 - Res + Dev
R 65 - Res + Dev
R 67 - Res + Dev
R 68 - Res + Dev
R 69 - Res + Dev
R 70 - Res + Dev
R 57 - Res + Dev
R 63 - Res + Dev
R 64 - Res + Dev
R 65 - Res + Dev
R 67 - Res + Dev
R 68 - Res + Dev
R 69 - Res + Dev
R 70 - Res + Dev
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
WORK INSTRUCTION
(to be handed in duplicate)

Date:..../..../.....
FROM :(signature of) Andre Immelman TO: Dr. K Psotta
Description of order: (Please attach all relevant literature to ensure prompt feedback with regard to the feasibility of the order)
Manufacturing of pure paraoxon following already determined procedures.

Service/Product needed:...........................
Frequency/Quantity/How much is needed: +- 20 gram
Date when needed:..../...../.....to...../.../.....as soon as possible

Signed: (signature of) A. Immelman

FEASIBILITY
FROM: (signature of) K. Psotta TO: A. Immelman
The above-mentioned order is: * feasible, but only (handwritten): after medical support is organised.
Projected duration of time: two weeks
Signed: (signature of) K. Psotta Date 28/1/86
*Attached please find request for project registration
____________________________________________________________
ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
MEMO
FROM: K. Psotta TO: A. Immelman
DATE: 07-02-1986
SUBJECT: Project 86/H/4/30
This project is completed; 35,66g of the product PO (S-7) was manufactured.
(signed by) K. Psotta

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) (LTD)
TELEKS: 3-22344(SA)
TEL: (012) -82-1012
P.O. BOX 13873
SINOVILLE
0129

PROJECT REPORT
DATE: 01/05/86
PROJECT NR: 86/H/8/30
PURPOSE: Isolation of MI1352 (Brodifacum)
PERSON WHO ISSUED THE INSTRUCTION: RNL (A. Immelman)
MOTIVATION: Need
INSTRUCTION: a) Isolate the active ingredient from Coopers ‘FINALE’
b) Investigate the possibility of synthesis
RESULTS: a) Isolation executed as instructed:
222 mg of the substance was delivered to Dr A Immelman on 25/04/86, and 745 mg delivered to Dr J Davies on 30//04/86.
b) Synthesis was investigated and a memo was sent on 188/04/86.
CONCLUSIONS: The project is completed.
PROJECT TEAM: K Psotta
(signature of): K. Psotta

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PROJECT REPORT (NO1)

PROJECT NUMBER 86/H/010/50
23 JUNE 1986

AIM: To determine the toxicity of Brodifacum in the blue ape.
MOTIVATION: Clinical poisonings.
TEST SAMPLE: Brodifacum (Coopers Finale)

METHOD:
1. Facility: RRL

2. Experimental animals: 9 Adult blue apes.

3. Groups used for treatment:
a. 1 Control animal
b. Group 1-2 apes orally treated against 125 microg/kg.
c. Group 2-2 apes orally treated against 250 microg/kg.
d. Group 3-2 apes orally treated against 500 microg/kg.
e. Group 4-2 apes orally treated against 1000 microg/kg.

4. Accommodation: Conventional cages.

5. Nutrition: PVM enriched maize meal porridge.

6.Special treatment:
a. Blood samples for APTT determined at 0h, 8h, 24h, 48h, 72h, 96h and 120h.
b. Clinical observations.
c. Thorough post mortem.

Results:
1. See table for APTT times and dosages.
2. The first clinical symptoms were detected 48 hours after treatment in ape nr 7 that was treated at 1000 micro gram/kg. At this stage only the saliva was red as a result of bleeding of the mucous membranes.
3. Ape nr 3 bled to death from the femoral artery during the night after blood samples were taken earlier on from the blood vessel for APTT evaluations.
4. Nr 6; at a dosage of 1000 micro gram/kg the ape dies after 280 hours - bleeding detected in the intestinal wall, the abdominal wall, subcutane and in the sceletal muscles.
5. The conclusion is that the blue-ape has a high resistance to Brodifacum compared to the rat and the experiment failed to determine a toxic dose for the species.

Recommendation:
1.Repeat the experiment on another species.
2. Repeat the experiment on a larger blue ape.
Project team: Drr JH Davies (Project leader)
A Immelman

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
DATE: 30/07/1986

APPLICATION TO REGISTER A PROJECT.
TYPE OF PROJECT:
AIM/PROJECT/TITLE: To determine the toxicity of P.O. and nicotine as a combination in the dog.
PERSON WHO ISSUED THE INSTRUCTION: Dr. André Immelman.
SPECIES: Beagle
FACILITY: RRL
ESTIMATED COSTS: R.....
(calculation of expenses attached as proof)
PLANNED DATE FOR COMMENCEMENT: 04/08/86
PLANNED DATE FOR CONCLUSION: 04/11/86
SERVICES NEEDED FOR THE PROJECT:
Division/Person: Service:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
MOTIVATION: See sketch protocol attached (and an overview of the Project*)
PROJECT LEADER: Dr. James Davies.

APPROVAL
This project is approved and registered under the following project nr:
....../......./....../....(under the following conditions):................

for BOARD OF DIRECTORS DATE:...../.../...
_____________________________________________________
ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
DATE: 30/07/1986
PROJECT NR: 86/H/ /50
PROTOCOL (NR 1)

AIM: To determine the toxicity of P.O. and nicotine as a combination in the dog.
PERSON WHO ISSUED THE INSTRUCTION: Dr. André Immelman
TEST SAMPLE: P.O.
Nicotine
METHOD:
1. Facility: RRL

2. Experimental animals: 9 Adult Beagles.

3. Groups used for treatment:
a. Group 1: 3 Beagles to be orally dosed with P.O. at ? mg/kg.
c. Group 2: 3 Beagles to be orally dosed with nicotine at 1mg/kg.
d. Group 3: 3 Beagles to be orally dosed with P.O. at ? mg/kg together with nicotine at ? mg/kg.

4.Accommodation: Conventional cages.

5. Nutrition: Epol dog pellets and water ad lib.

6.Special treatment:
a. Blood samples for cholinesterase evaluations on serum and acetylcholinesterase evaluations on pedigree……………..
b. . Clinical observations.
c. Thorough post mortem.
Procedure:
a. Day 0: Weigh the animals, take blood samples, determine dosages for treatment and apply dosage/s.
b. Day 1: Take blood samples 24 hours after treatment. Hourly clinical observations.
c. Day 2-7: Take blood samples every 24 hours. Clinical observations 4 times a day.

SAMPLES TO BE TAKEN:
1. Blood for cholin and acetylcholinestasis evaluations.
2. Carcass for PM.

PROJECT TEAM: DrrJH Davies (Project leader) (signature)
A immelman

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
DATE: 31July 1986
PROJECT NR: 86/H/11/50
PROJECT REPORT (NR 1)

AIM: To determine the toxicity of Nitroxynil in Primates.
MOTIVATION: Clinical applications.
TEST SAMPLE: Nitroxynil (Trodox, Maybaker).
METHOD:
1. Facility: RRL

2. Experimental animals: 9 Adult Blue sapes.

3. Groups used for treatment:
a. 1 Control ape.
b. 2 Apes to be injected with 0,1 mg/kg live mass.
c. 2 Apes to be orally dosed at 0,1 mg/kg live mass.
d. 2 Apes to be orally dosed at 0,5 mg/kg live mass.
e. 2 Apes to be orally dosed at 1 mg/kg live mass.

4.Accommodation: Conventional cages.

5. Nutrition: PVM enriched maize meal porridge and water ad lib.

6.Special treatment:
a. Day 0: Weigh the animals and determine dosages for treatment.
b. Day 1: Take rectal temperature before treatment and thereafter every hour for 8 hours.
c. Hematology before, at 4 hours, 8 hours and 24 hours after treatment.
d. Clinical observations every hour.
e. Thorough post mortem.

RESULTS:
1. See table 1 for rectal temperatures.
2. See table 2 for hematology.
3. In my opinion the only reason for the lack of a positive reaction, was a too low dosage or that the Nitroxynil became unstable during the dilution process and was partly destroyed.

RECOMMENDATION:
1. Repeat on the baboon without any dilution of the toxin.

PROJECT TEAM: Drr JH Davies (Project leader) (signature)
A Immelman

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
TELEKS: 3-22344 (SA)
TEL: (012)-82-1012

P.O.BOX 13873
SINOVILLE
0129
PROJECT REPORT (NR 1)

DATE: 21/08/1986
PROJECT NR: 86/H/17/30

AIM: Investigation of the suitability of NMR (Nuclear Magnetic Resonance) as an analytical technique to determine PO in tobacco tar
PERSON WHO ISSUED THE INSTRUCTION: A Immelman
MOTIVATION: ........
TEST SAMPLE: PO
METHOD:
Ethanol was used to extract the tar from the filters of 7 fully smoked cigarettes. The tar (17mg per cigarette) was mixed with PO (32,5% PO, 67,5% tar) and a NMR-spectrum was determined from the mixture.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS:
The presence of PO in the mixture is clearly visible. However, from the Nuclear Magnetic Resonance spectrum it is determined that the positive identification limit is about 10% PO with a large (50% or more) quantative error.
The result is that NMR is not accurate in this experiment and it is recommended that we wait for the HPLC (High Pressure Liquid) or GC. This will result in a higher level of accuracy.

PROJECT TEAM: K.PSOTTA
(signature of K. Psotta)
____________________________________________________________
ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
DATE: 18/07/1986

APPLICATION TO REGISTER A PROJECT
TYPE OF PROJECT: ../H/..
AIM/PROJECT/TITLE: Tobacco as Application route.
(Even in the case of a long-term project where several experiments are done, it is necessary to formulate a set of objectives)
PERSON WHO ISSUED THE INSTRUCTION: RNL (A Immelman).
SPECIES: ....
FACILITY: ........
ESTIMATED COSTS: R.....
(calculation of expenses attached as proof)
PLANNED DATE FOR COMMENCEMENT: 23/07/86
PLANNED DATE FOR CONCLUSION:
SERVICES NEEDED FOR THE PROJECT:
Division/Person: Service:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
MOTIVATION: See sketch protocol attached (and an overview of the Project*)
PROJECT LEADER: K. Psotta

APPROVAL
This project is approved and registered under the following project nr:
86/H/17/30 (under the following conditions):................
signed by: ??
for BOARD OF DIRECTORS DATE: 21/07/86
____________________________________________________________
(handwritten page):
Date: 21/07/86
Project Code: 86/H/17/30
Nature of Project: Research*
Person who issued the instruction: A. Immelman

Project description: Tobacco as Application route.
Commentary: 1. Determine the suitability of NMR (Nuclear Magnetic Resonance) as analytical instrument in this study.

Project leader: K. Psotta
Starting date: 21/08/86
Finishing date: 21/08/86
Report delivered on 21/08/86 to A. Immelman. NMR is not suitable.
Completed: (signed by) K. Psotta

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The person requesting the experiment is Dr Andre Immelman, head of research at the company; the researcher is Dr K Psotta.
ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
DATE: 11/11/86
APPLICATION TO REGISTER A PROJECT
TYPE OF PROJECT: H
AIM/PROJECT TITLE: Synthesis of a cyclic phosphorester
PERSON WHO ISSUED THE INSTRUCTION: RRL (A. Immelman)
ESTIMATED COST:.........
PLANNED STARTING DATE: As soon as the chemicals are delivered. (about 3 weeks)
PLANNED FINISHING DATE: ........
SERVICES NEEDED FOR THE PROJECT:
Division: ....... Person: .......
MOTIVATION: As was discussed on 10/11/86
PROJECT LEADER: K. Psotta
signed by: K. Psotta
APPROVAL
This project was approved and registered under the following project nr: 86/H/33/30.

signed by: ??
for BOARD OF DIRECTORS
DATE: 17/11/86

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
PROJECT NR: 86/H/028/50
26 FEBRUARY 1987

INTERIM PROJECT REPORT
1. a. REPORT NUMBER: 3
b. PROJECT TEAM: Drr JH Davies (Project leader)
A Immelman.
c. PERSON WHO ISSUED INSTRUCTION: Dr A Immelman.

2. PURPOSE: To determine the LD50 for Salitrane in Spraque Dowley rats.
3. SUMMARY: The problem with the solubility of the active substance was solved. The active substance was once again made available and the experimental work restarted. The results are not complete enough to report on.
signed by:
JH Davies

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
TELEKS: 3-22344 (SA)
TEL: (012)-82-1012

P.O.BOX 13873
SINOVILLE
0129
APPLICATION TO REGISTER A PROJECT

DATE: 21/05/1987
1. APPLICATION TO REGISTER A PROJECT
TYPE OF PROJECT: 0
AIM/PROJECT/TITLE: The formulation and evaluation of PO in a lip balm.
PLANNED STARTING DATE: 22 May 1987
PLANNED FINISHING DATE: 30 June 1987
SERVICES NEEDED FOR THE PROJECT:
Division/Person: Service:
JH Davies Clinical Evaluation
Other:........

CONFIRMATION OF AVAILABILITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND FACILITY: All the facilities are available.
PROJECT LEADER: S.V. Weldhagen

APPROVAL
This project is approved and registered under the following project nr:
.....under the following conditions: (handwritten): to strictly adhere to safety precautions
signed by: ??
for BOARD OF DIRECTORS DATE: 21/05/87

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
TELEKS: 3-22344 (SA)
TEL: (012)-82-1012

P.O.BOX 13873
SINOVILLE
0129
DATE: 3 June 1987
APPLICATION TO REGISTER A PROJECT
1. APPLICATION TO REGISTER A PROJECT

TYPE OF PROJECT: 0
AIM/PROJECT/TITLE: The formulation and manufacture of a roll-on deodorant with PO.
PERSON WHO ISSUED THE INSTRUCTION: Dr A. Immelman
PLANNED STARTING DATE: 5 June 1987.
PLANNED FINISHING DATE: ...
SERVICES NEEDED FOR THE PROJECT:
Division/Person: Service:
JH Davies Clinical Evaluation

2. RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT
CONFIRMATION OF AVAILABILITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND FACILITY: All the facilities that are needed in the Pharmacy are available.
PROJECT LEADER: S.V. Weldhagen

3. APPROVAL
This project is approved and registered under the following project nr:
87/0/P/027 RRL..under the following conditions:.(handwritten): to strictly adhere to safety precautions
signed by: ??
for BOARD OF DIRECTORS DATE:.21/06/87

4. SKETCH PROTOCOL
MOTIVATION: At this stage it is difficult to lay out a sketch protocol because problems/successes during the process will have an affect on the direction of the research.
TEST SAMPLE: The completed product will be given to Dr Davies for clinical evaluation.
METHOD: Clinical evaluation.

5. ESTIMATED COSTS
1. Labour
2. Supply

6. PROJECT SECURITY
SENSITIVITY CLASSIFICATION: Strictly confidential
ENTRY CLASSIFICATION: TA
Dr A. Immelman
MOVEMENT CONTROL
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS
THREAT

7. SAFETY
RISK CLASSIFICATION: PV 1
MEDICAL ASPECTS: Typical organophosphate poisoning
Washing and decontamination of exposed area is necessary after decontamination. Oximes and atrophen are the pharmacological antidotes if applied before fixation of the PO-sterase compound.
An alkaline solution of Bicarbonate of Soda in water (1kg in 10 l) is a chemical de-activator.
Specialist medical support after exposure entails (instandh v asemh en atropien toed kwartuurl, parenteraal)
PROCESS INSIDE THE LABORATORY: Wear a closed up white coat and a gas mask. Use gloves. Keep the alkaline solution, which is the de-activator, at hand at all times (1kg bicarbonate soda in 10 l of water). A similar solution must always be available to be used as a dip ? for all used apparatus.
COMMUNICATION: Constant radio contact must be maintained for as long as there is a possibility for contamination.
PREVENTATIVE PRECAUTIONS: As stipulated above.
Cholin-esterasis evaluations must be done before and during the process. (2x per week while working with the substance.)

signed by:
??

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SECRET
MEMORANDUM
Tel: 663-1530
Extension: 2332
12 July 1988
To: Brig W. Basson
From: Prof C.F.B. Hofmeyr

CONFERENCE: DR DAAN GOOSEN, DIRECTOR ROODEPLAAT BREEDING ENTERPRISES
CONFERENCE: DR A IMMELMAN, ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES

1. The following was discussed with Dr Goosen:
Undersigned is the Chair, the Animal research committee, the SAMS. These parties meet twice every month. The members represent interested parties including the Veterinary Faculty of the University of Pretoria (at Onderstepoort) as well as Medunsa which means that not all of these institutions have security clearance.
Recently an application was received for the registration of a project to introduce a combined operational use of dogs and horses. Due to the strategic nature of the matter, the undersigned decided that the issue should be treated as a secret and not to discuss it at a normal meeting of the Animal research committee. A Secret committee was established representing only members with security clearance. (SAMS, Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises, SAP and Correctional Services. Last week brig Booysen, the member for the Correctional services, informed me telephonically that a veterinary officer from the research division of Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises, had openly discussed the matter with people from the Correctional services, including people without security clearance.
The undersigned expressed his concern to Dr Goosen and requested stricter future control regarding this aspect.
Dr Goosen was furthermore informed about the contents of the report that was handed in by the undersigned as a one-man commission regarding the experimental animal organisation at Wits. As was already discussed with brig Basson, the execution of these recommendations are important for the prevention of free access to “outside institutions”.
Dr Goosen is also a member of the continuation committee that was established after a conference on animal research organised by dr Kraai Van Niekerk, the deputy Minister of Agriculture and Water Affairs.
Naturally, it would not be possible for him to mention the threat posed by hostile institutions to secret research. He was requested to use different arguments to enforce the decisions recommended in the commission report. He was also informed that, if this did not succeed, the undersigned would consider involving the Surgeon General in the matter.
2. Dr A. Immelman, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, is a former professor of Pharmacology, Veterinary Faculty, University of Pretoria. He is a member of the Federal Council SA Veterinary Association and he represents this Council on the SA Veterinary Council. He was requested in a separate capacity, to try to ensure the support of the abovementioned Council for the contents of the commission report.
signed by:
C.F.B. HOFMEYR: PROF
CFBH/SJ

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SECRET
MEMORANDUM
Telephone: 663-1530
Extension: 2332
6 July 1988
To: Brig W. Basson
From: Prof C.F.B. Hofmeyr

CONFERENCE WITH DR. JM ERASMUS, DIRECTOR VETERINARY SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND WATER AFFAIRS ON 4 JUNE 1988
1. Background. The undersigned served on a one man commission which was appointed by the Witwatersrand University to advise the University on the organisation of their animal experimentation laboratory prompted by a lawsuit against them by the SPCA (Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals). It is my opinion (strengthened by casual observations made by several people) that the SPCA is supported by other (undisclosed) organisations with the hidden agenda to, by means of stirring up public emotions, obtain the necessary legal right to free entry to all animal experimentation units. Seeing that it can possibly endanger secret experiments that are in the interest of the country, I expressed my reservations about the above to the previous as well as the current Surgeon general who were both of the opinion that I willingly accepted the appointment.
I have completed my report and handed it in to the Vice-Chancellor and Rector of the University of the Witwatersrand, who strongly supported it and assured me of the full support of the University council. Hereafter it was recommended that the Veterinary Director be in complete command of all operations and anaesthetics and that the centre be run as an animal hospital. This will ensure that all experimental animals receive acceptable treatment and that the researcher be assured that all animals are handled correctly after they have been operated on. The veterinarian, who will also be a researcher, as well as the nurses are all professionally bound by the discipline of the Veterinary Council (acc. to the SA Medical and Dental Council) and this argument can be used effectively to stave off free access to lay persons organisations. My real motivation is therefore to ensure that it will be impossible for enemies with secret motives to gain entry to secret experiments.
The SA Veterinary Council will as a result be different to other animal experimentation laboratories because these centres are quite vulnerable to access by the organisations mentioned above and they have become so to speak the prey of these organisations because they have not properly spelled out the veterinary involvement. The idea of registering an experimentation centre as an animal hospital is especially uncommon. However, it is extremely important that the Veterinary Council accepts this responsibility, as is clearly stipulated.
This is merely background information.

2. Dr Erasmus is the Vice-President of the Veterinary Council. I believe that he has Top Secret clearance. I expressed my fear of interference from lay persons organisations with possible secret motives if the Veterinary Council does not accept the recommendations. He agreed to use his influence, but said that due to the fact that some members of the Council may be security risks he would not be able to use this as an argument.

3. Dr Erasmus was further questioned about the control of anthrax in the RSA and the homelands. He assured me that the policy was one of yearly compulsory inoculation of all cattle. Unfortunately these inoculations cannot be properly controlled because it is left to the initiative of the farmers and a lot of them don’t follow the correct procedures. However, millions of cattle are inoculated.
signed by:
C.F.B. HOFMEYR: PROF
CFBH/SJ

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SECRET
MEMORANDUM
Telephone: 663-1530
Extension: 2332
4 July 1988
To: Brig W. Basson
From: Prof C.F.B. Hofmeyr

SECURITY STATUS OF CERTAIN PEOPLE

1. Given the responsibilities of the undersigned, he will from time to time need to know the security clearance of certain people which will be important in holding discussions. The following is a preliminary list of people but it will in time have to be added to:
a. Prof R.J. Coubrough, Dean, Veterinary Faculty, University of Pretoria (Onderstepoort)
b. Prof N. Owen, Dean, Veterinary Faculty, Medical University of Southern Africa.
c. Dr D.W. Verwoerd, Director, Veterinary Research Institute, Onderstepoort.
d. Dr J.M. Erasmus, Director, Veterinary Services Division, Dept of Agriculture and Water Affairs.
e. Dr C. Cameron, previous Deputy-director, Veterinary Research Institute, Onderstepoort, currently Chief Director, Laboratory services, Dept of National Health and Population Development.
f. Dr J. Goosen, Director, Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises.
g. Prof P. Gehrtsen, Roodeplaat Breeding Laboratories.
h. Dr W.P. Swanepoel, Director, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories.
i. Prof G.V.S. Turner, Chief, Dept of Nutritional Hygiene and Population Health, Veterinary Faculty, University of Pretoria.
j. Prof C.M. Veary, the same dept as Prof Turner.
k. Prof J.H. du Preez, the same dept as Prof Turner.

signed by:
C.F.B. HOFMEYR: PROF
CFBH/SJ

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
PROJECT NR: R0018
DATE: 1990/..

PROJECT REPORT
PROGRESS REPORT
5
Cloning of genes which code for sperm specific antigens.
Research development
Leader Mr A D Botha
Members Mrs A le Roux
Statistician .....................
Quality controller.................

NA
Another nine clones with antisperm antibodies were
These clones as well as those that were prepared before these were re-tested. Of all the re-tested clones, five reacted satisfactorily. We have therefore currently five available clones that produce and that reacts with antibodies prepared for neutralising human sperm
The bets approach for such a project, would be to start working with the of the mRNA of the specific tissue. Due to the unavailability of RNA the project was changed to use DNA as raw material, to at least be able to show some progress in the project reports. In the interim we have collected sufficient amounts of RNA. Although we did get positive clone reactions by using the DNA-method, the RNA-method is undoubtedly the best approach for such a project.
I therefore recommend the following:
(a) That the project be halted and that the clones that we already have, be kept for future tests.
(b) That the RNA which had already been prepared should be used as a basis for a new project.

TEST SAMPLE: NA
1. PROTOCOL THAT WAS FOLLOWED:
R0018, Report 2, Appendix A, dated 89-03-28
2. DEVIATIONS FROM PROTOCOL:
(Full description of every change if the protocol has been deviated from since the previous report).
3. FINANCIAL REPORT: (Costs relate to this part of the ) (PROJ 8)

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MAINTENANCE OF CULTURE COLLECTION

RESULTS:
1. The current culture collection is being maintained.
2. There was a slight expansion when the Salmonella bispebjerg was added.
3. Drawing up of a program to identify modified organisms.
Literature that can be useful for this program is being collected.

BACILLUS ANTHRACIS
1. Cloning of toxingene in E. coli:
The first step in cloning the gene is to prepare the DNA that contains this gene. At this stage we are already able to prepare total DNA as well as plasmid DNA from some virulent isolates of this organism. Some of the problems that we solved were:
- the unreliability of the literature about this organism
- the insolubility of total DNA following the precipitation of ethanol.
- the low yield and instability of plasmid DNA.
2. Vaccine development - the creation of an experimental animal model.
The purpose of this experiment is to develop an experimental model for immunisation against orally administered anthrax. We orally dosed ten hamsters and ten mice, twice each, with live spores from the strain (entstofstam) B anthracis and ten hamsters and ten mice twice each with dead spores of the strain (entstofstam). The animals received the virulent strain of B anthracis.
One of the hamsters that received the live spores (10%), and two of the hamsters that received the dead spores (20%), survived. None of the nine control hamsters survived. It seems therefore as if there is a possibility of protection by the orally administered vaccine.
Of the mice two of the administered animals survived and three of the ten control mice survived.
These results cannot be explained yet. It is possible that differences in species are responsible for this, or that resistant animals appear randomly in populations. The antigen dosage could have been too low, or the possible irritation of the mouth, throat or intestines might be needed to allow the avirulent organism to penetrate the immune system. All these possibilities will be investigated.
3. Raising of resistance to antibiotics:
The model that was successful in raising resistance to antibiotics for the strain (entstofstam) could not yet be successfully applied to virulent strains. These efforts continue.

CLOSTRIDIA
1. Improvement in the extraction of alphatoxin of C perfringens by clones:
Currently subclones of the alphatoxin gene-containing cloned DNA are being prepared. After a suitable subclone is identified, the basis sequence of the toxin will be determined to allow for the suitable positioning of a promoter and for the search for a suitable promoter.
2. Epsilontoxin gene cloning.
The gene has already been cloned. We have three clones that contain the toxin gene. The preparation of subclones is being continued to determine basis sequences.
3. Betatoxin gene cloning:
It seems as if we already have the clones that contain the betatoxin gene. The clone characterisation is being continued to confirm the presence of the betatoxin gene.

HORMONIS RESINAEH
Currently this organism is being grown with diesel as the only source of carbon and energy. It is clear that the diesel volume decreases during the process of growth. The broken down products of the diesel will be determined.

(ERSORSIE) BACTERIA
We have already tried to grow these organisms but we have not yet succeeded. Further efforts will continue.

MAGNETOBACTERIA
This project has not yet started.

DIAGNOSTIC METHODS
Immunochemical tracing techniques for biological and chemical aggressors:
The model that is being tested involves the following:
1. Apply the aggressor to be tested to a nitrocellulose membrane. These membranes have the ability to irreversibly bind several compounds.
2.
3.
4.
5.
This technique has already been successful with the tracing of the alpha and the epsilon toxin of C. perfringens in micro gram quantities. The model will also be expanded to a component of the anthrax toxin as well as to B anthracis itself.

HYPERIMMUNESERA

VACCINE FOR ENDO TOXIC SHOCKS
This project has not started yet. (handwritten note: the literature work has been completed.)

MICRO TOXIN
This project has not started yet.

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PROGRESS REPORT WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC R-PROJECTS

TOXICOLOGY
JULY 1991
1. IONOPHORE (NARASIN, MONENSIN AND MADURAMYCIN (R0282/MONTY)
PURPOSE:
Acute and chronic cardio toxicity with narasin, monensin and maduramycin in dogs, as well as the acute and chronic hepatoxicity in the same species.
RESULTS:
Dogs were orally treated with all three substances to determine the toxic dosage in dogs, and symptoms of extreme liver damage appeared with esp. narasin, at a dosage of 5 mg/kg. Mortalities occurred very acutely at this dosage, but when a chronic dosage of 3 mg/kg was administered over 14 days, no clinical symptoms appeared, except for the extreme liver damage that was discovered during the post mortem. (handwriten note: primary liver toxicity)
Where Maduramycin was used the symptoms were similar to the narasin application, at 4 mg/kg. Paralysis of the hindquarter occurred within 5 hours after oral administration and apparently the respiratory muscles were also affected because dispnoea with severe abdominal breathing occurred. (handwritten note: 13 hours to die, PM: liver damage/ severe kidney damage; hematuria - why?).
PLANNING
A study plan was drawn up for acute oral toxicity with all three substances in dogs, and specific attention will be given to the iso-enzymes to differentiate between heart muscle damage and sceletal muscle damage, as well as liver damage. This way it will be possible to determine the primary affected organ, by using the iso-enzyme and all the other parameters that will be established. This work will begin at the end of August and be completed by the middle of September.
Another study plan will be drawn up in September to determine the bio-availability of maduramycin in dogs. This will further clarify the absorption, distribution and half-life of the substance in vivo. This information is extremely important in determining the real toxic dosages, as well as the dosage to be used for the chronic poisoning study that will take place from October to December.

2. BICYCLIC PHOSPHATES (R0358/x-TPO)
PURPOSE:
To determine the acute toxicity of the substances when orally administered.
RESULTS: (handwritten note: released through fire extinguishing foam)
Very promising results were obtained with the available ethyl-phosphite agent. The agent does not dissolve easily in water, but it dissolved easily in alcohol and was orally administered to rodents and primates. The agents are GABA antagonists, therefore no suppression of impulses in the brain occurred. Acute grand mal convulsions occurred within 3 - 90 minutes after oral administration, and the animals died as a result of respiratory failure. The toxic dosage of the ethyl-phospite agent in primates is about 7-10 mg/kg. However, other toxic agents occur in the group, and the agent will have to be tested using more species to make a realistic extrapolation to the human being. The advantage is that the agent is fairly unknown and very little research has been done with regard to the agent.
We also looked at the treatment of the toxicity, by using phenobarbitone (Gardenal) intravenously. The agent suppressed the convulsions, but very high dosages had to be applied (about 100 mg/kg). Blindness occurred, but it could not be determined if it was reversible - it will have to be investigated further. Preliminary treatment with diazepam prevented toxicity and no symptoms occurred.
PLANNING:
Attempts will be made to treat the symptoms with diazepam. Thereafter the dosages of the more toxic agents will be looked at, also in other species, to make an extrapolation human being. The chronic effect of the agent will be looked at and specific attention will be given to the effect on the brain and the eye.

3. HD (R0093/COSMOS)
PURPOSE:
To create a model for respiratory exposure , ( heelliggaam ) afr
RESULTS:
The apparatus is functional and samples were collected here and at the facility where the system was calibrated. Although Toxicology is able to apply the technique successfully, it is still not clear if the analysis can be repeated or if the calibration is reliable.
Factors that could affect the concentration of the gas in the cupboard were addressed and the variance between the samples decreased significantly, but the concentration still does not agree with the calibration curve. It is essential to confirm this factor before any work is done on experimental animals.
PLANNING:
The producers of the system and apparatus were contacted and variables were identified. It is important that the analysis is done here to save costs and to enable us to compare the results with the values of the biological samples.

4. CHLORINATED CARBON ( KOOLWATERSTOWWE?) afr. (R0094/CABBAGE)
PURPOSE:
To determine the acute oral and per cutane toxicity of the agents.
RESULTS:
Work has not started yet because samples for chemical analysis have to be taken at the same time. However, the work will begin before the end of July with Izobenzane, using rodents.

5. ORGANOPHOSPHATES (RO357/BAKED, SOIL, “TAMELETJIE” AND VICTRIX)
PURPOSE:
To determine the toxicity of the four organophosphates with intraperitoneal application.
RESULTS:
The agent was dissolved in alcohol (ethanol) and applied. Pre -and post treatment blood samples were collected as well as brain tissue of the frontal lobe, ventricles, brain strain and cerebellum of every animal post mortem. These samples were handed over for acetylcholinesterase evaluations.
The symptoms of the agents were mainly suppressed due to the alcohol, and further tests will be done with a less toxic carrier substance. (handwritten note: Alcohol intoxication are visible before symptoms occur.)
PLANNING:
Toxicity experiments will be carried out with a less toxic carrier substance and treatment of symptoms with oxymes will be looked at.

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SUBJECT: ACONITIN
The substance aconitin is from the root and leaf extract of the plant Aconitum napellus. In the past this plant and its extracts were used as antiperetic and anti-hypertension treatment in humans. However, apart from aconitin these extracts also contain other active agents. The use of aconitin in its pure form is also prescribed to evoke arrhythmias in experimental animals and it is apparently for this reason that this Firm makes use of the substance.
Aconitin crystals do not dissolve easily in water, they are more soluble in ethanol chloroform and in a propylene glycol. However, we discovered that aconitin is not very stable in ethanol, after one hour we discovered another unknown substance on a thin layer of chromotographic analysis. We therefore decided to use chloroform and propylene glycol for our subsequent studies.
Aconitin is highly toxic and the LD50 after intravenous application in mice is 0,166 mg/kg and 1 mg/kg orally. The toxic dosage described in the literature is 2 mg for humans, either parenterally or orally. However, in certain documented cases some people survived an oral dosage of 10 mg.
The initial symptoms of poisoning are described as a tingling feeling on the tongue, mucous membranes and the skin, especially when applied cutaneously. This tingling sensation is regarded as diagnostic for aconitin poisoning.
The central nervous system is affected with the stimulation of the vomition centre as the initial reaction. Thereafter the central nervous system as well as the breathing system is suppressed. Convulsions may occur in singular cases.
The most important effect of aconitin is its effect on the heart. This is also the cause of death. Together with the effect on the central nervous system, the effect on the (vagussentrum) results in Bradycardia. The local effect on the heart muscle is an increased (prikkelbaarheid met geleidingsteurnisse). Arrhythmia is followed by heart failure.
These studies used the blue-ape as the experimental animal and the acceptable toxic dosage of 0,1 mg/kg dissolved in 01, ml alcohol was intravenously administered to 3 adult animals. The following ECG changes were observed before death occurred after 8 minutes. Bradycardia followed by tachycardia followed by arrhythmia followed by heart failure.
For intramuscular application the dosage of 0,1 mg/kg aconitin was dissolved in 0,1 ml propylene glycol. The adult blue-ape was used for the experiment. Six out of the seven animals died within 2 hours after application. The surviving animal showed all the symptoms of poisoning, but recovered after 48 hours.
The initial symptoms varied from 15 to 45 minutes after intramuscular application. Death set in 20 to 60 minutes after the initial symptoms occurred.
The initial symptoms occurred when the animal started rubbing its tongue against its teeth - probably as a result of the tingling sensation that was described earlier. The suppression of the central nervous system was observed as a tranquillity and a sleepiness experienced by the animal. Respiration is deep and the breathing rhythm becomes uneven, eventually respiration is forced. Vomiting occurs at this stage. Shortly before it dies the animal shows signs of excitation. The typical ECG changes are also observed here.
Studies were made regarding the oral application of aconitin at a dosage of 1 mg/kg in blue-apes. However, vomiting occurs very soon after application, possibly due to the following two reasons: The first being the direct effect on the stomach wall which probably experiences the same tingling sensation as described on the skin. The other reason is the effect of the substance on the vomition centre.
Our conclusion is that the amount of the substance that is left in system after vomiting is still enough to effect the heart muscle but not lethal. Where it was placed in the lower duodenum the results were very good. Post mortem investigation showed no specific lesions/damage in the experimental animals. The lesions that were detected were those typically associated with heart failure. The heart itself showed no lesions under macroscopic investigation.
Hereby attached are the ECG registrations typically observed in the experimental animals. The one after intravenous application and the other after intramuscular application.
Request
i. For an experienced intern to evaluate the ECG reports to determine whether the symptoms correspond to those experienced in a human heart attack.
ii. For the intern to prescribe the treatment to a patient who shows the same ECG pattern.
Further research
1. The oral route is still of greatest importance and methods will have to be discovered to apply it successfully. The assistance of the pharmacologist is sought to find a formulation that will ensure that the substance is taken up lower in the duodenum or the jejunum.
ii. Cutaneous Aconitin absorption is satisfactory and further research will be done regarding this aspect.
iii. After suggested treatment is obtained, the success of the treatment will be evaluated.
iv. Our new analytical facility will enable us to fully research the traceability of aconitin in all organs and body fluids.
Recommendation
Due to the low dosage required (+- 0,2 ml) aconitin can be given intramuscular clandestinely. In experimental animals no lesion or marks can be macroscopically detected in the injected area.

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THE USES OF PARAOXON
Paraoxon is a metabolyte of the organic phosphate parathion. Parathion is a well-known pesticide that is used in SA as well as in other parts of the world. Poisonings during the normal use of the substance occur. Parathion is a S- containing organic phosphate and the whole group is not toxic, poisoning takes place when metabolytes like paraoxon is formed in vivo.
It was decided to investigate paraoxon for the following reasons:
1. The substance can be manufactured easily in the current facilities.
2. The metabolyte is highly toxic, information shows 1 mg/kg as a lethal dosage.
3. The substance is highly lipide soluble and is rapidly absorbed by all routes, even through the skin.
4. If traces are found in a body this can easily be explained by the easy availability of parathion. However, more specialised organophosphates will immediately reveal the source.

Current tests are being done on baboons with oral administrations. A dosage of 1 mg and 2 mg/kg was administered respectively. With both administrations the animals showed clinical symptoms of poisoning within 20 minutes. Forty-five minutes after administration the baboon that received the lower dosage died even after being treated with atrophen.
The second animal also stopped breathing and showed heart fibrillation ? but reacted positively to heart massage and survived. After 24 hours the clinical image was restored.
Blood samples taken 30 minutes before administration showed a dramatic decrease in erithrocytcholinesterase. Unfortunately no follow-up tests were done to determine the tempo of the cholinestarasis recovery. Available information shows that recovery can take as long as 21 days.
The following work is being done here:
The stability of paraoxon at high temperatures is confirmed and it could therefore be added to hot food. The long-term stability at a temperature of 30 degrees Celsius is being investigated and the solution is exposed to air. This is to determine the nature of a practical application of paraoxon.

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DELTA G SCIENTIFIC (PTY) LTD QUARTERLY REPORT FOR THE SECOND QUARTER 1987: 1/6/87 – 31/8/87

1. INTRODUCTION
The second quarter is characterised by the following aspects which will be discussed in more detail in the pages that follow.
The revision of the personnel remunerations, and the awarding of a general salary increase of 15% to employees.
The successful running of Facility 1 with the production of FP/00/03.
Increased activities of the “South African Chemical Workers Union”.
Further resignations of technically qualified personnel, apparently as a result of the inability to adapt to changing circumstances, as well as moral issues concerning certain aspects of research in the company.
The secession of the pension fund of the Professional Consultants Pension Fund, and the founding of a Delta G Scientific Pension Fund which will be administered by Sanlam.
The finalising of long term research contracts with Medresco (Pty) Ltd.
A further escalation of the final cost of the Facilities and Laboratories, and the further deterioration of the relationship with the Mechanical and Electrical Advising Engineers over the laboratory air conditioning and extraction systems.

2. FINANCES
2.1 BUILDING PROJECT
This project is all but complete, currently final accounts are being issued for most of the contracts and final payments are being made.
There are certain problematic aspects especially with regard to potential litigation in which the company could become involved. What is of particular importance here is the current negotiations between the company’s legal representatives and the insolvent estate of DPK builders with regard to outstanding fees, and the payment of guarantees.
The Mechanical and Electrical Advising Engineers, JD van Niekerk and Partners were notified that, due to the problems experienced concerning the laboratory air conditioning and extraction systems, the company refuses to make any further payments, unless these problems are solved satisfactorily (~R300 000).
Legal action is currently taken by DGS and JD van Niekerk to rectify their respective positions with regard to contractual and legal obligations.
Due to the fact that this Project (Indigo) is almost completed, small adaptations to final accounts resulted in the variation in the final amounts. The final estimated cost of the project amounts to ~ R29,993 million (see Appendix A).

2.2 OPERATING FINANCES (bedryfsfinansies)
Appendix B contains extracts from the Financial Statements of the company. This includes the following:
Summarised financial results
Capital expenditure report
Summary of the operating expenses
Departmental summary
Cash flow statement and budget
Debtors age analysis
Investments
Supply analysis
Creditor analysis
Revenue budget
Research projects
A strict cost control program is followed, however, the increase in company activities is causing an increase in operating expenses.
Of the total estimated capital expenditure of R1,735 million, R1,343 million has already been spent. Most of the research equipment has been bought and only equipment expenditure for the completion of the pilot facility is planned for the next six months.
Items that are underbudgeted for, mainly due to problems experienced with estimating final costs, are buildings, (R34 000) (Engineers’ offices) and safety equipment. The estimated costs for these items were fat too low.
However, due to the high premium placed by DGS on the safety of employees, DGS will continue in supplying the latest and best safety equipment to them.
Operating costs for the year to date are already 8% less than was originally expected. This is mainly due to strict cost controlling methods and lower operating levels.
It is notable that salaries contribute R210 000 to the R332 000 which was underspent. This “underspending” of salaries is chiefly due to problems experiences with regard to recruiting personnel. New employees are appointed later than was originally expected.
Looking at the Departmental budgets, it is notable that especially Marketing and Facility 2 are underspending. This is mainly due to personnel problems and problems with regard to initial production of additional products, as well as the fact that Facility 2 was very seldom used. This scenario is expected to change drastically within the next six months.
Serious problems were experienced in dealing with the waste products from the product FP/00/03. This resulted in a 50% increase in expenses at the Waste Product facility. However, these costs will dramatically decrease with the changing of the recipes for the handling of waste products as well as the changing philosophy regarding waste products: where there’s waste, after decontamination and masking, it will immediately be removed by Waste-Tech.
The costs of direct removal of waste products by Waste-Tech amount to only 10% of treatment costs. Therefore it was decided for the facility not to deal with waste products itself.
The cash flow statements show a very healthy cash flow position for the company. This is due to proper management of cash flow and predeterminable receipt especially with regard to contractual research. It is therefore seldom necessary to make use of additional funding e.g. overdraft facilities.
If one uses the position of the previous six months as criterion, it would be fair to estimate a cash flow surplus - not adding depreciation and tax, - of R820 000 on 29 February 1988.
As a result of the current policy on the re-investment of profits, these funds will eventually be used: either for building up Reserves for replacing facilities or for the purchase of additional capital equipment.
Depending on the results of the negotiations regarding Salicyl aldehyde (RMO1: one of the two main derivatives for the production of FP/00/003), it might become necessary to apply the cash flow surplus to the purchase of strategic supplies of raw materials.
The position of the Debtors and the Creditors in the company gives the impression that the management of these financial aspects needs some improvement.
The debtors collection term of 69 days on average, against the creditors’ payment term of 45 days is a problem. Additional efforts are made to make more use of the creditor financing.
Fortunately, the two main clients of the company, Medresco and Regent International Trading Services make regular payments to the company, so there is no financing problem with regard to cash.
Collateral investments currently amount to R385 000, and the Board of Directors decided that the saldo limit for this account for the year will be R400 000.
Average supply amounts to ~R1 million, depending the results of the investigation into the supplying position of the company, ideal objectives regarding stock cash value. This will be especially relevant to raw materials.
Final products, e.g. FP/00/004 and FP/00/003 were not accounted for when the cash value was determined. If FP/00/03 were to be accounted for, the value would have increased to R2,1 million.
The Income/Revenue statement and the Income budget shows that the company is still very dependent on contractual research as well as sales of FP/00/003.
When Facility 2 and the Pilot facility are both up and running, together with the possible use of the waste product facility for the mixing processes, the relative contribution of the current products and contractual research to the turnover of the company, will decrease.
Due to the improved financial precautions and financial management of the company, another budgeting action will be undertaken at the end of this quarter. Although it has not yet been finalised, it seems as is the company will be able to finance additional purchases of strategic materials and still show a reasonable surplus.
The estimated profit of ~R800 000 or 5,9% of the turnover is not expected to change drastically.

3. OPERATING ASPECTS
3.1 OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENTS
3.11 PRODUCTION
The current quarter is characterised by the continued production of FP/00/003. Apart from FP/00/003 cannabanoid extractions were done at Facility 2, as well as the production of a washing product for Sasol Technology.
The one positive factor of the production of FP/00/003 is that the planned capacity of the Facility with regard to the production of the intermediary substance, as well as the production of FP/00/003, is being achieved.
Up to this point almost 3 tons of this product has been produced. (Appendix C).
A worldwide shortage of Salicyl aldehyde (one of the basic raw materials) is causing serious problems in obtaining this material. Delta G Scientific has not been able to obtain any Salicyl aldehyde during the previous month.
Due to this shortage no ITO1 will be produced during September and the first half of October.
Depending on the delivery of the next lot of Salicyl aldehyde (12 ton), production will begin during the second half of October.
Problems experienced with particle size specifications and the handling of waste products from the final steps of the process had caused an increase in capital expenditure of R150 000 in order to ensure the cost-effective running of the facility for the future.

3.1.2 PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT, BIOCHEMISTRY AND ANALYTICAL SERVICES
As was mentioned before, 9 research contracts to the value of R7,555 million were entered into with Medresco (Pty) Ltd over the period being reported on.
Two of the projects are biochemical, one information gathering and the other six chemical. All the projects are aimed at the development of new products for Medresco.
In addition to these nine projects, other projects are being worked on, of which the most important are:
a. A biochemical project to the value of R490 000 for RRL.
b. The development of
i. Chlorhexadine gluconate;
ii. Methformin,
iii. Fenodoon·
c. Antibiotic extractions for RRL
d. Pyrethriods and the development of Crysanthemic alcohol.
e. The production of Salicylaidehyde (RM01).
In order to run all these projects efficiently, additional personnel is urgently needed. A recruiting program will be launched in the next quarter for the recruitment of technically qualified chemical research personnel.
Due to the current problems experienced with regard to the worldwide shortage, and the inability of Delta G Scientific to obtain a guaranteed source of this raw material, the development of RMO1 (salycilaldehyde) is a high priority. Up to this point a final process could not yet been found.
The Department of Analytical Services has received an order from Swartklip Products for pirolyses analysis of tableted products at the value of R67 000.
An identification of reputed substances was done for a client, and this extremely delicate work was done very successfully by the staff of DGS. A detailed report on this work was drawn up and will shortly be presented to the client.
The ability of Delta G Scientific to do this type of analysis has once again accentuated the unique characteristics of the company. After ~ 1000 man-hours, of highly qualified personnel, very small quantities of a substance was identified and quantified.

3.2 SERVICES DEPARTMENTS:
3.2.1 SECURITY
This department is 100% manned and delivers a high quality service to the company. Dealing with visitors to the company is a primary task, and during the previous quarter the Department has dealt with a total of 1085 visitors.
Background studies is another responsibility of Security, and of the 33 investigations requested, 18 is completed.
The introduction of the electronic zoning system to the premises is currently undertaken by Security, and during the next quarter it will be refined.

3.2.2 ENGINEER SERVICES
This department/function of the company has shown a marked improvement during the past quarter after the appointment of mr J Coetzee as Engineer manager.
The utilities that are available to the company show a measurement of more than 99% for the past quarter.
Maintenance is being executed with great speed and accuracy, and this Department is especially responsible for the more than 80% capital use of facility 1.
A measurement of the productivity of staff has shown that staff is overloaded (more than 65%) and currently additional personnel is being recruited for the next quarter.
With the completion of the additional offices the problems that was experienced by the Engineer services department regarding space are now solved. There is also a great improvement in the general neatness and maintenance of the workshops.

3.2.3 MANAGEMENT OF MATERIAL/PURCHASES
The increased activities of the Production facilities place a huge workload on these departments. This resulted in the appointment of an additional clerk to the Stores to handle the documentation.
The appointment of an additional buyer will also release the heavy workload on the current buyer and clerk and will hopefully improve the running of this department.
During the past quarter especially systems were implemented, based on the computerised accountancy system of the company.

3.2.4 DATA AND INFORMATION
The Burroughs computer system is currently running 98% of the time without any problems. The computerising of information sheets e.g. reprints, books, etc. is running ahead of schedule and there is already ~3000 indexed articles on the Urica database.
Extensions are added to the computer as and when necessary, depending on the needs of the respective departments.
The back-up disks of the computer system and especially of the sensitive database which will be installed soon, will be delivered to Medresco on a three-monthly contractual base.

4. MANAGEMENT
Rationalisation of the company structure continues and after the resignation of dr J Botha, Mr C Botha was promoted to Production manager. During the next two months further organisational changes will take place to ensure the smooth running of management structures.
The company is looking for a suitable senior staff member to manage the Analytical Services and Quality control Departments.
They are also planning to appoint a General manager for Technical Services to be responsible for the running of the Engineer services and Production departments. This appointment will eventually lead to appointing a Director to these departments.
A number of procedures and policy directives were changed and accepted by the Board of Directors to be implemented during the last quarter. The most important ones are the company policies with regard to Security, disciplinary precautions for management, Grievance procedures and management authorisations.
The investigations into alternative methods for the financing of capital continues, and a contract was signed with Adv. CB Marlow to investigate the alternatives for investing in Delta G Scientific.
Initial indications are that Corbank (the old Hill Samuel, Mr Lawrie Korsten), the Rembrandt group and the Old Mutual group are all showing some interest.

5. PERSONNEL
By the end of the second quarter (31/8/87) 165 people were employed by the company. These numbers are made up as follows:
Permanent: White 102
Temporary: White 14
Permanent: Black 49
This implies that the number of black complementary workers was reduced from 55 to 49 in line with the company’s decision to rather employ whites to avoid problems with the S.A.C.W.U. (union).
During the second quarter 17 new staff members were employed on a permanent basis, ands 15 members resigned or were dismissed.
There are currently 24 vacancies for employees, 4 of which are already filled with personnel that will start here in the third or fourth quarter.
This means that, considering the current staff complement of 165, by the 29th of February 1988 the company will probably employ 190 to 200 staff members, that is if all the vacancies are filled.
The staff turnover for the first six months of the financial year is 14%, which implies an annual turnover of 28%. This is too high and far from the ideal figure of 10%. It seems as if senior members are resigning due to moral issues regarding contractual research and uncertain future developments, especially with regard to remuneration and company financing.
The senior management of the company is currently addressing all these aspects.
The S.A.C.W.U. has accused the company of unfair labour practices after the dismissal of a black employee. An application was handed in to the Minister of Manpower to appoint a Reconciliatory council and an application was made to the Industrial Court to re-appoint the person under discussion, mr Edward Mashabela.
It seems as if the Union wants to use the Reconciliatory council and the Industrial Court to force the company to recognise the Union.
The company has employed labour consultants and attorneys to counter act this application to the Minister and the Industrial Court.
The company is still engaged in the battle against the efforts of the C.W.U. by means of its Workers committee that was established last year. Time will tell if these precautions were successful.
An investigation into the compensation structures of the chemical industry showed that, although the compensation structure and the remuneration policy fall within the parameters of the Industry, the company’s remuneration packages are not that attractive as was originally thought.
The Board of Directors decided to take this issue under constant consideration to prevent the loss of personnel and to ensure, insofar it is possible, that the company employs the best-qualified technical personnel, especially on the chemical level.

6. SAFETY AND SECURITY
The company sticks to its policy of absolutely safe working conditions for its employees. No costs are spared to ensure that all employees enjoy the best possible protection.
The policy on Safety is constantly being updated and elements are added where necessary. All emergency training was done in the last quarter, with good results.
Fire training and re-training is constantly being carried out and a high standard is maintained.
During the past quarter the company started determining the levels of dangerous substances in the working environment, and these levels are constantly being monitored to establish the necessary precautions.
The possibility of appointing a temporary Industrial surgeon is being investigated to do regular check-ups on employees that work with dangerous chemicals.
Up to this point 158'000 man hours were completed without having any labour related injuries. The objective is 500 000 man hours without injury, and at the current tempo it should be achieved by the end of 1988. (Appendix D).
The AOB frequency figure is currently 8,75 (Appendix E). This figure is too high, but this is due to the two accidents which resulted in employees being unable to return to work.
No security incidents with regard to information, etc. were reported during the last quarter.

7. IN GENERAL
Senior management is in the process of planning and making forecasts for the next year and strategic budgeting is being done.
Cash flow statements and objectives are drawn up and it looks as if the company can expect a turnover of between R15 million and R17 million during the 1988 Financial Year.
The investigation into alternative investors for financing continues, and a detailed evaluation will be decided on in the near future.
___________________________________________________________
APPENDIX A
DELTA G SCIENTIFIC (PTY) LTD
NEW BUILDING COMPLEX AT MIDRAND:
FINAL ESTIMATED PROJECT COSTS
1. The following summary of the final estimated project costs was made according to the latest available figures:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Already due Further possible Estimated Commentary total debts Cost

Contracts

Professional fees

Diverse paymentsby DGS

Guarantee claims

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USER REQUIREMENTS FOR PYROTECHNIC COMBINATION WITH SUBSTANCE B AS ACTIVE INGREDIENT.
DOCUMENT NR: 05-PN310-4488-0001
DATE: May 1992.

USER REQUIREMENTS FOR PYROTECHNIC COMBINATION WITH SUBSTANCE B AS ACTIVE INGREDIENT.
INTRODUCTION
In order to use substance B in a conventional manner it would have to be placed in a pyrotechnic combination in e.g. hand-, rifle- and 155mm- grenades.
CHRONOLOGY
The document describes the requirements that such a pyrotechnic combination would have to meet in order to be suitable for the distribution of substance B.
REQUIREMENTS
1. The chemicals used in the combination must have the following characteristics:
(a) Non-corrosive to other combining materials.
(b) They must not affect the chemical stability of substance B.
(c) They must remain chemically stable during as well as after exposure to shocks, vibrations, extremely low (-10 degrees Celsius) and extremely high (+60 degrees Celsius) temperatures for as long as 24 hours.
(d) They must be, individually as well as combined, completely compatible with substance B.

(page missing)
3.2 The pyrotechnical combination must:
(a) have a shelf life of preferably 10 years (minimum) under normal storage conditions
(b) be sensitive enough to be easily ignited by a flame
(c) not crumble or ignite when subjected to the centrifugal forces, acceleration and recoil force of a M53A1 charge at 60 degrees Celsius
(d) remain chemically stable during and after exposure to conditions as described in paragraph 3.1(d)
(e) release the maximum quantity of substance B after being activated.

3.3 The functioning of the pyrotechnical combination must be of such a nature that it:
(a) is not interrupted when immersed in water or covered by sand
(b) only destroys a minimum quantity of substance B during the functioning process
(c) will be impossible for any person to handle the container with his bare hands
(d) will be able to release the active substance B omni-directionally.

3.4 The pyrotechnical combination must have a functional reliability of 95% and a reliability level of 90%.
___________________________________________________________
QUOTATION FOR THE CONCEPT STUDY OF PYROTECHNICAL COMBINATIONS WITH SUBSTANCE B
DOCUMENT NR: 05-RR310-4488-0003
DATE: May 1992

1.CHRONOLOGY OF QUOTATION
1.1 Literature study to identify and expand existing pyrotechnical combinations.
1.2 Production and evaluation of test samples.
1.3 Determining the compatibility of substance B with chemicals and ignition mechanisms.
1.4. Determining the sensitivity of pyrotechnical combinations.
1.5 Determining the effectivity of combinations for narrowing down choices.
2. DELIVERABLES
2.1 Compiled report about the investigations as stipulated in paragraph 1 with a recommendation for the most suitable pyrotechnical combination to be used with substance B.
3. COST EVALUATION
3.1 Item 1: Performing activities as described in paragraphs 1.1 to 1.5. Delivery of deliverables as described in paragraph 2.
Laboratory Analyses (External) * R100 000,00
Labour (540 hours @ R136 per hour) 72 440,00
Components and Chemicals 16 000,00
R189 440,00
10% VAT 18 944,00
TOTAL: R208 384,00
*Refers to Paragraph 4.2

4. CONDITIONS
4.1 Labour rates and the prices of materials are fixed and based on the presumption that the activities described in paragraph 1 will be completed during the 1992/93 financial year. If these activities are not completed in the financial year, labour rates and the prices of materials will increase.
4.2 The amount of R100 000,00 that was quoted for external laboratory analyses (paragraph 3.1) is not fixed because it is an estimated value.
4.3 In the case of the cancellation of a contract, the client will have to pay all costs for work that was already completed at the time of cancellation as well as for all components and material in that cannot at that stage be cancelled.
4.4 The client will supply all of the substance B that is needed for experimental purposes and there will be no costs involved.

SWARTKLIP PRODUCTS DATE

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REPORT
SCREWDRIVER
1. There were some problems with the screwdriver:
1.1 The plunger clinches/latches over on the back and then gets stuck in the cylinder due to the impact on the aluminium plunger.
1.2 Only 2 to 2,5 ml of the 5 ml which is the full cylinder measurement, is expelled.
2. There is not much noise because it is inside a locked room, it is acceptable.
RECOMMENDATION
1. The cylinder should be made of a much harder metal, e.g. stainless steel.
2. The cylinder volume to be decreased to 2,5 ml for all of the substance to be expelled at the same time.

signed by:
J Davies

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AVAILABLE PRODUCTS

Aconitin
Highly toxic
Not soluble in water

Aldicarb
Carbonate
Not soluble in water
Low dosage, but it is traceable

Azide
Soluble in water
Slight problem with taste
Effects often too acute

Brodifacum
Anti-coagulative agent
Not soluble in water
Single dosage takes effect 5-7 days
Not easily traceable
Treatable

Catharadine
Acute nefrotoxin
Not easily soluble in water

Colicalciferol
Dosage 60 mg/kg divided into 3 parts
Not soluble in water
Takes effect after 3-5 days
Non-traceable
Not easy to diagnose

Sodiumcyanide
Highly soluble in water
Easily traceable because of typical image
Treatable after an acute attack

Nicotine
Brown oil
Very strong characteristic smell

Paraoxon
The product still in supply
Due to problems in obtaining derivatives, synthesis cannot continue.

Paraquat
Soluble in water
Slight precipitation with brown spirits
Slight problem with taste
Traceable

Phosgen
Tablets to be used as gas.

Pivanyl
Active ingredient ‘pindoon’
Anti-coagulative agent
Water soluble
Single dosage possible but it is preferable to repeat the dosage
Serious problem with yellow colour, therefore can only be used where the colour is suitable.
Thalliumacetate
Easily soluble in water
Precipitation problems with brown spirits that can be filtered.
Traceable
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MICROBIOLOGICAL
B anthracis
Salmonella typhimurium
Salmonella typhi
Vibrio parahaemolyticus
Brucella melitenses
Brucella abortus
Botulinum toxin

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Bacillus anthrax
1.1 Code
RRL freeze-dried number is 369.

1.2 Organism
Spores of Bacillus anthrax

1.3 Container
Glass McCartney flask with metal screw-on lid.

1.4 Contents
The McCartney flasks are filled with varying volumes of freeze-dried spore suspension.

1.5 Suspension
Any liquid that is suitable for oral intake will be suitable for the suspending of the organisms, 5-10 ml will be sufficient. This includes water, alcohol, milk etc.

1.6 Application
For oral application any liquid can be dissolved or it can be sprinkled over food as a dry powder.
It can also be applied respiratorily in its powder form.
If applied cutaneously, it can leave a local mark/lesion, especially if the skin has been scraped.

1.7 Dosage
The flask contains at least 1010 spores/ml suspension if dissolved in a 5-10 ml liquid.
One drop of this orally administered, is a lethal dose and will contain about 108 organisms.

1.8 Incubation period
If the prescribed dosage is orally administered, the incubation period will be 18-24 hours.

1.9 Safety Precautions
See to it that none of the dissolved suspension or dry powder is taken up orally or inhaled. Any antibiotic that contains penicillin will be efficient if administered during the time of exposure.

1.10 Decontamination
In the event of a spill, the contaminated area must be disinfected with 10% formalin, the contact period must be 10 minutes. Clothing and other items can be autoclaved for 10 minutes or longer, to destroy the spores.
The spores are very resistant and are able to survive in this form for a number of years.

1.11 Expected symptoms of illness
1. Orally and respiratorally: Acute and fatal septicaemia.
2. Cutaneously: Local carbuncle with the ability to become septic.

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Brucella melitensis
2.1 Code
RRL freeze-dried number is 364.

2.2 Organism
Vital freeze dried organisms

2.3 Container
Glass McCartney flask with metal screw-on lid.

2.4 Contents
The McCartney flasks are filled with varying volumes of the freeze dried organisms.

2.5 Suspension
Any liquid that is suitable for oral intake will be suitable for the suspending of the organisms, 5-10 ml will be sufficient. This includes water, alcohol, milk etc.

2.6 Application
Contamination takes place through ingestion, cutaneous contact and breathing in.

2.7 Dosage
The flask contains at least 1010 organisms/ml suspension if dissolved in a 5-10 ml liquid.
One drop of this orally administered, will cause illness and will contain about 108 organisms.

2.8 Incubation period
Acute brucellosis 14-21 days.
Chronic brucellosis 2-5 months.

2.9 Safety precautions
See to it that none of the dissolved suspension or dry powder is taken up orally or inhaled.

2.10 Decontamination
The organism responds to the normal disinfectants. It is fairly resistant to drying out and can survive for several weeks and even months in dust, soil and water.

2.11 Expected symptoms of illness
Acute brucellosis: fluctuating temperatures, fatigue, weakness, general aches (muscles and wrists), anorexia, and constipation. Sometimes localised spondilytis, hepatitis and orchitis.
Chronic brucellosis: weakness, depression, fatigue, this can last for up to 20 years.
The symptoms of being infected with Brucella melitensis are worse than the symptoms of infection by Brucella abortus. Low levels of mortality occur.

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Vibrio parahaemolyticus
3.1 Code
RRL freeze-dried number is 314.

3.2 Organism
Vital freeze dried organisms

3.3 Container
Glass McCartney flask with metal screw-on lid.

3.4 Contents
The McCartney flasks are filled with varying volumes of the freeze-dried and vital organisms.

3.5 Suspension
Any liquid that is suitable for oral intake will be suitable for the suspending of the organisms, 5-10 ml will be sufficient. This includes water, alcohol, milk etc.

3.6 Application
Only effective when taken orally.

3.7 Dosage
The flask contains at least 1010 organisms/ml suspension if dissolved in a 5-10 ml liquid.
One drop of this orally administered, will cause illness and will contain about 108 organisms.

3.8 Incubation period
12-24 hours if the optimal dose is applied.

3.9 Safety precautions
See to it that none of the dissolved suspension or dry powder is taken up orally or inhaled.

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Salmonella typhi
4.1 Code
RRL freeze-dried number is 34.

4.2 Organism
Vital freeze dried organisms

4.3 Container
Glass McCartney flask with metal screw-on lid.

4.4 Contents
The McCartney flasks are filled with varying volumes of the freeze-dried and vital organisms.

4.5 Suspension
Any liquid that is suitable for oral intake will be suitable for the suspending of the organisms, 5-10 ml will be sufficient. This includes water, alcohol, milk etc.

4.6 Application
Only effective when taken orally.

4.7 Dosage
The flask contains at least 1010 organisms/ml suspension if dissolved in a 5-10 ml liquid.
One drop of this orally administered, will cause illness and will contain about 108 organisms.

4.8 Incubation period
10-14 days if the optimal dose is applied.

4.9 Safety precautions
See to it that none of the dissolved suspension or dry powder is taken up orally or inhaled.

4.10 Decontamination
The organism responds to any of the normal disinfectants. It is very stable when freeze dried and will remain stable for 2-3 weeks even when dissolved in water.

4.11 Expected symptoms of illness
Headache, fever, unwell feeling, constipation, toxaemia, septicaemia, muscle ache, diarrhoea only develops later. Untreated cases can last for up to 4 weeks. Complications can cause perforation of the intestines and bleeding.

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Salmonella typhimurium
5.1 Code
RRL freeze-dried number is 32.

5.2 Organism
Vital freeze dried organisms.

5.3 Container
Glass McCartney flask with metal screw-on lid.

5.4 Contents
The McCartney flasks are filled with varying volumes of the freeze-dried and vital organisms.

5.5 Suspension
Any liquid that is suitable for oral intake will be suitable for the suspending of the organisms, 5-10 ml will be sufficient. This includes water, alcohol, milk etc.

5.6 Application
Only effective when taken orally.

5.7 Dosage
The flask contains at least 1010 organisms/ml suspension if dissolved in a 5-10 ml liquid.
One drop of this orally administered, will cause illness and will contain about 108 organisms.

5.8 Incubation period
8-48 hours if the optimal dose is applied.

5.9 Safety precautions
See to it that none of the dissolved suspension or dry powder is taken up orally or inhaled.

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POISONING: BCF
Bromochlorodifluoromethane (BCF) poisoning is part of the halon group of metals.
Death has been ascribed to the narcotic effects of the substance that leads to respiratory suppression, Robbins 1946 and Krantz and Rudo,1966).
Several cases of sudden death in the industry due to the use of BCF are recorded (Reinhardt et al 1971). Sudden death under teenagers due to the “sniffing” of the halon to obtain the right state of mind is ascribed to ventricular fibrillation after heart sensitisation (Reinhardt et al 1971). Death follows after sensitisation of the heart due to the arrhythmogenic actions of adrenalin. Heart sensitisations in the dog occurred after BCF concentrations of 0,18% to 80% were inhaled. Heart sensitisation is observed as ventricular tachycardia with ventricular ectopic heartbeats (Clark and Tinson 1982).
A singular exposure of 2 hours resulted in irreversible damage to the heart, muscle damage and fatty changes to the livers of dogs, cats and hamsters (Weigand 1971). Repeated intake of the halon causes the following changes in the blood biochemistry:
- Increased cholesterol and phospholipids
- Decreased sodium, potassium and calcium levels
- Glycerides decrease after 2 weeks, normalise after 4 weeks and increases after 12 weeks. (Orlowski et al 1982).
- Rinitis and slight damage of the lungs after inhalation of BCF is described in the literature (Doe et al).
BCF concentrations can be determined by gas chromatography (Romsey and Flanagan 1982).

REFERENCES:
1. Clark, DG and Tinston, DJ. Acute inhalation toxicity of some halogenated and non-helogenated hydrocarbons. Human toxicology. (1982) 1, 239-247.
2. Doe, JE; Curry, AM; Robinson M and Melia, BJ. The acute toxicity of the breakdown products of the fire extinguishant Bromochloro difluoromethane (BCF, Halon 1211).
3. Krantz, JC and Rudo, FG. The fluorinated anaesthetics. Handbook Exp Pharmacol XX/1, Berlind and New York. Springer report, pp 501-568.
4. Orlowski, J; Zielinska-Psuja, B and Stypinski, Z. Evaluation of toxicity of Halon 1211. Part IV. Biochemical studies in blood. Chem. Toksykol. (1982), 14(4), pp 271-274.
5. Ramsey, JD and Flanagan, RJ. Detection and identification of volatile organic compounds in blood by heaspace gas chromatography as an aid to the diagnosis of solvent abuse. J. Chromatogr (1982) 249(2), 423-444.
6. Reinhardt, CF; Azar, A; Maxfield, ME; Smith, PE and Mullin, LS. Cardiac arrhythmias and aerosol “sniffing”. Arch Environ Health (1971) 22, 266-279.
7. Robbins, BH. Preliminary studies of the anaesthetic activity of fluorinated hydrocarbons. J Pharmacol Wxp Ther (1946) 86, 197-204.
8. Weigand, W. Inhalation toxicity of fluoro derivatives of methane, ethane and cyclobutane. Zeniralbe Arbeitsmed, Arbeitsschutz. (1971), 21(5), 149-156.

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
PRODUCT INFORMATION ON BOTULINUM TOXIN

Container:
5 ml glass flask sealed with a rubber and aluminium lid.

Contents:
Freeze dried toxin of Clostridium botulinum type A, partly purified.

Activity:
1x 106 mouse lethal dosages per ml.

Solubility:
The toxin can be dissolved in any of the following solvents;
tap water, dam water, milk, beer, wine. Solvents with high concentrations of alcohol must not be used; this includes whiskey, gin, etc. (See observation 1). As little as possible of the solvent , about 1-2 ml (10-20 drops) must be used to dissolve the toxin.
Application:
1. It can be applied as a dry powder or as a solution, by sprinkling it over food or adding it to water or any drink that will be consumed.
2. It can also be applied parenterally as a solution.

Incubation period:
Expected period before symptoms are detected depends on how much of the toxin the victim has taken in and this can vary from 2-24/36 hours. The more toxin is taken in, the shorter the incubation period and the higher the mortality rate.

Safety precautions:
The powder must not be inhaled, or the toxin must not come into contact with the skin. Wash off with soap and water or even pure alcohol if possible.

Expected symptoms in humans:
1. Impaired vision
2. Photophobia
3. ‘disfagie’ (inability to swallow properly)
4. General muscle weakness
5. Dizziness
6. Affected breathing
7. Paralysis of specific muscles

Characteristics of Toxin:
1. It can be activated with beer, wine, milk, water (tap or dam water, in other words, clean or dirty water) and can be stored for 35 days at 0, 22 or 37 degrees Celsius.
2. It is sensitive to temperatures and will become inactive at temperatures higher than 80 degrees Celsius.
3. It is stable in acidic solutions, therefore it can be efficiently administered orally.
4. It is destroyed in the presence of alkaline solutions.

Observation 1:
Precipitation will take place if the toxin is added to pure alcohol (Whiskey, gin, etc.) - it will be visible as little white flakes. To cause this reaction one needs between 15-20% ethyl alcohol. The toxin is still fully re-active in its precipitating state. This characteristic is applied as an in-between step in the purification of the toxin. If the final drink contains less than 10% ethyl alcohol (e.g. when mixed with water/ soda water and ice), the toxin (dissolved or in powder form) can be added to this drink and no precipitation will take place.

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SENSITIVE DOCUMENT

AVAILABLE DATA ABOUT BRODIFACUM

Brodifacum is the active ingredient of the commercial rat poison Finale (Coopers). and appears in it as 2,5 g/l in the liquid product and 0,02 g/l in the solid product. Both products are blue as a safety precaution.
The activity of Brodifacum compares to that of warfarin, it inhibits the clotting of blood due to the anti-vitamin K function and the decreased prothrombin. However, the difference between the two products is that warfarin has to be applied repeatedly over 3 days whereas Brodifacum is effective as a single dosage.
The Chemistry Department used the commercial product in its liquid form for the extraction of the active substance. A powder with about 95% purity was extracted. The colour varies from white to light blue. The colouring does not affect the efficiency of the substance. The powder is tasteless and odourless.
The LD50 for brodifacum after oral application in rats is 270mg/kg.
Toxicity tests were conducted on primates to determine the fatal dosage and to determine the time it takes for the substance to act. Single oral dosages were applied to apes: 125mg, 250mg, 500mg, 1000mg/kg. The highest dosage resulted in the death of one experimental animal after the coagulation period (APTT) went from 36 seconds to 375 seconds. The other animals showed coagulation periods of 328 seconds and clinical signs, but they survived. One animal that received a dosage of 500mg/kg, also died after the coagulation period (APTT) increased from 27 seconds to 297 seconds. The other one in the group showed an increased coagulation period from 29 seconds to 120 seconds and then bled to death through the (veneusepunksie) that was done to collect the samples. The lowest dosage showed minimal changes in coagulation.
The coagulation period in humans is normally longer than in apes. The coagulation period in baboons is closer to that of humans, therefore in further studies this species was used.
Two baboons per group received dosages of 500mg/kg as a single dosage. Another group received the same dosage, but after 24 hours received another 500mg/kg. The last group received a single dosage of 1000mg/kg.
After 96 hours the first symptoms of blood in the defecation were observed in some of the animals and these were not connected to dosages.
Real symptoms of bleeding were only detected after 6 days. The mucous membranes were also bleeding. The first death occurred 8 days after application. The post mortem showed bleeding of all the mucous membranes, muscles and subcutane. Some of the animals were killed in the terminal stages. Post mortems showed the same wounds and no changes were observed as a result of the different applied dosages. It can be concluded that all of these dosages were toxic and that the dosage had no effect on the length of the latent period, the chronology of the symptoms or the post mortem results. The one important aspect was, that the animals were very ill for 48 hours before they eventually died. Death is not acute and in no cases could bleeding on the brain be determined.
The abovementioned results raised the question as to how subjects would react to treatment. As is the case with warfarin, the classic treatment would be to administer large quantities of Vit K. Reaction to Vit K takes several days and in advanced cases this treatment might come too late, therefore it is important to keep fresh blood with still effective prothrombin.
In this study there were 3 animals per group. Group 1 received Vitamin K at 5 mg/kg. Group 2 received fresh blood (about 1 hour after collection in citrate) at 20 mg/kg. Group 3 received both applications.
Symptoms were raised by administering a single oral dosage of 1 mg/kg to the baboons. The animal was treated as soon as it showed signs of illness, e.g. anorexia and listlessness or if there were any signs of bleeding. The coagulation period was determined before treatment and was repeated twice with 72 hours in between.
When the symptoms appeared, the APTT values were already high (5-6 times the normal values). The first symptoms appeared 10 days after application in the first animals and on day 11 all the animals were ill. After treatment, 1 animal in each group died within 48 hours after treatment. All the other animals recovered after treatment, 72 hours after the first treatment the coagulation period (APTT) decreased by as much as 50 %. By the time the samples were collected, 144 hours after application, the coagulation period was back to normal and it was concluded that the treatment was successful.
The 3 animals that died showed internal bleeding, especially in the heart muscle. The animals were diagnosed with heart failure.
Warfarin is often used as rat poison combined with sulfaquinoxalin, due to the fact that sulfaquinoxalin also causes hypoprothrombinemea and bone marrow suppression and bleeding. It was decided to determine this synergistic working in the case of brodifacum. In studying rats this synergism could not be proved. The possible reason for this is that sulfaquinoxalin e.g. warfarin will have to be administered repeatedly. The single dose is just not enough and due to the fact that brodifacum has a latent period of 9 days, the synergism does not occur.
The most effective means of application is through food. To this end the product was tested for its stability at high temperatures. The pure product was boiled in water for 5 hours. The toxicity of this product in rats was then compared with that of the standard product. An oral dosage of 0,8 mg/kg was administered to 5 rats in each group. In both groups all the animals died 9 to 12 days after application. The conclusion is that the product is stable.

Recommended uses
1. The powder is readily available and can be produced at short notice.
2. The powder is not soluble in water. It is not easily soluble in alcohol, but dissolves in chloroform.
3. Absorption through the stomach is good. It does not absorb cutaneously, therefore the handling risk is low.
4. The recommended dose is 0,5 - 1 mg/kg, i.e. a single oral application.
5. The substance is stable and can be stored for long periods. It will also not become inactive in the presence of other substances.
6. The substance is odourless and tasteless. The experimental animals also did not experience any negative effects on the digestive tract.
7. The latent period varies from 8-10 days. The toxin takes about 72 hours to work through the system.
8. Treatment can be more than 50% effective, if the symptoms are picked up early.

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CHOLICALCIFEROL

BACKGROUND
Vitamin D3, or cholicalciferol is a commercial rat poison that is used, either on its own or combined with warfarin, both abroad and in South Africa. It is especially useful where there are problems with rodent strains that are resistant to warfarin. The producers of these products say that a single intake of cholicalciferol is enough to kill the animal, but they do admit that rodents need to take an average of three doses before death occurs.
Cholicalciferal causes calcification of the blood vessels and the heart muscle and eventually of other organs. This leads to heart failure and death. At the correct dosage cholicalciferol poisoning can also lead to degeneration and necrosis of the heart muscle as well as other tissue which causes secondary distrophic calcifications.

CHEMICAL CHARACTERISTICS
The substance is soluble in organic solvents.
It is de-activated in damp air through the process of oxidation. No specifications about the humidity % or the period of exposure are available. In the production of commercial rat poison nothing is added to prevent the process of oxidation. If the dry powder is vacuum-packed and held in a fridge or coolroom it can be stored for more than one year.
Cholicalciferol is a crystalline powder that does not dissolve in water and does not easily dissolve in alcohol and vegetable oils, although it will be reasonably soluble if the solvents are heated. About 0.6g of the substance in powder form can be contained in a normal gelatine capsule.

CLINICAL OBSERVATIONS
On the first day the rodent will take in a large volume of the toxin, on the second day it takes in a bit less and on the third day even less. Between the fourth and sixth day after initial exposure to the toxin the animals start to die. The same tests were done on dogs where the active ingredient was administered three times and death occurred within four to seven days after the initial application. One pig that received the same dose died on the third day due to (uitgesproke hemoglobienuriese nefrose) although there were already signs of calcification of the blood vessel walls in the heart as well as in the heart muscle tissue.
Blue-apes dosed with small doses of cholicalciferol every day for 30 days suffered severe damage of the heart muscle and blood vessels when they died after 65 days.
One single dose is not sufficient to cause any signs of illness and no notable hispathological changes in any organs were detected.

DOSAGE
The recommended dosage for rodents is 56 mg/kg which was proved when we conducted our own experiments. A lot of work was done on various species, and it is important to note that low chronic dosages only cause mild damage to the aorta in particular and do not necessarily cause damage to the heart muscle.
However, there is a strong variation in susceptibility between individuals of the same species and in each group one will find single animals that will show a high tolerance to the substance.
The recommended daily dosage for an adult human, is 10 micro gram per day (total dosage), but as little as 1,25 mg/day for 30 days has proved to be very toxic to humans.
Therefore the recommended ACUTE dosage for humans is a total dosage of 65 mg/kg divided into three applications over three days at an initial application of 35 mg/kg, followed by 20 mg/kg, followed by 10 mg/kg.
The recommended CHRONIC dosage applied over 30 days, is a total application of 10 mg per day for 30 days. This dosage can safely be increased and applied over a longer period. The required effect will occur about sixty days after the initial application.

EXPECTED SYMPTOMS
The symptoms described for humans are mainly for chronic poisoning, but also apply to acute poisoning:
- anorexia
- nausea and vomiting
- ‘poliurie’
- muscle weakness
- nervousness
- itchiness
- hypertension
- heart arrhythmia
- hypercalsemiae

POST MORTEM SIGNS

A wide range of post mortem wounds is described, depending on the species, dosage, application period and organs involved.
Pigs:
Degeneration with inflammation of the kidneys, lungs and soft tissue. Degeneration and distrophic calcification in the heart.
Rabbits:
General arterial calcification, supraventricular stenosis and calcification in the kidneys and ovaria.
Rats:
Disseminated focal necrosis with re-active round cell and granulosite infiltration in the lung.
Horses:
Extensive
Primates:
Mineralisation in the kidneys, liver, lungs and widespread in the blood vessels and heart muscle.

TREATMENT
The following treatment is prescribed for humans:
- Magnesium sulphate - it reduces the serum calcium and assists in the discharge of urinary calcium
- Cortisone
- Calcitonin
However, it is important to note that, by the time that the symptoms are observed, the heart will already be damaged beyond recovery. It is therefore important to initially apply a large enough dosage.

CONCLUSION
It is clear that this substance can be used very successfully, keeping in mind that individuals will respond differently to it. It is advised that a high dosage is applied to ensure its effectivity. It also clear that the substance is untraceable and will therefore not be a problem. It is suggested that the toxin be combined with a toxin that will cause weakening of the heart to ensure a speedy death.
The toxin can be used in various forms. It can easily be used in capsule form or be placed on food, since it is tasteless.

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INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE PARAOXON

RRL can prepare Paraoxon in its pure form.
Chemical studies show that:
i. Paraoxon can be very easily broken down in an alkaline medium. It is only stable up to pH7.
ii. The substance is heat resistant. In experiments the substance was boiled in water for 1 hour with a minimum loss of activity.
iii. Stability at 37 degrees Celsius and daily exposure to air was very satisfactory.
iv. Water solubility is very unsatisfactory. It dissolves well in alcohol. If the concentration of the toxin is low, it will dissolve in a water and alcohol combination.
v. The toxin has no characteristic smell.

Results of experiments done on baboons
Cutaneous application
A single application of 4 mg/kg mass was applied to the shaved skin, covering an area of 2 cm2. The substance always applied between the scapulae. The first effects of the dosage were noticed 6-8 hours after application. The symptoms were more the neurogenetic effects of organophosphates and not so much the ordinary muscarine signs. Nicotinic signs were present. Twenty-four hours after initial application the blood pressure decreased. These animals recovered slowly after a few days and received no treatment.
The dosage of 4 mg/kg mass was applied several times with periods of 24 hours in between each application. The application technique was the same as in the previous experiment. 2 Animals were treated with atrophen and obidoxime (Toxogonin-Merck) when the first symptoms of poisoning were detected. Within 12 hours after the first application, 3 of the animals showed symptoms of myosis, opisthotonos, ataxia and weakness. However, one animal did not show these symptoms during the first period, only 4 hours after the second dosage was applied. After the second application all the animals showed symptoms within the first 2 hours after application. Death occurred 12 hours after the second application. Some animals died after 36 hours, 48 hours as well as after 168 hours. There was no difference between animals that were treated and animals that received no treatment -they all showed the same symptoms.
A general observation is made that the affected animals appear to feel better in the morning than later in the day. This is attributed to rest stimulation - the activities in and around the cages cause stress and this aggravates their symptoms.
The first symptoms are that of anorexia followed by ataxia. Diarrhoea and vomiting follow thereafter. The above-mentioned experiment was repeated using a lower dosage of 2 mg/kg mass. This resulted in the same symptoms as with the increased dosage. However, the initial symptoms were only detected 12 hours after application and were the more classical symptoms that can be expected with this group of substances. Four hours after the second application the symptoms occurred again and the animals were treated. The first death occurred 168 hours after initial application and the second one 24 hours later. The animal that survived after 8 days was one of the two that were treated, but his condition is critical.
The cutaneous route experiment was concluded with the application of a single dosage of 8 mg/kg mass. In two cases the first symptoms occurred 4 hours after application. The third case was 24 hours and the fourth 28 hours after initial application. The extent of the symptoms was much faster in these animals. Two baboons were treated using the standard treatment. Death was delayed by the treatment, but occurred however within 96-168 hours after initial application. The untreated animal died within 30-48 hours after initial application.
Oral application
3 Adult baboons received oral dosages of 0,5 mg/kg mass. Two dosages were administered at 48-hour intervals. After the first application the animals showed no noticeable symptoms. However, within 24 hours the erythrocytecholinesterase levels dropped to 25% of their normal concentrations. After 48 hours the levels were only 10% of the initial concentrations. The second dosage was administered 48 hours after the first and 2 hours later the erythrocytecholinesterase levels were 0. Within 30 minutes after the second application the animals started showing clinical symptoms. After receiving treatment with atrophen, they slowly recovered and survived.
An increased dosage of 1 mg/kg was administered as a suspension to an adult baboon. After 15 hours the animal showed symptoms of poisoning and 30 minutes later the animal died.
A dosage of 2 mg/kg mass was administered to another adult baboon, again as a suspension which is not a very suitable formulation due to the problematic nature of the applied dosage. The first symptoms were visible after 15 minutes and 30 minutes later the animal stopped breathing and heart fibrillation occurred. After the animal received heart massage, it showed signs of improvement and after 24 hours it seemed to have recovered completely. However, these results are questionable due to the methods of dosage.
We improved the dosage methods and paraoxon was added to a water and alcohol combination. Instead of an oral administration, the dosage was administered intra esophageally to ensure the correct intake. 2 Animals received a dosage of 0,5 mg/kg mass. Only one animals showed mucus flow and slight muscle fasciculation, but recovered completely after seven hours. The increased dosage of 1 mg/kg showed clinical symptoms of poisoning after 30 minutes and the two animals died 70 minutes and 150 minutes after application.
Paraoxon
Paraoxon is the active metabolite of the inactive organophosphate paraotin. Therefore the end product of bio-transformation is still para- nitrophfenol. Even when a low dosage of 1 mg/kg mass is applied, the para-nitrofenol will be observable in the urine and other parts of the body.
Safety studies and treatment
Due to the fact that paraoxon breaks down very quickly in an alkaline medium, experiments were done to investigate the neutralising effect with the cutaneous application. It was determined that a 60 seconds application of 5% NaOH and a 6% Na Co solution effectively protected the animals after paraoxon was applied to the skin for 60 minutes. No symptoms of poisoning were observed. When the alkaline was added, the paraoxon acquired a bright yellow colour.
Although no studies have yet been done, it can be expected that an oral administration of an alkaline substance will also have this neutralising effect if a large enough quantity of the substance is applied.
Atrophen treatment can be effective as well, if only to slow down the poisoning. The use of oximes could have a temporary effect because the inhibition of cholinesterase could be reversed temporarily. Six hours after application the cholinesterase levels will decrease again. Using obidoxime (Toxogonin-Merck) will be the correct treatment because it is suspected to also affect the neural system. The other oximes do not affect this system.

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD
P.O. BOX 13973
SINOVILLE
0129
DATE: 88/07/21
PROJECT NR: 88/0/P/042/RRL
PROJECT REPORT
INTERIM REPORT
1.a. REPORT NUMBER: 2.1
b. PROJECT TEAM: J.J. Nieuwenhuis
c. PERSON WHO ISSUED THE INSTRUCTION: (Dr A. Immelman)

2. AIM: Characteristics of paraoxon (PIXO)

3. SUMMARY: The possibility of the application of paraoxon in shampoo is investigated.

4. INTRODUCTION: Colgate lanolin shampoo (pink colour) was used. The paraoxon that was tested (97%; see Report 1.2) had a slightly yellowish colour.

5. METHOD:
1. The pH of the shampoo was determined by using a PH meter: 8.2
2. 0,6 g PIXO was added to 10 g shampoo in a glass test-tube which was sealed with parafilm. The mix was shaken to aid the suspending process and it was left for four days at room temperature.

OBSERVATIONS:
a) The shampoo turned orange (probably due to the forming of a very small amount of p-nitrophenol);
b) There is a change in the smell of the sample, but the smell is not bad;
c) The viscosity of the shampoo sample decreased substantially;
d) A certain amount of yellow oil (about 200-300 mg; paraoxon?) collected at the bottom of the tube.
3. Clean shampoo (6 g) was dissolved by means of inversion in 100 ml water in a separating funnel (“control”). Without shaking it again, 6 g of the sample was dissolved from the abovementioned nr 2. in 100 ml water (it dissolved faster than the control (“test sample”).
Both separating funnels were shaken very well for about 5 times and left for 60 minutes.

OBSERVATIONS:
a) The control mix turned pink; the test sample turned yellow;
b) Both samples foamed easily
c) The foaming head of the control had 30 volume units against the 23 of the test sample
4. After adding 12 g NaCl, both the test sample as well as the control were extracted with ethyl acetate (3x 30 ml). The combined organic phase was washed with water (1x30 ml) dried (Na2SO4) and analysed for paraoxon by using GCMS.
5. GCMS:
a) 5 mg paraoxon (97%) was dissolved in 1 ml ethyl aceteate.
b) Parameters: He flow 50 EFS units (Head pressure 35 kPa)
Oven -- initial temp 60 C
30 C/min to 200C, keep at 0,5 min
10 C/min to 250 C
Transfer line 250 C
Injection (poort) 150 C
Purge off 0,8 min
MS on after 2 min
c) Apply 0.3 ul
d) Retention period 8.84 min. Area 152 units.
e) Inject 1 ul each of the test sample (Fig 1) and the control (Fig 2)

OBSERVATIONS:
Paraoxon present in the test sample: retention period 8.85 min (area 188 units). A small amount of p-nitrophenol (retention period 6.34 min) is observed in the chromatogram - however, this does not represent more than about 5% of the amount of paraoxon).

6. RESULTS:
Paraoxon suspends to some extent in shampoo without breaking down (during the 4 days that the experiment was done). The estimated amount of paraoxon in 6 g of shampoo is 150 mg. The foaming characteristics of the shampoo is not affected.

7. DISCUSSION:
The solubility of paraoxon in shampoo is (i.e. water) is probably too low for a single application. The advantage is that the toxin will not wash off. Water soluble organophosphates will be prepared as soon as the necessary reagents arrive - an increased amount of the toxin can be placed in the shampoo, but the possibility then exists that it will be washed off easily (resulting in a too short period of exposure).

8. RECOMMENDATION:
A chemical substance must be sought (that can be easily absorbed cutaneously) and which will be easily soluble or suspend well in shampoo (e.g. by the forming of micella, but that will not dissolve when water is added.

signed by:
......?.....

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PRESENTATION OF CERTAIN BACTERIA
A. Clostridium oedematiens.
A particular pathogenic strain
i. infects wounds.
ii. Spore forming
iii. Wounds:
- oedemia after +- 24 hours.
- Toxemia and death after another +- 48 hours.
iv. Several strains of this organism are present in soil.
v. The organism is susceptible to antiseptics and antibiotics.

B. Organisms which cause gas gangrene.
Clostridium histolyticum, Clostridium septicum and Clostridium perfringens type A.
The only difference with Clostridium oedematiens is that it does not cause oedemia, but gas gangrene with hemorrhagic lesions.

C. Enteropathogens
The following non-lethal organisms are available:
- E coli.
- Vibrio cholera.
- Shigella spp.

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TOP SECRET
RNDCHNGE 12.08.1991

ALTERNATIVES TO THE CHANGE IN THE SADF'S INTERESTS IN CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WITH REGARD TO THE MEDCHEM GROUP OF COMPANIES.

1. INTRODUCTION:
Political changes in South Africa, especially with regard to the handling of Secret Funds, could force the SADF to reconsider the nature of its current relationship with the Medchem Group of companies (MCG). The sensitive nature of the R & D project that is run by Delta G Scientific (DGS), could present a security risk if it is exposed to a private sector commission -certain of the projects undertaken by Delta G Scientific could not be classified as purely defensive.
This report takes into consideration the fact that that the security of Project COAST should be protected at all costs.
Other suppositions are:
Maintaining the corporate integrity of the sub contractors, in other words neither the SADF nor the companies can currently afford liquidation or legal representation.
Maintaining the skills of highly qualified personnel, as well as their goodwill with regard to the SADF, the current and future government.
Maintaining the technology, which was developed at a high cost, for the RSA.

2. CURRENT CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND THE UNDERLYING FACTORS WHICH LED TO IT:
DELTA G SCIENTIC was established in the early eighties in order to equip the SADF with a research and development (R&D) as well as a production capacity with regard to Chemical Warfare (CW).
During the period 1982 to 1985 the organisation grew and physical facilities were established to satisfy the conditions laid down by the SADF. The facilities that were established at Midrand, were designed to undertake mainly CW R&D as well as production.
However, due to political changes in the country, the production activities are no longer necessary. The instruction was however to maintain these facilities in order take up production again if necessary.
Due to the changing circumstances, changes in command, as well as the changes in the security environment, the organisation was corporatively and financially restructured in order to fulfil the following demands:
To cut costs insofar as it is possible
To maintain security in an ordinary commercial environment
To keep the trained staff employed as well as offer them long-term job-security.
This restructuring resulted in the corporate structure as described in Appendix A. The corporate ownership structure maintains an “arm-length relationship” with the SADF and fulfil all the above-mentioned demands, it also ensures that none of the parties involved will be benefited unfairly.
Long-term contracts were negotiated with Medchem Consolidated Investments (MCI) as mediator although the activities would take place at Delta G Scientific to establish the “arm-length relationship” with the SADF. The long-term objective with regard to the cost of the contracts was to enable the group to fully commercialise over a period of five years, and to be ready when the SADF begins the down scaling process regarding its direct interest in CW R&D as soon as the technology reached a satisfactorily level of development. In order to do this, loans and ‘user rights’ were created by means of lease agreements to establish a pure commercial relationship.
An important factor in the creation of the above mentioned relationship, was the value added to the designing plant at DGS, with regard to the value of the company Randjespark Property Holdings (RPH), as well as the business loan that was negotiated with D John Truter Financial Consultants (DJT), in order to make the assets affordable over a period of 5 years.
The interest rates and values added to the respective transactions were based on the agreement that services, in the form of R % D contracts, would be rendered at a pre-determined cost and escalation (PPI) over a five-year period.

3. CURRENT FINANCIAL POSITION:
It is clear that, considering the financial statements of the group, any changes to the contractual relationship with the SADF would have a direct effect on the financial status of the companies. Any changes to the pre-determined income profile of the operation would have a serious effect for the following reasons:
a. Except for certain personnel costs the largest part of the cost structure is fixed.
b. Increased growth of any alternative business in the current economic climate, especially in the chemical industry, is highly unlikely.
c. Although Delta G Scientific has achieved excellently in terms of new production technology development, the development process for new products, especially for the export market, does not happen overnight.
In the long term the successful commercialisation of the group should be advantageous to South Africa, especially with regard to the value added to locally produced raw materials and the exploitation of export markets.

4. PROBABLE IMPORTANT EVENTS AND FACTORS:
The following probable events (taking into account the current contractual position which should continue) and suggestions for the implementation of changes were investigated:
4.1 No change.
4.2 Changes to delivery requirements which implies a partial adaptation or the ending of the contractual relationship.
4.2.1. Genuine downscaling of involvement through constant expenditure on CW R & D over the next three-and-a-half years.
4.2.2 Downscaling of contractual expenditure, to e.g. R5,0 million per year (maintaining the ‘PPI’ raise on this annual amount)
4.2.3 Immediate cessation of all CW R & D projects of the group, as well as the ending of the relationship between the group and the SADF.

4.1. NO CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SADF AND MCG:
If there is no change in the relationship with regard to CW R & D, the situation will be as stipulated in APPENDIX B.
It appears as though, judging by the pro forma Balance sheets, on the basis that the proposals are achievable, that the Group will be in a position to redeem the largest part of the loan after 5 years. To make forecasts would be too risky for any organisation, especially if a new party joins a business that depends on the success of its R & D and the development of new technology, and where the competition is so strong that some of the big contenders are experiencing financial problems.

4.2. CHANGING DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS WHICH IMPLIES PARTIAL ADAPTATION:
4.2.1 GENUINE DOWN-SCALING OF R & D EXPENDITURE BY THE SADF
A genuine down-scaling of R & D expenditure by fixing the annual contractual costs to R14 million, would have the following effect on the financial position of the group: (APPENDIX B)
This would result in a substantial weakening of the MCG income profile. A decrease in services rendered can lead to certain cost savings, but this will probably not be sufficient, because the fixed cost component of contractual research amounts to the largest part of the profile.
Although this will result in a weakened financial position for the group, the problem can be solved if it is accepted that:
The quantity of annual services rendered, would decrease in line with the genuine decrease in salaries
Only 50% of the loan would be repaid after the 5-year period. However, the group would be in a position to serve these accounts and it would become possible for D J Truter to get back the R12 million that it is owed within the next two years after the ending of the contracts in 1997, that is if the suppositions are correct.
However, this situation implies that the financial relationship with the SADF will continue after the ending of the contracts.

4.2.2. DOWN-SCALING OF CHEMICAL WARFARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
It was arbitrarily decided that the research expenditure could be reduced to R5,0 million per year. It was further accepted that this amount would remain constant in real terms, in other words an annual raise until 1997 of a percentage equal to the ‘PPI’, which is currently 13,8%. (APPENDIX D).
This event would clearly have a serious effect on the financial structure and the operating financial integrity of the group.
Under these circumstances an agreement would have to be made with regard to an amount for damages incurred, to compensate for the effective cancellation of a part of the R & D contracts. In terms of the current contract with the SADF, a cancellation fee was determined (APPendix G).
This recommendation suggests a cancellation fee of about R20,0 million. This would mean a net negative cash flow balance for the SADF of about R3 million. This presentation eventually makes a recommendation for the application of such a cancellation amount.

4.2.3 IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF CONTRACT R & D
Regarding this scenario, there are two possibilities:
A constant growth in other sales, as would be expected should the contract R & D continue. In other words no increase in the production and marketing of other products by the use of R & D personnel in another capacity.
An increased growth in other income, by the application of staff and facilities that were previously involved in R & D, for the development of commercial products.
4.2.3.1 No additional commercial sales:
If the contracts are immediately partially cancelled, an amount for damages incurred can be paid. Even in this scenario the group will be financially ruined within two years.
The deteriorating situation is clearly described in the Balance sheet hereby attached (APPENDIX E). It is obvious that the group will not be able to exist under the above-mentioned circumstances.
4.2.3.2 Alternative use of R & D facilities:
If there is a partial cancellation of the contract, the following scenario can be expected:
a. A cancellation fee of about R32,5 million (see calculation in APPENDIX H).
b. The group will probably not need to lay off any of the researchers, but will be able to use them for the development of new products and to speed up the development of products.
c. This should lead to an increase in other sales, with an increase in income as stipulated in the pro forma financial statements in APPENDIX F.
An explanation of the application of the cancellation fee is needed, in order to ensure a proper interpretation of the balance sheet.

5. APPLICATION OF THE CANCELLATION FEE
The following transactions ought to take place:
a. A cancellation fee of R32,5 has to be paid.
b. Considering the inflated evaluation of the Plant (in ordinary commercial terms) belonging to Randjespark Property Holdings (RPH), during the re-structuring of the group as well as the DJT business loan, it would have to be offered at a substantial discount. It is calculated that realistic evaluation will lead to a discount of about R10 million for the acquisition of the DJT interests in RPH. The DJT loan will also be payable at a discount of at least R5 million, because it would be structured for a 5-year period.
Therefore an amount of R17 million would be subtracted from the R32,5 million payment from the SADF.

6. SUMMARY:
Although the group can under no circumstances be regarded as a financially healthy organisation, it has enough potential to successfully complete the commercialisation process within the next 3 and a half years.
If the group were to find financially strong business partners it would improve its position even more, and taken into consideration that the group will become relatively competitive, this is not an unlikely prospect.
It is also important to note that the DGS employee shareholders will benefit from this situation, because all share options will be immediately executed. From a security point of view, this event would probably offer the best cover/protection for the SADF, especially with regard to future embarrassment due to the previous relationship with the group.
In the event of any changes to the SADF involvement in CW R & D, it is recommended that all transactions be carried out before or on 30 September 1991, to prevent the 12 % VAT (value added tax) effect.

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TOP SECRET

Only Copy
GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5
Telephone: 6715412
Enquiries: Brig W Basson
SAMS Headquarters
Private Bag X102
Hennopsmeer
0046
7 May 1994

FINAL REPORT: USA DOLLAR ADVANCE
1. On 28 November 1991 it was determined that the project officer would need a USA Dollar cash amount for the next six months to pay for flights through Africa to Europe (transporting samples and material). The money will be used to pay for fuel, landing fees and “discretionary” costs (cash payments to airport security officials to ensure the smooth running of procedures regarding clearances and searches). A CSI front company (Pasload Flights) provided the $75 000-00 in cash. The amount was used to pay for the following:
a. In December 1991 the Chief of security at the airport in Ndjamena received $12 000-00.
b. Custom officials at the airport in Douala received $5 000-00 to prevent a search of the aeroplane.
c. In September 1993 Croatian border guards received $10 000-00 to allow the project officer entry into Croatia for the interviewing of government officials.
d. During this visit another amount of $10 000-00 was paid to officials of the Croatian armed forces to make appointments for the project officer with the government officials and bankers involved.
e. On 26 March 1994 an amount of $36 000-00 was paid to dr D Chu for expenses incurred by him when Brig Basson was arrested in Switzerland in December 1993. These expenses included:
i. Legal costs - $2500-00 (he was called as a witness in Zurich)
ii. The pre-active closing of accounts and the cancellation of the use of safes could have led the Swiss Police to connect him with the Project officer. At this stage he was not sure what exactly the Police was investigating and which compromising documentation they discovered in possession of the project officer.
iii. The destruction of two computer hard drive disks which contained information about the previous purchases and research activities of the project officer in Switzerland, to avoid discovery by the Police ($28 000-00).
f. The balance -$1-500-00 - was used by the project officer for the renting of a car to move through Europe before the trial as well as in the period thereafter, in an effort to find Jacomet.

2. Due to the lack of proof, it is requested that these payments be certified by the project officer as expenses incurred in the interest of the project.
signed by:
(W BASSON)
PROJECT OFFICER JOTA: BRIG
The above-mentioned expenses are certified as having been incurred in the interest of the project.
signed by:
(DP KNOBEL)
PROJECT LEADER JOTA: LT GENL

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD

PROJECT NR: 86/H/10/50
DATE: 28 JUNE 1986
PROJECT REPORT (NR 3)

AIM: Determination of the toxicity of Brodifacum and Sulphaquinoxalin as single doses and in combination.

TEST SAMPLE: Brodifacum (Coopers Finale)
Sulphaquinoxalin (Embazin)

METHOD:
1. Facility: Roodeplaat Research Laboratories
2. Experimental animals: 20 Adult Spraque Dowley rats
3. Treatment Groups:
a. Group 1 : 2 Rats dosed with 100 mg/kg Sulphaquinoxalin.
b. Group 2 : 2 Rats dosed with 50 mg/kg Sulphaquinoxalin.
c. Group 3 : 2 Rats dosed with 0,5 mg/kg Brodifacum.
d. Group 4 : 2 Rats dosed with 0,25 mg/kg Brodifacum.
e. Group 5 : 3 Rats dosed with 50 mg/kg Sulphaquinoxalin in combination with 0,5 mg/kg Brodifacum.
f. Group 6 : 3 Rats dosed with 100 mg/kg Sulphaquinoxalin in combination with 0,25 mg/kg Brodifacum.
g. Group 7 : 3 Rats dosed with 50 mg/kg Sulphaquinoxalin in combination with 0,25 mg/kg Brodifacum.
h. Group 8 : 3 Rats dosed with 100 mg/kg Sulphaquinoxalin in combination with 0,5 mg/kg Brodifacum.

4. Accommodation: Individually - in conventional cages.

5. Nutrition: Epol rat pellets ad lib, as well as water.

6. Special treatment and procedures:
a. Day 0: Weigh and dose animals.
b. Day 1-20: Daily Clinical observations.
c. Complete post mortem.

RESULTS:
1. See table 1
2. Due to the small amount of animals per group we were unable to draw adequate conclusions. It appears as if there is no difference between large applications of Brodifacum and the combinations, with regard to the period before they die.
3. Most of the animals died from internal haemorrhaging, although 2 animals suffered from a loss of blood through the nose and mouth, due to bleeding of the lung. No macroscopic bleeding of the brain was observed.

PROJECT TEAM: Drr J. H. Davies (Project leader)
A. Immelman.

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ROODEPLAAT RESEARCH LABORATORIES (PTY) LTD

TELEX :3-22344(SA)
TEL: (012)-82-1012
P.O BOX 13873
SINOVILLE
0129

PROJECT REPORT (NR 3)
DATE: 13/05/86
PROJECT NR: 86/H/1/30(2)

AIM: Isolation of Monensin
PERSON WHO ISSUED THE INSTRUCTION: A Immelman (RRL)
MOTIVATION: Need
INSTRUCTION: 300g is needed. This was extended to 500g on 24/04/86.
RESULTS:
35,0g was delivered to Dr J Davies on 04/04/86
80,4g was delivered to Dr J Davies on 09/04/86
90,0g was delivered to Dr J Davies on 22/04/86
391,7g was delivered to Dr A Immelman on 13/05/86
Total 597,1g.

CONCLUSIONS: Project completed.
PROJECT TEAM: K Psotta, E Joubert
signature of: K Psotta

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SENSITIVE - SHAREHOLDERS MEETING AUGUST/85

3. RESEARCH
3.1 BPV
3.2 IONOPHORE ANTIBIOTICS
REPORT ABOUT THE IONOPHORE ANTIBIOTICS AND THEIR USE
The ionophore antibiotic is also known as the poli-ether antibiotic. These are agents extracted through bacterial fermentation and are characterised as large complex molecules. Synthetic production has already been done but is very difficult and is not yet applied commercially.
The agents cannot be clinically used in humans. In veterinary practice they are used as growth stimulants due to the fact that the flora of the rumen is affected in such a way that larger quantities of propionic acid and smaller quantities of acetic acid are formed. The finding that these agents are narrow spectrum antibiotics but that they affect a wide spectrum of coccidia, resulted in their common use as coccidiostatic in poultry and ruminants.
After clinical use it was determined that one of the first applied ionophores, monensin, causes degeneration of cardiac muscle in an overdose in ruminants. It was also determined that horses are particularly susceptible to the agent and could suffer acute death. Monensin also caused secondary problems due to a problem with taste. However, the later developed agents in this group, e.g. lasalocid, salinomicin and meduramicin did not have the taste problem. These agents were also less cardiotoxic than the original monensin.
This information led to RRL investigating the possibility to use these toxins clandestinely. The advantage is that, were they to cause acute or sub-acute heart failure in the target, it would not be possible to trace the ionophore.
Experiments were done on 2 baboons, where monensin was orally administered. Both animals developed diarrhoea, which is probably the result of the affected intestinal flora. The application was repeated after 5 days , the one animal received 10 mg/kg and the other 50 mg/kg. ECG tests were done 14 days later and the animal that received the largest dosage suffered from artrial fibrillation, tachycardia and a decrease in electrical activity. Three weeks later it had sinus tachycardia.
Due to the fact that daily oral applications to baboons are problematic, the toxin was placed in their food. The taste of monensin was still a problem here and no sufficient dosages could be administered. It appeared as though the taste would also be problematic when administered to humans.
More oral experiments were done with blue-apes and sheep. The only monitoring system that could be used were enzyme studies in order to demonstrate the damage to cardiac muscle. All these results were negative but can still be questioned due to the doubtful nature of the normal values of the enzymes of this particular species. Electrocardiographic tests were not possible because the scientists had to borrow this apparatus from the Veterinary department and it was not available at the time.
Monensin is not absorbed properly through the alimentary canal, only 10% of the applied dosage in the case of ruminants.
Monensin is not water soluble but it dissolved well in alcohol. A dosage of 10 mg/kg was intravenously administered to a baboon. The animal died 6 hours later. Macroscopic and microscopic post mortem investigations showed signs of heart failure, but there was no visible damage to the cardiac muscle.
A smaller dosage of 5 mg/kg was intravenously administered to a baboon. The ECG monitor showed a second grade atrio ventricular heart blockage. Half an hour later there was a pathogenic arrhythmia that could possibly develop into ventricular fluttering. Two hours after application the symptoms were an anoxic ischemia of the miocard with clinical sianosis. Three hours after application there was a sinus rhythm developing into sinus tachycardia.
(geleidingsteurnisse in die hart) are probably due to increased intracellular potassium. It is a well-known fact that the ionophores affect the movement of certain cations through cellular membranes.
Further planned research:
1. Intramuscular application of monensin. Linked to this would be the development of suitable formulations for intramuscular as well as intravenous application.
2. The other ionophores will also have to be investigated, this might even solve the taste problem. Comparative studies show that the toxicity of these agents in humans is not necessarily the same as in horses.
3. Studies of pigs must also be included in those of primates. Especially with regard to oral application.
4. Studies of rodents continue.

In order to complete this work, the researchers need the following:
1. The pure material is not easily available.
2. An ECG machine is very necessary and it is expected that such a machine will be delivered on the premises within the next three months.
3. The assistance of a pharmacist, with regard to formulation problems.
4. The limited availability of storage facilities slows down experiments.
5. Histopathological investigations are done by an outside consultant and it is hard for him to act efficiently due to the fact that he cannot be informed about the experiment/s.

We recommend that the study is continued in order to not only determine acute toxicity, but also degeneration of the cardiac muscle through sub-acute/chronic studies.

3.3 REPRODUCTIVE IMMUNOLOGY

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HSF/UG/302/6/C123
Telephone: 671-5413
Enquiries: Brig W. Basson
Chief of the SA Defence Force
Private Bag X414
Pretoria
0001
19 August 1991

Genl M.A. de M. Malan, SSA,
Minister of Defence
P.O. Box 47
Cape Town
8000

PROPOSALS WITH REGARD TO THE ENDING OF CONTRACTUAL TIES WITH THE MEDCHEM GROUP WITH EFFECT FROM 1 SEPTEMBER 1991 – IMPLICATIONS AND OPTIONS: PROJECT COAST
Appendix
A : Corporate structure of the Medchem group
B : Determination of cancellation costs with regard to contract research: 3-year cancellation period
C : Determination of cancellation costs with regard to contract research: 5-year cancellation period
D : Predicted Financial Statements for the Medchem Group including R17,7m cancellation costs
E : Predicted Financial Statement for the Medchem Group including R37m cancellation costs

BACKGROUND:
1. DELTA G SCIENTIC was established in the early eighties in order to equip the SADF with a research and development (R&D) as well as a production capacity with regard to Chemical Warfare (CW).
2. During the period 1982 to 1985 the company grew and physical facilities were established to satisfy the conditions laid down by the SADF. The facilities that were established at Midrand, were designed to undertake mainly CW R&D as well as production.
3. Until the end of March 1990 the company was fully controlled by the SADF through Project COAST. Project COAST was funded by the Special Defence account. By the end of 1989 it was clear that it would be very difficult to maintain commercial security within the existing organisational structure. Other factors e.g. the insecurity of employees, management problems and funding, led to a reconsideration of the relationship between the SA Defence Force and Delta G Scientific.
4. The Ministers of Finance and Defence were briefed about the approval of certain organisational changes with regard to the relationship with Delta G Scientific, as well as the sale of the assets to the employees of Delta G Scientific (DGS). Therefore the company responsible for chemical research was corporatively and financially restructured in order to satisfy the following demands:
a. To cut costs insofar as it is possible
b. To maintain security in an ordinary commercial environment
c. To keep the trained staff as well as offer them long-term job-security.
d. To establish a majority shareholder (Medchem Consolidated Investments (Pty) Ltd in order to create a distance between the SADF and the company with regard to contracting and other activities (e.g. finances and organisational processes) as well as the controlling of activities in DGS.
5. This restructuring resulted in the corporate structure as seen in Appendix A.
6. Long term contracts were negotiated with Medchem Consolidated Investments (MCI) as a go-between. The long-term objective with regard to the cost of the contracts was to enable the group to fully commercialise over a period of five years, through the gradual withdrawal of the SADF when an acceptable level of technological development had been reached in terms of CW research and development. In order to do this, loans and user rights were created by means of lease agreements to establish a pure commercial “arm-length relationship".
7. An important factor in the creation of the above mentioned relationship, was the value added to the designing plant at DGS, with regard to the value of the company Randjespark Property Holdings (RPH), as well as the business loan that was negotiated with D John Truter Financial Consultants (DJT), in order to make the assets affordable over a period of 5 years.
8. The interest rates and values added to the respective transactions were based on the agreement that services, in the form of R & D contracts, would be rendered at a pre-determined cost and escalation (PPI) over a five-year period.

THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGED POLITICAL CLIMATE ON THE CHEMICAL RESEARCH PROJECT
9. The recent uproar about the use of “Secret Funds” means that the nature of the funding of Coast must be re-visited.
10. The activities of Project COAST are clearly in line with military policies. Their aim is to develop and apply military technology.
11. The management of funding within the project organisation is also satisfactory. All the levels of funding are constantly being audited, even the largest percentage of “end users” or recipients of money is audited.
12. However, the issue regarding the controversial or contentious nature of the Project remains a potential problem. Were the existence of the laboratories to be revealed to a commission, it could insist on continuous monitoring to minimalise potential contentious action. If questions are asked about the nature of the state’s involvement in Delta G Scientific, the government could find itself in a very difficult situation. The question of ownership of the facilities that are effectively in the hands of the SADF, can also become a problem. So-called “unfair” competition with the private sector is also a potential problem.
13. It is therefore suggested that it would make sense for all official research programmes to end and to break all ownership ties. It also makes sense to end this aspect of COAST before the Minister completes his term at the end of August. He is fully briefed about these aspects of the project as well as the implications thereof.

DIRECTIVES FOR THE PLANNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SADF FROM THE CHEMICAL RESEARCH
14. A properly orchestrated ending to the research activities and transfer of assets is essential. To maintain this orderliness, certain directives are important.
15. Maintaining security is of utmost importance. The withdrawal of the State must not be noticeable. The true situation must only be revealed to the majority shareholder, Medchem Consolidated Investments. MCI should manage the process and present an acceptable explanation to DGS without revealing the true facts.
16. It is very important to maintain the corporate integrity of DGS. There is the potential danger of bankruptcy during the transition phase and the subsequent investigations and actions.
17. An effort must be made to maintain the maximal productivity and a positive attitude of all the staff members to ensure their future co-operation.
18. Maintaining the already developed technology is a priority for the RSA.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF THE FACILITY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
19. The biggest problem with regard to the transfer of ownership is that outside elements could possibly become aware of the existence and detail of the nature of such a facility. Any new owner who is experienced in the chemical industry will be able to deduce the former activities of the facility.
20. Any buyer from the private sector would also, by investigating the company’s financial history, be able to deduce its former activities. It would therefore breach security if an outside buyer from the chemical industry is sought.
21. A buyer from the financial sector would probably not be able to make any conclusions with regard to the primary use of the facilities. This kind of buyer would only be interested in financing the building if it could be taken over as a running concern with an assured hire purchase income. If an outside buyer is out of the question for security reasons, then a bank will probably not provide finances to the current shareholders for the purchase of the building. They don’t have access to the facility’s commercial history as well as no guaranteed income if the research contracts are halted. This view was confirmed after enquiries in this regard were made at two commercial banks.
22. It seems therefore as if the only option under the circumstances concerning the cancellation of research contracts would be to transfer ownership to the current shareholders of the facilities, that is to say the shareholders of the company DGS.
23. It should be kept in mind that Delta G already has an option to purchase the facility at a realistic market value. This option can be exercised over the next 19 years. However, it cannot be exercised until the loan amount is redeemed, unless the Ministers involved authorise such an action.
24. Apart from the issue with regard to who should take over the facility, the transfer costs also present a potential problem. Although the book value of the company and the lease agreement is R17 million, it has in fact been revalued at R20 million (replacement value) when the process of commercialisation started. By doing this a non-divisible reserve of R3 million was created in the company books.
25. Determining the current value as stipulated in the option to buy is also a difficult task which is affected by the current economic climate. The chemical industry is not doing well financially. Their turn over and profits have decreased dramatically. A downscaling of research and development is taking place in all areas. A limited marketing study was done with the mediation of the management of a big chemical group, Sentrachem. They did not make any direct offers, but two aspects became very clear by dealing with them. The first aspect was that they would not be able to fund such a facility, but that they would be willing to make an agreement with a bank for the purchase of the facility. The second aspect was that, according to the amount that they indicated they were willing to pay for rent, they must have estimated the value of the facility at R12 million.
26. The facility is “over designed” for regular commercial use. Certain aspects of the design of the facility, e.g. the safety systems, delay normal working procedures, that is to say they hamper productivity. The equipment can also not be used generally due to its high value and the fact that it has a single purpose - e.g. the reactors are made of glass to be able to handle the type of agents required for chemical warfare. The maintenance of the facility is also extraordinarily expensive. The type of activities have also decreased the lifespan of the facility.
27. It must further be accentuated that, currently, certain sections of the facility are “hot spots” and will have to be thoroughly cleaned before any commercial activity can take place. This effectually implies that these sections (about 40% of the total production area) are unavailable for commercial use for an undetermined period.
28. All of these factors contribute to the fact that it would currently be impossible to sell at book value, and that the facility will have to be sold at a discount. The discount could be as high as 40%.

IMPLICATIONS OF RENOUNCING CONTROL AND OWNERSHIP OF THE OPERATING COMPANY, DGS
29. Shareholding on the operating company has already been transferred to the employees of DGS during the first commercialisation phase. However, the State still effectively controls the company by means of a secure loan of R12 million (secured by the company shares). To be able to end all contact with this element of the project, the secured loan will have to be redeemed. As long as the loan is there, the connection to the State will be there.
30. The question is raised as to the value of the secured loan. The loan between MCI and D J Truter Financial Consultants is determined at R12 million. The loan can be paid back at the end of one year, and is interest free for the first three years. The value of the loan was initially determined by the book value of the fixed assets (R8,932 million), the operating costs and an additional amount for specific operating activities. The value of the loan was further also determined by the assumption that the relationship between MCI/DGS and the instructor (the SA Defence Force) would continue for at least five years.
31. Currently the company assets will be of little value if the primary activities do not continue. At this stage the fixed assets must be regarded as non-profitable because they focus on very sophisticated processes and it will not be easy to use them for other purposes. There is no existing market in South Africa for this type of equipment. An independent investigation by specialists from Sentrachem indicated that they would only be willing to take over the assets at book value if the research contracts continue and that these contracts will even have to be extended.
32. It seems therefore as if it will be impossible to sell the loan at this stage, and that a reasonable discount on the R12 million will be acceptable due to the changing relationship between MCI/DGS and DJ Truter, that is from a planned medium to long term relationship to a “fire sale” approach. Sentrachem has indicated that it would be willing to take over the company at a discount of 33 and a third percent.

IMPLICATIONS OF SUSPENDING THE RESEARCH AGREEMENTS
33. The research contracts stipulate clearly that a specific cancellation amount is to be paid out to MCI if the SA Defence Force makes a unilateral decision to give up the contracts. The contracts stipulate that such a unilateral cancellation can be made after three years. However, it is very clear that, by looking at all three of the agreements (lease agreement and option to buy) and by analysing the structure of the first phase of commercialisation, the initial and implicit meaning of the agreement necessarily implies a medium to long-term relationship between the Medchem group and the SA Defence Force to ensure the successful commercialisation of the group. It would therefore be in order to look at a five-year period for determining the cancellation amount, were the economic realities of the day to dictate such an action.
34.In Appendix B the cancellation amount with regard to the research agreement is determined. If the current value of the cancellation amount can be determined after 3 years, it amounts to R19,389 million if escalation is added and to R17,7 million if escalation is not added.
35. In Appendix C the current value of the escalation amount with regard to the research contracts is determined for a five-year suspension period. This amounts to R46,912 million if escalation is added and to R37, 669 million if escalation is not added.
36. To choose a cancellation amount based on purely contractual grounds, is not easy. Appendixes D and E show the predicted financial statements of the Medchem group if all R & D projects are halted (at the end of August), the assets are transferred at a discount to the Medchem group and a cash amount (the balance between the cancellation amount and the amount due with regard to assets at a 32% discount) is paid out to the Medchem group.
37. In Appendix D (cancellation period of 3 years) it is clear to see that the group will not be able to survive financially and will be bankrupted. Therefore to choose this period (3 years) as a cancellation period will lead to a financial catastrophe.
38. The cancellation amount as it is worked out in Appendix E (cancellation period of 5 years without adding escalation) of R37,669 million when analysed, seems to offer the Medchem group the only real chance to survive. The round figure of R37 million was used in the calculations. If the amount of R37 million is paid out as a cancellation amount and the assets (loan of the operating company and the facility) are transferred to the group at a discount of 32%, it will provide them with a cash injection of R15 million. This means that they will have to carry on for two years before receiving a cash injection or that they will have to make a break-through with regard to selling their products.
39. By the end of four years they will have an overdraft of R9, 4 million. This ought to be maintained by the underlying value of the assets. At that stage the total ownership interest will also be realistic and within reasonable limits. Up to this point it is not really possible to cut costs, because the largest part of the costs are fixed. Even staff expenses must be seen as fixed costs due to the fact that the biggest amount of these costs are paid out to people who are also share holders in the company and therefore cannot be fired without a sound reason.

PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR THE ENDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SA DEFENCE FORCE AND THE MEDCHEM GROUP
40. It is proposed that all R & D contracts are ended at the end of August 1991.
41. A cancellation amount of R37 million (five year cancellation period, no escalation added) to be paid out to the Medchem group.
42. It is further proposed that the ownership of the operating company and the facility (the ground, buildings and fixed equipment) be transferred to the share holders of the Medchem group for an amount of R22 million (a discount of 32% with regard to the R32 million that is owed according to the books). This transfer takes place in line with the proposed end result of the planned commercialisation that was approved with effect from 1 April 1990. The difference of R15 million will then be paid as a single amount to the Medchem group.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXERCISING THIS OPTION
43. A number of important consequences will follow the exercising of this option:
a. All contact between the SA Defence Force and the Medchem group will end.
b. The financial consequence of this action will result in a net cash flow of R15 million for the Medchem group. Due to the fact that R4,5 million is already available for this sub-project from the COAST budget, it seems as if the extra R10,5 million will have to be gathered in the current financial year to implement the process.
c. In this way commercial security will be maintained by enabling the Medchemgroup to functioning for two more years which will make it easier to obtain finances.
d. Staff security will also be maintained. The R & D staff will remain in the service of the Group and their activities will be directed to product development for the private sector. The current shareholders will also maintain their controlling position.
e. The attitude of management and the organisation towards the SA Defence Force and the State will remain intact. This makes future research relations with them possible.
f. The Medchem Group undertakes to, within the next two years, continue the current research on AIDS as well as to continue and finish the project regarding an anti-riot agent for the SADF.
g. After two years the Medchem Group will have a trade history and will be able to look for partners for further financing.

APPROVAL REQUESTED
44. The following are requested for approval:
a. The ending of the chemical research project that is part of Project COAST as stipulated in paragraphs 40 to 42.
b. The payment of a cancellation fee of R37 million to the Medchem Group in terms of the unilateral cancellation of the research agreement.
c. That a 33% discount be offered on the outstanding loan amount owed by Medchem to D John Truter Financial Consultants, leaving an amount of R8 million, instead of R12 million.
d. That a discount of 30% be offered on the land and buildings of the facility owned by Randjespark Property Holdings. DGS would then pay an amount of R14 million for the facility instead of the R20 million in book value.
e. That Medchem be allowed to pay off the outstanding loan immediately with the cancellation payment and that the loan agreement will be cancelled.
f. That Delta G Scientific be allowed to purchase the land and the property holding company (RPH) at a discount with the cancellation fee and that the option for DGS to buy RPH be cancelled.
g. That the lease agreement between DGS and RPH be cancelled.
h. That the control which the SADF has over the Philip Mijburgh Family Trust with regard to the appointment of Trustees and other orders, ends.

signed by:
(A.J. LIEBENBERG)
CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE: GENERAL

signed by:
(M.A. DE M. MALAN)
MINISTER OF DEFENCE

signed by:
(B.J. DU PLESSIS)
MINISTER OF FINANCE

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TOP SECRET

C ARMY/D PROJ/UG/302/6/A576
Telephone: 291-2721
Enquiries: Cmdt R. Louw
SA Army Headquarters
(Directorate Projects)
Private Bag X172
Pretoria
0001
5 August 1988

REPORT: OVERSEAS VISIT COMMANDANT R LOUW
Appendix A: Detailed report with regard to the visit to West Germany
Appendix B: Detailed report with regard to the visit to Israel

INTRODUCTION
1. The overseas visit was characterised by two phases, namely a first phase which entailed a visit to West Germany and a second phase which entailed a visit to Israel. The report will deal with each phase individually, due to the shift in emphasis regarding the aim of each one.
2. Appendixes A and B respectively report on the two visits.

SUMMARY
3. The visit was generally successful and the objectives were achieved largely. The value of the visit to the SA Army as well as to the SA Defence Force can be summarised as follows:
a. It provided for personal contact with experts in the CBW field and the establishment of relationships to be followed up.
b. Access was gained to industries which were formerly inaccessible.
c. A basis was created for the possible co-operation with Israel's MOD in the CBW field.
d. A wider insight with regard to attitudes (philosophies) and key problem areas in the CBW field was obtained which has already lead to changing attitudes and brought about cost savings.
e. It is confirmed that although the SA Defence Force (the SA Army) is still in the early stages with regard to its CBW status, the programme is fundamentally sound and up to date with the latest developments.
f. Confidence was built and the SADF was acknowledged as a partner in the field of defensive CBW, although this will not be announced, especially in Germany.

signed by:
(CMDT R. LOUW)
CHIEF OF THE SA ARMY: LT GENL
DISTR
For Action
C SADF (Department of Planning)
- Genl Maj M.C. Botha
- Genl Maj B.J. Vorster
For info
SG - Brig W. Basson
Intern
File C ARMY/D PROJ/UG/302/6/A576

__________________________________________________________
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX A TO REPORT: OVERSEAS VISIT

DETAILED REPORT WITH REGARD TO THE VISIT TO WEST GERMANY

1. Purpose of the visit. The purpose of this phase of the visit was to gain exposure to selected German industries that are involved in CBW, to view the CBW reconnaissance vehicle FUCHS and to visit the German military CB school. It was with the emphasis on the last mentioned objective that cmdt Louw was sent overseas on special request of brig W. Basson, SAMS.

2. Duration of the visit. Monday 4 July 1988 to Saturday 9 July 1988.

3. Members who undertook the overseas visit.
a. Cmdt R. Louw SA Army
b. Mr U. Paschke Host - PATECH (Pty) Ltd
c. Mr A.N. van der Walt Armscor - Tanks and Military engineering systems
d. Mr A Tonkin Defence Research and Development Council (DRDC)

4. Companies visited
a. Monday 4 July -Deugra in Dusseldorf
b. Tuesday 5 July -Thuschen Henschel Kassel,
Odenwald-Werke Rittersbach (OWR)
c. Wednesday 6 July-Odenwald-Werke Rittersbach
-Bluker Franzen Bremen
d. Thursday 7 July -CBW School Technical branch Aachen

5. Reception. The group was generally received well. Two specific events are worth mentioning:
a. Cmdt Louw visited OWR on his own and was received unusually warmly. The company showed an excellent understanding of South Africa and specifically the SADF. (This company does not want to do any business with Israel.)
b. In contrast, the visit to the Technical branch of the CBW school in Aachen was unsatisfactory - the itinerary was organised by Mr. U. Paschke, whose contact was mr Haake of the Engineering Bureau in Aachen. Mr Haake did not receive his visitors satisfactorily and no information could be gathered.

6. Achieving the objectives. The purpose of the visit was achieved, with the exception of certainly the most important one, namely the visit to the German CBW School. This will be discussed further on.

7. Gifts received. Cmdt Louw had received the following gifts from the companies mentioned here:
a. Two bottles of white wine from OWR.
b. One night’s hotel accommodation from OWR.
c. Lunches from Deugra and Thuschen Henschel.

8. Financial report.
a. Travel costs (excluding the aeroplane ticket) DM 298-00
b. Accommodation costs DM 854-20
c. Daily allowance DM 1224-87
d. Diverse DM 56-63
DM 2433-70
Exchange rate of 0,7563 = R 3217-81
e. Aeroplane ticket for the whole trip R 6782-00

9. Program. The program mentioned below was followed. It is worth mentioning that Cmdt Louw had no input in the way in which the program was composed and recommendations regarding this issue are made further on.
a. Monday 4 July - Arrived at Frankfurt airport and was met by the rest of the team. Met Mr U. Paschke of PATECH (Pty) Ltd who drew up the program for the week and who acted as contact person. Drove to Dusseldorf and visited DEUGRA, the company producing fire extinguishing equipment - specifically automatic systems for vehicles. It actually bears no reference to CBW. Left for Kassel.
b. Tuesday 5 July - Visited the company THUSCHEN HENSCHEL in Kassel. This company produces the CBW reconnaissance vehicle, the FUCHS. It is based on the German “Ratel” which is rebuilt and equipped with the MM1 mass spectrometer.
Due to the dedication and the cost of the vehicle, the SADF/SA Army will have to seriously consider the configuration of such a vehicle. The principles of design, advantages and disadvantages and the problem areas were carefully inspected. The company was completely open to the team’s questions in spite of the presence of BWB members (“German Armscor”) in the same office block. They were also aware of the fact that they were talking to a SADF officer.

Recommendation: During the project study and the developing phases these people will have to be contacted again. Travel to Rittersbach to the Odenwald-Werke (OWR) and had first round of discussions the same evening.
c. Wednesday 6 July - Detailed discussion about decontamination between Cmdt Louw (who was on his own at that stage) and Mr Peter Reiss, the managing director of OWR and colonel (retired) Glasser who is currently employed by Odenwald-Werke Rittersbach. An updated “SWINGFOGGER” that can be used especially for the inside of vehicles for decontaminative purposes was demonstrated. All other decontaminative equipment was demonstrated. Cmdt Louw had made available SAMIL 100 chassis drawings to the company and they will make a quote for the delivery of two units - a decontaminative system for equipment as well as for staff which will be mounted onto a S100. Their technical manager, Mr Kratzman, was previously employed by IVECO. If the SADF decides to buy these two units - which are urgently needed - OWR will be willing to include the technology as well as send their technical manager to SA to see to it that the systems are properly implemented.
Cmdt Louw and Col Glasser spent a lot of time (unscheduled) in each other’s company, discussing CBW tactics. Col Glasser is the 'father’ of the German NCB approach and was the CB specialist in the German military for many years. He was very keen to hold further discussions but there was not enough time for that.

Recommendation: It is proposed that serious attention is given to the quote for the decontamination units and technology and that funding be made available for this if the quote is reasonable. It is also proposed that Col Glasser be brought to SA to talk to SADF members about CBW - this could probably be taken up with brig W. Basson. It is important that good relations are maintained with OWR particularly in the light of their expertise, goodwill and good contacts all over Europe with regard to CBW.
Note: OWR is not at all interested in establishing a business relationship with Israel.
Left for Bremen.
d. Arrived in Bremen still on 6 July. Visit to the company BLUCKER FRANZEN, producer of the MM1 Mass spectrometer. What is interesting about this company is that 80% plus measured in value is produced in house. Considering the high level of the technology involved, this is truly excellent and this is also the reason for the high percentage of in-house technology. Apart from the mounting in the FUCHS vehicle, other versions were seen of static units as well as units mounted in light vehicles (Mercedes Gelandewagen) - the equipment is therefore not vehicle bound. The equipment is very accurate and sensitive in terms of tracking. It is particularly suited to verification operations while its use in mobile operations is still a debatable issue. The company was also very open to the delegation.

Recommendation: This aspect must be thoroughly investigated during the project study phase. The high costs of the equipment need to be taken into consideration.
Left for Aachen.
e. Thursday 7 July - Met mr Haake of the Engineering Bureau in Aachen. He is the contact person for the School in Aachen. Visited the school and viewed the Leopard II instruction model which incorporates the whole NBC system. However, problems were experienced regarding the fact that mr Haake made no effort to try and translate the member’s questions for the school’s personnel (Colonel and Captain), he insisted on answering all the questions himself with disastrous consequences. The member subsequently stopped asking questions and had to be satisfied with a visual investigation. Other vehicles that were viewed were the Leopard 1, Marder and Luchs. The School itself is of no value , it can be compared to a large TD training centre.
Left for Frankfurt.

Recommendation. It is proposed that no further negotiations be conducted with mr Haake, due to his dishonesty. Further associations with the School in Aachen will also be of no value to the SADF.
f. Friday 8 July - No activities were undertaken on this day and it was used to reflect on the activities of the week and to plan for the visit to Israel. The next day the member joined the rest of the team on the way to Israel. These activities are discussed in Appendix B.

10. Recommendations with regard to future visits. Due to bad arrangements around visiting dates a lot of time was wasted. Col Louw could have left the RSA one day later. It is proposed that all parties involved should be aware of the correct program and that all changes to the program should be discussed with everybody .It is furthermore difficult to travel under cover, using an alias and then having to use a different name for business purposes.

11. Security aspects.
a. No photographs and/or photostats of documents were taken at any of the airports.
b. There were no problems with custom officials - they hardly looked at the passport.
c. No identification as a RSA citizen other than by means of travel documents was detected.
d. No questions were asked at passport control.

12. Summary. Please refer to the cover sheet for a complete summary.
____________________________________________________________
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX B TO REPORT: OVERSEAS VISIT

DETAILED REPORT WITH REGARD TO VISIT TO ISRAEL

1. Purpose of the visit. The purpose of the visit to Israel was, in the light of the ISSAKOM negotiations, to meet with the MOD and IDF with the view to identify areas of co-operation between the two countries with regard to CBW.

2. Duration of the visit. The visit took place from 9 July 1988 to 16 July 1988.

3. Members who undertook the visit:
a. Brig W. Basson SAMS
b. Col H. Breytenbach CSADF - DEP LOG (CS Army)
c. Cmdt R. Louw SA Army
d. Mr J. N. Coetzee Armscor - Security forces
e. Mr A. N. van der Walt Armscor - Tanks and Military Engineering systems

4. Visits made. The following organisations and people were visited:
a. MOD - Hosts and negotiators - Tel Aviv
b. IDF Medical Corps members - Tel Aviv
c. NBC School - Zrifin
d. Physiological Institute at Heller Institute of Medical Research - Tel Hashomer
e. Eagle company - Ashqelon
f. Shalon company - Qiriat Gat
g. Elbit company - Haifa
h. Genl Uzi Elam - Director of Defence R & O

5. Reception. The delegation was well received and surprisingly all questions were answered openly.

6. Achieving the objectives. The objectives were achieved and my subjective opinion is that even more was achieved than was originally expected.

7. Gifts received. Col Sharon, chief of the NBC School gave each member a departing gift - a book about Israel as a country.

8. Financial report. The aeroplane ticket mentioned in Appendix A, also covered this part of the voyage.
a. Accommodation $ 494-88
b. Daily allowance $ 330-95
c. Transport $ 15-00
d. Diverse $ 34-00
874-83
Exchange rate 0,43 =R 2034-49

9. Program. The program will be discussed briefly and after every discussion, recommendations are made. A final list of possible fields of co-operation proposed by them as a result of the week’s negotiations, is given. A proposal is made with regard to priorities relating to the needs of the SA Army.
a. 9 July - Arrived at Ben Gurion and met by maj E. Krasner of the MOD-NBC School. We were then taken to the hotel.
b. 10 July - First round of negotiations at IMOD’s NBC Defensive Centre. The delegation was briefed about their NBC organisation and its activities, NBC protective systems, principles and methods of decontamination and an exhibition of equipment. The most important single aspect that was discussed, was the fact that a dedicated NBC organisation was founded that was responsible for NBC defence for the whole of the defence force. This includes the following:
i. R & D
ii. Development, evaluation and qualification of equipment as well as inspections and supervision of NBC preparedness.
iii. Development of doctrine and tactics.
iv. Planning, controlling and executing NBC training and - aspects of conventional training.
v. Control equivalent to the Army - NBC troops as well as division - NBC troops during operations.
The command and control of this department is on a horizontal level with the development of arms and projects are run as a completely separate division.
c. Their NBC philosophy also regards survival as the first priority and maintaining the ability to fight as the second. The NBC program consists of the following elements:
i. Individual protection.
ii. Protection of flight crew.
iii. Collective protection.
iv. Civil protection.
v. Detection and Identification.
vi. Decontamination.
vii. Medical treatment.
d. A brilliant new approach to Retrofit for non-custom made combat vehicles was discovered and will definitely have to be investigated. They have functioning systems for their Centurion as well as their M60 tanks. The duration of an NBC specialist course at their NBC School is 11 (eleven) weeks.
Recommendation. Negotiations also to be conducted on a pure Military level in order to discuss tactics, training etc. It is suggested that the project officer of the Army as well as representatives of D Ops, Army college, L Combat S and perhaps also (GS2) participate in these negotiations.
e. 11 July - Visited the Heller Institute of Medicine in TEL-HASNOMER where they conduct the physiological research. (Maj (Dr) Epsteen). Their aim is to predict and improve combat efficiency under a wide range of environmental and stress factors e.g. CBW, climate etc. Brig Basson responded well to this information and he will handle these aspects. We also paid a visit to the NBC School in ZRIFIN. All training, R & D etc. is done here. There is a specially adapted facility for realistic group training where they use CS.
f. 12 July - Visited the Eagle clothing and canvas equipment company in ASQELON (mr Lerner). They do not produce NBC clothing locally but they are planning it for Sept/Oct 1988. Their materials as well as the source are similar to that used by the SADF. They showed us an interesting “air-cushion” shoe that can be used to walk over landmines with the weight of two people on it. It was explained to the project officer of Directorate Engineering. Other items e.g. the Kevlar bullet resistant jackets were also inspected.
The company has a so-called “Controlled Dry Storage System” for the long-term storage of vehicles, aircrafts, stock in general etc. This needs further investigation but col Breytenbach will take it up with CS Army.
Recommendation. SA Army Logistics Commandment to contact col Breytenbach and investigate the matter.
g. 12 July - Visit to Shalon’s gas mask facility in QIRIAT GAT - they import raw materials like rubber and activated carbon but the all production, quality control and packing is done at the facility.
h. 13 July - Visited the Elbit company in HAIFA where they produce electronic equipment. (Mr J. Mellerburgh, Dr Haloney). They are developing a detector called the CHASE with very good results. It is a complete in-house technological development but it is very expensive. Research is being done to try and make it affordable.
Also paid a short visit to their Surgeon General.
Recommendation. To investigate the CHASE during the project study phase.
i. 14 July - Guided tour to Jerusalem and Bethlehem.
j. 15 July - Visited genl Uzi Elam, Director of Defence R & D. A summary and conclusions were made. They suggested six fields for possible co-operation and that will be taken into consideration by both parties. These subjects/fields are:
i. Pato-physiology and treatment for the effects of mustard gas.
ii. Further development and production of a low cost semi-automatic detector.
iii. Micro-climatic cooling for tank crew.
iv. Development of masks for the future.
v. Development of a computer model for danger evaluation.
vi. They will formulate a proposal with regard to a CBW training package.

10. Recommendations. The following proposals are made by the SA Army taken into account its own needs and priorities:
a. The SA Army has prioritised the following aspects (in order of importance):
i. The development and production of a low cost semi-automatic detector.
ii. The development of a computer model for danger evaluation (currently under way).
iii. The development of masks for the future.
iv. Microclimatic cooling for tank crew.
b. In the light of the current as well as the short term expected situation it is proposed that the CB training package gets the highest priority in order to establish a nucleus of well trained people in the SA Army. It is important to give the opportunity to people who will be able to implement their knowledge in the most productive way, e.g. project staff, training staff (Army college and (L Combat S ) and policy making staff.

11. Future visits. In the future, only skilled people who are specialists in this field should participate in the negotiations, to avoid creating a bad image and harming negotiations.

12. Security aspects.
a. No photographs or photostats were made of documents at any of the airports.
b. No problems were experienced with custom officials.
c. Recognition as RSA citizens. In two instances the members of the group were recognised as RSA citizens, however, in both cases the connection was made by shop personnel who knew people in South Africa. This is not important.
d. On departure the airport security personnel did the usual inspection and asked the usual questions with regard to security aspects.

13. Summary. Please refer to cover sheet for a complete summary.

Return to Table of Contents

TOP SECRET

SECRETARIATE OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL

Reference nr: 22/3/1/2/38
Enquiries: Genl-maj JFJ van Rensburg

March 1986
To all the members of the State Security Council

THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF MANDELA

INTRODUCTION
1. On 3 March 1986 the State Security Council tasked a special committee (vide Minutes nr SSC 3/86, item 2 g) with examining the possible repercussions of releasing Mandela, with the view to advising the State Security Council.
2. The committee, comprised of the directors-general of the departments of Justice, Foreign Affairs, National Intelligence and the Commissioners of the SA Police and the Correctional Services as well as the Secretary of the State Security Council, investigated the matter. The committee’s report on the matter follows:

REPORT
3. The committee was advised by the organisations involved of the following issues:
a. The position with regard to the release of Nelson Mandela that has already been made public.
b. The reactions on this position.
c. The different available options and the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

4. The committee considered the documentation and the various options and has made their recommendations.
5. The committee is of the opinion that different perceptions exist amongst the South African population of all races as well as amongst subversive elements and overseas about the government’s position with regard to Mandela and that this uncertainty contributes to the climate of unrest in the country. Therefore the committee proposes that a position be formulated that will be accepted and publicly advocated by all government institutions and that this position will be formulated as follows:
- It must be simple and easily understood;
- It is not to be adapted/changed often;
- It should be morally justifiable for all parties concerned;
- It should contribute to diminish the uncertainty in the minds of the well-meaning part of the population; and
- It should accommodate all the options.

6. The committee recommends that such a position be formulated as follows:
“Up to this point Mandela has refused to reject violence. The government is convinced that his release will contribute to an escalation of violence and terror in South Africa as well as in Southern Africa. Until the government is convinced that the release of Mandela will lead to a diminishing of violence and terror, he will not be released.”
7. The committee recommends that, if the government accepts this position, it not only be advocated internally, but that it also be conveyed to other relevant governments.

CONCLUSION
8. The issue will be resolved at a meeting of the State Security Council on 17 March 1986.

SECRETARY OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL
____________________________________________________________
Ref nr: 22/3/1/2/38
March 1986

STRATEGIC ADVICE WITH REGARD TO THE OPTIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA

INTRODUCTION
1. The ongoing debate regarding the release of Nelson Mandela received extra momentum since the government announced that it would be willing to release Mandela under certain conditions and amidst the escalating revolutionary threat. The situation has since already developed in such a way that the perception exists both internally and overseas that it is now only a matter of time before Mandela is released.
2. At this stage Mandela is perceived as a “Messiah” that will be able to free the Black man from White oppression. Within revolutionary/radical circles he is perceived as the militant commander-in-chief of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK). Mandela therefore has the image of a symbolic unifier in the effort to violently overthrow the RSA government. While the ANC promotes violence and Mandela does not distance himself from this policy, he will remain the unifying leader of all elements that promote unlawful violence. In this regard it is essential to note that:
a. Mandela maintained his convictions during the past +- 22 years that he has been incarcerated and he still supports the objectives of the ANC as stipulated in the so-called Freedom Charter;
b. Mandela is regarded as the indisputable leader of the ANC and he undoubtedly possesses the leadership qualities which could escalate the revolutionary onslaught irreversibly.
c. Mandela has aligned himself irrevocably to the violent struggle of the ANC and his compatriots and he still considers the revolution as the only solution for the problems of the Black man.
d. Mandela supports/subscribes to the ANC’s relations with the SACP and Marxist countries.

3. The leadership aura that surrounds Mandela is so strong that the international community can envisage no future government in the RSA without the participation of Mandela, even if the majority of black people in South Africa support it. S.R. “Mac” Maharaj, a former ANC co-prisoner, in connection with this said the following:
“Furthermore no black group which claims to be standing for the rights of the black man and for the ending of national oppression, however much they may differ even on tactics and theory and strategy, facts to mention Nelson Mandela when it talks of a future South Africa. Thus not only does the ANC recognise him as a leader, but he is accepted as a national leader, in the country as a whole by all the people whatever their colour, and no future plans can afford to exclude him from their calculations.”

4. The release of Mandela, on whichever foundation, can only be considered if it leads to pro-active action of the government to the advantage of the South African Republic. Action in reaction to international and internal pressure from the “Free Mandela” campaigns, will be considered as a action out of weakness. The internal unrest situation has reached the stage that incidents of unrest take place any place or time and there can’t necessarily be large-scale national co-ordination or the presence of mobilising hot spots. The issue around Mandela can serve as a spark to escalate the revolutionary onslaught to an uncontrollable level.

5. The ANC. From press releases, interviews with ANC leaders and Radio Freedom broadcasts the following main themes could be identified:
a. The ANC is of the opinion that it is an indisputable fact that Mandela will be released. The question is; when?
b. The government’s willingness to release Mandela is due to the pressure that the ANC exercises on the government as well as pressure from the international community.
c. Nelson Mandela will under no circumstances accept political exile. The ANC insists that Mandela be released in the RSA and remains in the RSA.
d. The ANC considers the release of Mandela as one of the conditions for negotiating with the South African government.
e. The ANC rejects the connection that was made by the State President on 31 January 1986 in his opening speech of parliament, between the release of Nelson Mandela and that of capt W. du Toit, Andre Sakharov and Anatoly Shcharomsky.
f. The release of Mandela must be seen as part of a releasing process of political prisoners and not in isolation. This aspect is clearly illustrated in the themes of the following programs which were broadcasted by Radio Freedom respectively on the 5th and the 6th of February :
i. “The Release of Mandela and all Political Prisoners must be Intensified”.
ii. “Let us Intensify the Fight for the Release of All Political Prisoners”.
g. The release of Mandela will not result in the ANC ending its policy of violence.
h. If ANC leaders who are presently incarcerated are released, they will probably take up their previous positions or otherwise the current leaders might decide to re-assign other responsibilities/tasks to them. These were the words of Oliver Tambo on 1 March 1986 broadcasted by Radio Freedom: “When those leaders who are in prison come out, they will probably take up their places or otherwise the whole leadership would - and decide to re-assign tasks for them”.
i. The present rumours concerning the release of Mandela is a concerted effort to by the government to escape the present pressure. The ANC requests that the rumours be ignored and that the pressure be increased so that Mandela and other political prisoners can be released.

6. Winnie Mandela. Because of her regular contact with Nelson Mandela, her public statements/opinions about the release of Mandela can largely be seen as coming from Mandela himself. These are the main elements of Winnie Mandela’s statements about the situation:
a. Due to the pressure on the government the release of Mandela is unavoidable. It is simply a question of time.
b. Nelson Mandela will never be willing to accept political exile.
c. When released Mandela will maintain his leadership of the ANC and continue to work for an end to apartheid.
d. As well as the fact that he will refuse to accept political exile, Mandela, when released, will ignore all legal restrictions, in order to confront the government with the decision to re-arrest him.
e. The release of Nelson Mandela will have an undisputed impact on the people of South Africa. The following quotes from Winnie Mandela illustrate this:
i. In an interview with the Washington Post in February 1986 she said: “The whole country will turn out to welcome him - everything will come to a standstill and it will stay that way for as long as the people want it”.
ii. Radio Nederland on 13 February 1986: “Mrs Mandela predicted that his release would trigger a mass popular (indistinct) on the scale of Mahatma Gandhi’s march to the sea and the Ayatola Khomeini’s return to Teheran. The whole country would turn out to welcome him, she said, it would be the return of the people’s Messiah, everybody will be in the streets and everything will come to a standstill”.

7. Other. Dr Beyers Naude and the Chairman of the Organisation for African Unity are of the opinion that the release of Nelson Mandela will end the current spate of violence in the RSA.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE OPTIONS
8. The following has been taken into consideration when options with regard to the release of Mandela are considered:
a. Mandela, the ANC/SACP/UDF alliance as well as the international community will not accept a conditional release.
b. Mandela will not forfeit his role as leader of the ANC and as the so-called liberator of the oppressed masses. It should be expected that he will continue to openly support the objectives of the ANC and to taunt the authorities in order to promote the revolutionary onslaught.
c. Mandela will not be prepared to negotiate his personal release or his future position and will do everything in his power to destroy the present law and order. The role of the old ANC and old restricted members in the UDF, in conjunction with the political implications to accommodate both him and his political alliances, can serve as an example of the future role that Mandela will fulfil.
d. The release of Mandela, whichever way it is secured, will place the government in a position that all other so-called Rivonia prisoners - the rest of the ANC top structure - will need to be released as well.
e. With regard to White politics it should be expected that the release of Mandela will lead to polarisation in the white community.
f. The release of Mandela will increase greater pressure on the South African government because the impression will have been created that the government has bowed to pressure.
g. It can be expected that the release of Mandela will increase pressure on the government to lift the ban on the ANC and/or to give general amnesty to so-called political exiles (revolutionaries).
h. Re-arresting Mandela will lead to a deterioration of the present situation and escalate the pressure on the government.

9. In addition to the above points government statements regarding Mandela and national as well as international reactions to these statements, have been analysed and options concerning these question have been considered.

CONSIDERING THE OPTIONS
10. The various options are analysed, taking into account the advantages and disadvantages as well as against the background of the current situation.

OPTION ONE: UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE
11. Advantages
a. International as well as internal pressure with regard to the release of Mandela will disappear.
b. There is a slight possibility that faction forming within the ANC will take place.
c. Mandela’s image as a martyr will be harmed and might even disappear.
d. Mandela will be in the position where he will have to proof his leadership qualities.
e. The RSA government’s objectives with regard to evolutionary political reform will be strengthened and the onus will largely be on the radicals/revolutionaries to prove their willingness to participate in the process.

12. Disadvantages
a. ANC/SACP/UDF action will increase the escalation of the revolutionary onslaught.
b. RSA action will be regarded as a weakness and his release will be seen as a victory for the revolutionaries.
c. There will be greater unity in the combined action of the so-called oppressed masses against the South African government. It will also lead to closer co-operation between the radicals/revolutionaries.
d. Western countries will increasingly be willing to negotiate with Mandela (in the RSA) rather than with Tambo (in a foreign country) and see Mandela as the future leader of the RSA.
e. Buthelezi’s role (Inkatha) as a moderate leader in the eyes of the international community will diminish.
f. Pressure on the government to politically accommodate the ANC/SACP/UDF alliance and Mandela will increase uncontrollably.
g. The government will have to give amnesty to ANC exiles/terrorists or be willing to accept excessive pressure.
h. The rest of the so-called political prisoners (in particular the Rivonia prisoners) will also have to be released, that means that the ANC top structure will be free.
i. In the light of the above it is doubtful if the Security forces will be able to stop the momentum of the revolutionary onslaught.
j. Pressure on the government to accept the one-man-one-vote principle (which implies a Black majority government) will increase uncontrollably.
k. Radicals/revolutionaries will also, regarding demands, be less accommodating because they will see the release of Mandela as the government “backing down”.
l. Polarisation within the white community will increase resulting in a decrease in White support for the government.
m. The unconditional release of Mandela and his presence thereafter in the RSA implies a de facto recognition of the ANC.
n. All indications are that Mandela will goal-directedly attempt to ignore/break the laws of the country and therefore re-arrest/restriction/deportation will be unavoidable.

OPTION TWO: RELEASE WITH RESTRICTION

13. Advantages
a. The perception that the RSA government acts out of weakness will not be so strong.
b. The extra time could allow the RSA government to “test” the revolutionary situation and to consider a different strategy to that of re-incarceration, e.g. deportation, neutralisation, etc.
c. The leadership position of Mandela will be restricted for the immediate short-term if the government decides to strictly enforce the restriction orders.
d. The humanist gesture from the side of the authorities without compromising the countries principles of safety can be used advantageously.

14. Disadvantages
a. Restricting Mandela after his release will have no limiting effect on the escalation of the revolutionary onslaught, on the contrary, the situation will deteriorate.
b. The government will be in the unenviable position to enforce the restriction order (the current situation with regard to Winnie Mandela and other restrictives bears proof of how hard it is to enforce such an order). Mandela will also ignore his restriction order to taunt the government.
c. Mandela, the international community as well as the radicals/revolutionaries will not accept any form of restriction (conditional release).
d. Mandela will maintain his martyr image and internal as well as foreign attention will increasingly focus on him.
e. The government will be increasingly pressurised to lift the restriction orders.

OPTION THREE: RELEASE OUTSIDE THE BORDERS OF SOUTH AFRICA
13. Advantages
a. As the leader of the revolutionary onslaught, Mandela will lose all direct contact with the local population.
b. Mandela’s martyr image will disappear.
c. There is a slight possibility that this will lead to faction forming within the ANC.
d. The onus will be on the radicals/revolutionaries to contribute to non-violent evolutionary change in South Africa.
e. Advantages with regard to Intelligence might be obtained.

16. Disadvantages
a. Internationally as well as internally the government will be increasingly pressurised to accept Mandela as the leader of the majority of the South African population and to accommodate him politically. (This also implies that he will return to South Africa.)
b. The possibility of an exile government, led by Mandela and with considerable international support, is not excluded.
c. There is no guarantee that Mandela will not want to settle in South Africa (excluding the RSA, TBVC and National States).
d. It should be expected that the revolutionary onslaught will escalate and that political pressure on the government to give in to the demands of other revolutionaries/radicals, will increase.
e. If his family were to decide to join him, their position (“uprooted from their home land) will gain a lot of propaganda value. Their overseas activities will also cause certain problems.

OPTION FOUR: RELEASE TO THE TRANSKEI
17. Advantages
a. As the leader of the revolutionary onslaught, Mandela will lose all direct contact with the local population.
b. Mandela’s martyr image will disappear.
c. There is a slight possibility that this will lead to faction forming within the ANC.
d. The onus will be on the radicals/revolutionaries to contribute to non-violent evolutionary change in South Africa.
e. Advantages with regard to Intelligence might be obtained.

18. Disadvantages
a. The current position of Ndamase and the Matanzima family (as well as other political leaders) will be endangered and this will lead to political instability.
b. The Transkei will probably become the so-called safety haven for the ANC and its comrades.
c. Mandela will still be in a position to act from “inside the borders” of the RSA because the TBVC states do not enjoy international recognition. The disadvantages of this situation are similar to those mentioned in paragraph 12.
d. The possibility exists that the South African government will be blamed for running a pseudo operation against Mandela.

OPTION FIVE: CONTINUED INCARCERATION WITH THE POSSIBILTY OF BEING RELEASED AT A LATER STAGE
19. Advantages
a. The RSA maintains its credibility and “strong-guy” image.
b. More time will be gained to consider the release under more favourable circumstances.
c. It is possible that keeping him in prison for a longer period of time could have a negative impact on his health which would lead to him being able to lead the revolution for a shorter period of time when after his release.
d. For as long as Mandela is incarcerated, direct contact with revolutionaries/radicals (depending on their contact with Mandela in prison) will be partly diminished.
e. The positions of Buthelezi and other TBVC and National State leaders will not immediately be endangered.
f. Buthelezi as well as other TBVC leaders and the leaders of the National States have the opportunity to strengthen and consolidate their positions with regard to the ANC/SACP/UDF alliance.
g. The government has the opportunity to do psychological damage to Mandela and to discredit him as the future leader of the ANC/SACP/UDF alliance (after his release).
h. Mandela can be used in negotiations to the advantage of the RSA (e.g. for the exchange of incarcerated South African prisoners).

20. Disadvantages
a. The government will have to prepare itself for increasing international and internal pressure to unconditionally release Mandela.
b. There is the possibility of Mandela dying in prison with the implications of such an event.
c. Mandela’s martyr image will be enhanced.
d. It is possible that the government will be blackmailed by its enemies to release Mandela (e.g. by hijacking a plane or kidnapping a senior government official).
e. The government’s image of unity could be undermined by the development of undercurrents within government circles with regard to the release of Mandela.
f. Mandela uses his time in prison to teach the other prisoners about revolutionary warfare (under the present circumstances).
g. There is a danger that de facto leaders will not be willing to negotiate unless Mandela is released.

OPTION SIX: UNDETERMINED INCARCERATION
21. Advantages
a. The RSA maintains its credibility and “strong-guy” image.
b. Direct contact with revolutionaries/radicals is limited.
c. The positions of the leaders of the TBVC and National States are not endangered and they will be in a position to consolidate their positions.

22. Disadvantages
a. Internationally as well as internally the government will be increasingly pressurised to accept Mandela as the leader of the majority of the South African population and to accommodate him politically. (This also implies that he will return to South Africa.)
b. The death of Mandela in captivity will have national as well as international implications for South Africa.
c. The option of undetermined incarceration will fall away automatically if Mandela and his supporters are willing to accept his conditional release and/or the demands of the government are complied with.
d. Any de facto recognition of the ANC , either through negotiations or in any other way could affect the option of undetermined incarceration (as well as of other so-called political prisoners).

OPTION SEVEN: UNDETERMINED INCARCERATION UNDER DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCES (LUXURY VILLA ON ROBBEN ISLAND)
23. Advantages
a. The RSA maintains its credibility and “strong-guy” image.
b. Direct contact with revolutionaries/radicals is limited.
c. The positions of the leaders of the TBVC and National States are not endangered and they will be in position to consolidate their positions.

24. Disadvantages
a. The South African judicial system will be ridiculed. Mandela is a criminal and not a political prisoner.
b. Mandela will be in a position where he will gain unrealistic status from the government.
c. This will be regarded as a “sign of weakness” of the government and will lead to increased pressure on the government.
d. A precedent is created that will force the government to consider the positions of other security prisoners.
e. Other disadvantages - as described in paragraph 22.

OPTION EIGHT: CONDITIONAL RELEASE: RELEASE WITH REJECTION OF VIOLENCE
25. Advantages
a. The onus for release will be on Mandela and his supporters.
b. It is not expected that Mandela and his supporters will accept this option, unless the revolutionary onslaught eventually forces the government to accommodate the ANC politically.
c. Violent action by the ANC/SACP/UDF can be psychologically exploited.
d. The credibility of Mandela will be negatively affected.
e. The RSA will largely maintain its “strong-guy” -image and the impression will have been created that the RSA wants a peaceful process of political reform (evolutionary versus revolutionary).
f. The ANC/SACP/UDF will be branded as violent and revolutionary.
g. This is in line with public statements made by the government where the conditions for the release of Mandela are spelled out.

26. Disadvantages
a. Internationally as well as internally the government will be increasingly pressurised to accept Mandela as the leader of the majority of the South African population and to accommodate him politically. (This also implies that he will return to South Africa.)
b. The possibility of an exile government, led by Mandela and with considerable international support, is not excluded.
c. There is no guarantee that Mandela will not want to settle in South Africa (excluding the RSA, TBVC and National States).
d. It should be expected that the revolutionary onslaught will escalate and that political pressure on the government to give in to the demands of other revolutionaries/radicals, will increase.
e. If his family were to decide to join him, their position (“uprooted from their home land) will gain a lot of propaganda value. Their overseas activities will also cause certain problems.

OPTION NINE: A QUID PRO QUO RELEASE (EXCHANGE FOR OTHER PRISONERS)
27. Advantages
a. If the quid pro quo is of direct advantage to South Africa, the government could maintain its credibility and “strong-guy” -image.
b. This will give the government the opportunity to keep Mandela in jail for as long as it is necessary, depending on the willingness of Mandela to accept the quid pro quo conditions. (It is however highly unlikely that Mandela and his supporters will accept any quid pro quo conditions.)
c. This option is in line with public statements that have been made by the government the issue.

28. Disadvantages
a. Internationally as well as internally the government will be increasingly pressurised to accept Mandela as the leader of the majority of the South African population and to accommodate him politically. (This also implies that he will return to South Africa.)
b. The possibility of an exile government, led by Mandela and with considerable international support, is not excluded.
c. There is no guarantee that Mandela will not want to settle in South Africa (excluding the RSA, TBVC and National States).
d. It should be expected that the revolutionary onslaught will escalate and that political pressure on the government to give in to the demands of other revolutionaries/radicals, will increase.
e. If his family were to decide to join him, their position (“uprooted from their home land) will gain a lot of propaganda value. Their overseas activities will also cause certain problems.

RECOMMENDATION
29. Option five: “Continued incarceration with the possibility of being released at a later stage” is recommended under the following conditions:
a. The time must be right and the circumstances must be favourable for the RSA government.
b. Mandela must be released (to) outside the borders of Southern Africa.
c. Mandela’s physical condition must be relatively weak so as not to enable him to act as leader.
d. A well-planned, pro-active, psychological program will have to be launched during as well as after his release.

Note: Any of the options regarding the conditional release (rejecting violence, concessions made by Mandela and quid pro quo) can be used to keep Mandela in prison for a relatively long period.

SECRETARY OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET

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(Researcher’s note: Author: unknown; This document comes from the archives of Mechem and it is likely that the author is De Villiers, JP.)

HANDBOOK FOR THE SADF COMMAND SYSTEM
VOL 1: NATIONAL SECURITY AND TOTAL WAR

CHAPTER 12: APPLICATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF TOTAL WAR

1. CHEMICAL ASPECTS
With the exception of certain high-energy nuclear particles this world consists mainly of atoms and molecules, in other words, chemicals; and modern civilisation is based on a concept of physical laws and the use of substances which have developed through chemical processes. These weighty statements are made to accentuate the fundamental influence of chemistry, and physical science in general, on society as we know it.
Chemicals are also commonly used in warfare, but when one talks about “Chemical Warfare” it implies a more limited concept with the accent on the direct application of the physiological effect of these chemicals on people or on plants. The biggest part of this chapter deals with this concept, but Economic chemical warfare demands to be investigated more extensively.
By far the greater part of chemical warfare took place sixty years ago and a historical approach that deals especially with evaluations and reports, tends to overpower any thorough overview of the subject. Judging from the current situation, over the past twenty years, both the chemical warfare agents as well as concepts have changed so much that it changed the contents of earlier history into becoming a source of examples. Therefore this chapter can be regarded as a study de novo.

1.1 The possibilities in chemical warfare
The possibilities of the use of and the threat posed by chemical warfare can be explained by the following two main concepts:
(a) Military chemical warfare.
(b) Economical chemical warfare.
The two groups can be distinguished from each other and defined by the fact that the military aspects deal with the use of chemicals against the enemy and the economical aspects deal with obstructing the enemy’s access to the necessary raw materials.
1.2 Military chemical warfare
Chemical weapons are all weapons that can be applied chemically, but it is not essential for these weapons to have an explosive or pyrotechnical effect.
The following points will deal with all the possibilities:
1.3 Gas warfare munitions
1.3.1 Lethal agents
1.3.2 Non-lethal agents
1.3.3 Irritants
1.3.4 Incapacitants

1.4 Defoliants and herbicides

1.5 Anti-personnel incendiary munitions, flame weapons
Napalm
Phosphorus

1.6 Sabotaging agents
Before the agents are dealt with it is important to deal with the concept of persistency.
All chemical warfare agents can be divided into non-persistent and persistent agents depending on the period of activity.
Applying the non-persistent agents is a three-dimensional problem because the agent has to be dispersed within a given volume of air and is therefore affected by any airflow within the volume of air. This means that there are certain absolute limits regarding the operational conditions for the application of non-persistent agents.
However, contrary to non-persistent agents, persistent agents need to remain active for a much longer period, i.e. hours to weeks compared to the minutes of the non-persistent agents. In order to make this work, persistent agents cannot remain in the air and will have to cover surfaces. Therefore dispersing the persistent agents is a two dimensional problem; the contamination of surfaces to obstruct/inhibit access and hinder crossing. This is in principle identical to the use of mine fields on land or on sea.
In practice non-persistent agents are used offensively and persistent agents are used defensively.

1.3 Gas warfare munitions
1.3.1. Lethal agents
Although a large amount of lethal chemical warfare agents are known, only two series of agents are currently of importance.
The one series is the extremely toxic and highly lethal nerve gases of which the G-agents e.g. Sarin, Soman tabun are either non-persistent or not very persistent, and the V-agents eg. VX are extremely persistent.
The other series is that of vesicants of which mustard gas, a persistent agent, is the most important. All these agents are liquids with different volatilities. They are lethal when breathed in as well as when they are absorped cutaneously. Protection against both series is possible, but it is a very impractical process.
During the Second World War there were two mustard gas factories in South Africa, but these facilities no longer exist and the country has currently no production capacity/ies for nerve gas or mustard gas. However, the chemical industry in South Africa does not lack the capacity to produce these agents.

1.3.2 Non-lethal agents
From the initial stages there was interest in the use of non-lethal agents to overpower or drive away the enemy; and the first chemical warfare agent ever used was tear gas. The interest in these kind of agents were also maintained by both highly idealistic thinkers who thought that the use of non-lethal agents would make war less cruel, as well as officials whose job it was to ensure that internal safety is maintained by the use of the minimum violence. The latter approach has been successfully achieved but within the limited arena created for the use of chemical weapons.
As mentioned earlier, non-lethal agents are divided into irritants and incapacitants.

1.3.2.1 Irritants
There are currently three irritants that can be used:
(1) (CS, o-chlorine-bensiliden)
(2) (DM, adamsite,)
(3) (CR, difensoksasepien)
The most important one is CS that is used all over the world as a crowd controlling agent. It is not very toxic, but is very irritating and affects the mucous membranes of the eyes, mouth, nose and also the respiratory system to a lesser degree. The irritating feeling does not last very long, about ten minutes, which can be disadvantageous under certain circumstances.
CS is colourless or light yellow crystals. It is dispersed either pyrotechnically as a smoke, which has a very non-persistent effect, or as a powder, which also has a non-persistent effect but can be persistent under certain circumstances. CS is produced in South Africa.
DM was used as a chemical warfare agent in the First World War and is much more toxic than CS. The effect of DM is similar to that of CS, although it lasts much longer, a few hours, which can be very advantageous under certain circumstances. It is dispersed as a smoke.
DM is not produced in South Africa, but is easy to prepare.
CR is the most recent irritant. It is similar to CS with regard to its toxicity and effect, although the effects last longer and the agent is more persistent.
CR is not produced in South Africa, but is easy to prepare.

1.3.2.2 Incapacitants
These agents were well known in the 1950’s and 1960’s, but interest in them has eventually faded. Theoretically these agents represent the ideal concept of humane warfare, but it is unlikely that they will ever be used in an operational situation.
The only incapacitant that was ever used in munitions was BZ, an American agent, but there is good reason to believe that this agent is not used any longer.

1.4 Defoliants and herbicides
These agents can be regarded as agents used for indirect chemical warfare because they do not affect the enemy directly, they do however alter the environment. A defoliant will for example remove leaves from an enemy cover and a herbicide will destroy the natural vegetation. Another possibility is to destroy the enemy’s food sources by applying herbicides to their growing crops. This is an example of economical warfare. Herbicides, and also defoliants to a lesser degree, are commonly used in agricultural and industrial practises and they are well described in literature. These agents cover almost all of the possibilities - there are persistent and non-persistent agents, with either short-term effects or long induction periods.

1.5 Anti-personnel incendiary munitions, flame weapons
These are well-known agents that are all incorporated into standard munitions and that don’t have to described here.

1.6 Sabotaging agents
It can be said that the wider meaning of sabotage does not imply that it has to regarded as a necessary part of chemical warfare, but that it really is the clandestine use of chemicals as agents of destruction or arson, or as toxic agents and incapacitants, which is probably the most effective use of chemical agents in total warfare. If used imaginatively and with a good knowledge of their possibilities as well as limits, sabotaging agents can be applied successfully as torturing agents.
These agents cover a very large scope which makes it impossible to be discussed here. However, the knowledge and the skills with regard to these agents are at the disposal of the SADF.

1.7 Economical chemical warfare
This is an overview of how economical chemical warfare can be used against the enemy.
With all its mineral reserves and a well established agricultural industry South Africa is in a position to use this to its advantage in a situation of total warfare. The ability to deny or supply food to a neighbouring state can be a powerful tool of persuasion. A food shortage can develop due to naturally unfavourable circumstances and incapability, but can be made worse by sabotaging the industry with herbicides. As described in par 1.6, there are many possibilities, but a proper knowledge of these agents and their uses is vital.

1.8 The legal aspects of chemical warfare
South Africa is, like most countries, a signatory to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of suffocating, toxic or other gases, as well as biological methods of warfare. However, this only applies to warfare between States, and not to the use of chemicals against citizens of the State, therefore in a guerrilla war where the terrorists are citizens of the state.
It is difficult to establish the practicality of the restrictions that were laid down by the Geneva Protocol, due to the fact that there has been no large-scale use of lethal chemical agents since the Italian march against Abyssinia in 1936. During the 1950’s and 1960’s, both the USA and the USSR have deployed a chemical warfare capacity with nerve gas as part of their approach of intimidation, but have apparently since dismantled this capacity. This can therefore not be used by the South African government to justify the establishment of a chemical warfare capacity.
The wide use of the non-lethal irritant CS by the USA in Vietnam can however serve as justification for the use of such weapons in a guerrilla war where the terrorists are citizens of the state.
To conclude, it can be said that the legal aspects of chemical warfare will be ignored, unless the advantages outweigh the result of using these weapons.

1.9 Conclusion
The following statements summarise the current practical status of chemical warfare:
1.9.1 Strategic lethal chemical warfare
Throughout the world, the strategic large-scale use of lethal chemical warfare agents is highly unlikely. Strategically speaking, a super power will rather rely on other weapons e.g. nuclear weapons that are more reliable and of which the effectivity is clear. At a lower level the possibility of a strategic victory by means of violence does not exist, and there is reason to believe that very few countries have, or will ever have a strategic chemical warfare capacity.
Therefore South Africa is not a target for a large-scale lethal chemical attack.
1.9.2 The tactical application of lethal chemical warfare agents
Due to the nature of South Africa’s enemies and their sponsors the tactical application of these agents against South Africa is not a real option.
Under certain circumstances the possible tactical application of lethal chemical warfare agents can be very advantageous for South Africa. The persistent nature of mustard gas for example makes it a very effective defensive agent for obstructing an area or to hinder the crossing of a terrain. These methods were used very effectively by the Germans during the First World War as well as by the Italians in Abyssinia.
South Africa has currently no capacity to produce or distribute mustard gas.

1.9.3 The tactical use of non-lethal agents, irritants
Although South Africa is under no threat of attack by these types of agents they could be used to the advantage of the SADF. The target can be incapacitated for short periods (CS) or for longer periods (DM). The agents can be used to hamper the enemy’s freedom of movement and to create a local environment that allows defensive troops to act freely but that will obstruct the enemy’s ability to fight. If a terrorist is forced to carry a gas mask around , it will increase his logistical problems and he will be more conspicuous.

2. BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 specifically prohibits bacteriological (biological) warfare.
The application of biological warfare is always strategic because these agents are by nature unfit for tactical use. Theoretically these agents will also have to be applied clandestinely due to their characteristics.
In all the wars that led up to the First World War, the percentage of casualties due to disease was always higher than that of injuries inflicted by the enemy. Therefore all indications are that the use of biological agents ought to be a very effective method of warfare. However, the real application of biological warfare is so problematic that, except in severely limited and clandestine situations, biological warfare under any circumstances is highly unlikely. This is confirmed by the fact that the super powers have now decided to lay down all biological warfare weapons. (or to stop the development of bw agents)
Therefore it can be said that biological warfare poses no threat and is also of no advantage to South Africa.

JPdV/LL/July 1977

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TOP SECRET

SPES FORCES/302/6/B67/1
Telephone nr: 711471
HQ Special Forces
Private Bag X1007
Voortrekkerhoogte
0143
9 January 1981
Director
BARNACLE

FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF BARNACLE
1. Accept the approval of appended table.
a. Aim. To conduct special operations of an extremely sensitive nature.
b. Functions:
i. Eliminations.
ii. Ambushes against persons who are of strategic importance.
iii. To conduct other super sensitive operations as instructed.
iv. To collect combat information with regard to the abovementioned operations.
v. To collect information with regard to cases that are of such a nature that other sources cannot be applied for this purpose, as instructed.
vi. To conduct certain special security tasks for Special Forces, e.g. observation of sources/agents and doing spot-checks as instructed.

2. It was decided that this organisation would work under cover, using the code name BARNACLE. However, tasks resorting under this cover should not be regarded as functions, but rather as modus operandi.
3. For the efficient functioning of the organisation, the following aspects are important:
a. The company must be tasked with clear and specific measurable objectives and priorities.
b. The company will in turn have to present a complete plan with regard to the achieving of a given objective. Such a presentation will have to point out the kind of cover that will be applied to achieve a given objective.
c. The director will have to receive clear, written delegations of CG (Commanding General) Special Forces that will have to include the following:
i. What the company will have to do/deliver.
ii. (no description)
iii. The director will have to regularly notify CG Special Forces regarding the progress of tasks and objectives and travel schedules.
iv. Before any agreement is made by either the director or his staff with other institutions, it will have to be cleared with CG Special Forces.
v. With regard to the company and its activities, CG Special Forces will at all times maintain the initiative. The director(s) have no decision making powers. This power rests with the Chief of the SA Defence Force through his CG Special Forces.
vi. The director will have to draw up task sheets for his employees and instruct them accordingly.

4. You are requested to deliver your contribution for inclusion in the aspects mentioned in paragraph 3, that is the SSO Fin (Senior Staff Officer Finances) financial aspects, before or on 23 January 1981.
5. SSO Fin is requested to give special attention to the kind of record that is prescribed by law for a private company.

signed by: F. Loots
COMMANDING OFFICER SPECIAL FORCES: GENL MAJ
handwritten date: 8 January 1981
also signed by:
SSO Operations
SSO Finances
SSO Staff
SSO Intelligence
SSO Security
SSO LOG
_________________________________________________________________
Telephone nr: 27352-6
Extension: 20
20 June 1979
MEMORANDUM
From: C O Special Forces
To: C SADF

ACQUISITION OF FIXED PROPERTY
1. The previous discussion between C SADF and Genl maj Loots as well as your principled approval for the acquisition of fixed property to conduct Special Operations, refer.
2. A company was founded for security reasons to buy and control the property with two staff members to direct it. Chief of Staff Finances, “K” and the Auditor General as well as the State Attorney were notified of this and procedures were undertaken to guarantee the property rights of the State.
3. The company and the owner have now come to an agreement regarding the acquisition of the property. A copy accompanies this. The price for this property amounts to R180 000 plus R7 500 for commission to the estate agent.
4. I now request your official approval for the use of the Vampire funds for the acquisition of the property. The necessary documentation with regard to the guarantee for the property rights of the State will be completed before any payment takes place. With your approval, the final documents will be kept by CSF in person.
5. Your approval is furthermore requested for the payment for:
a. Attorney costs with regard to the founding of the company, which amount to R415,00 (the State Attorney will certify the correctness of this amount before payment takes place).
b. The transport costs with regard to the property which amount to R10 122,25.
c. Both statements are attached.

signed by: F. Loots
COMMANDING OFFICER SPECIAL FORCES: GENL MAJ
APPROVED
also signed by:
M. Malan - 20/06
CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE: GENL
_________________________________________________________________TOP SECRET

Telephone nr: 27352-6
Extension: 7

MEMORANDUM
22 January 1980
From: C O Special Forces
To: Chief of the SADF
My reference:
SPECIAL FORCES/302/6/B67

AQUISITION OF FIXED PROPERTY: OPERATION BARNACLE
1. As a result of the activities of the abovementioned operation which included inter alia the founding of a private company, it has now become extremely important to obtain private, permanent accommodation for one of the company directors. For security reasons it is not possible to make use of state subsidised accommodation.
2. The amount that is needed will be between R30 000 and R35 000. I now request your official approval for the use of Calculator funds for the purchase of the property. The necessary documentation with regard to the guarantee for the property rights of the State will be completed before any payment takes place.

signed by: F. Loots
COMMANDING OFFICER SPECIAL FORCES: GENL MAJ
APPROVED
signed by: M. Malan
CHIEF OF THE SA DEFENCE FORCE: GENL

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TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
APPENDIX B

BACKGROUND INFORMATION COAST/JOTA
Taking into account the impact of the audit notes which in these cases were stored on file; storage of documentary proof at clients/project manager/share holders; reference to people; reference to equipment and substances, it is of cardinal importance that the following aspects are given the necessary weight:
1. The undercover handling of this “Top Secret” project was successful for many years. The success of this project was only possible taking into consideration the careful recruiting of foreigners and on the basis of restricted access of background detail and information (both locally and overseas).
2. Unlike Armscor and its affiliates or/and even its front companies, these various projects were not created from legislation and were not legally justified and could therefore not be traced back to a State corporation that would justify activities under “boycott” conditions.
3. Neither Armscor (and this is my personal field of expertise) nor the State wanted to take responsibility for the defined project and even at present would probably not be prepared to carry the political consequences which would accompany the emotions and perceptions that exist amongst a relatively unsophisticated population.
It remains my personal opinion that the project company/ies or the Project could at no stage be classified or handled as State corporations (per definition or per announcement).
4. The various stages of the project were maintained separately and neither own staff, except in one or two cases, nor audit staff and/or audit partners (except P. Theron) were ever used in more than one of these various main components.
5. The flow of funds were specifically handled in segments, but with complete cross-reference to end consumers and reciprocants both locally and overseas where possible.
6. Substances which had to be obtained right at the end of the project in partial or completely processed form had to be considered comparable with operational activities which would normally not be audited in a conventional manner. Various of these substances had been banned worldwide and no country would be prepared to be associated with the trade in these substances and very specifically not with South Africa.
7. Top secret activities would not stop me from obtaining the audit assurances which I wanted. However, it would have to be a very unsophisticated auditor who would require normal audit proof under these specific circumstances.
8. Much was made of the fairness of the prices negotiated; the appropriation and storage as well as recording by independent parties etc. which caused doubt as to whether those who appropriated these documents understand the nature of the project; insofar as it concerns operational substances and operational equipment to a limited degree. Protective clothing except combat gear, is excluded, except to point out that international sources for acquisition were not expecting orders from South Africa.
9. Commentary was recorded with regard to the supposed insufficiency of audit actions which were apparently executed regarding a certain raw material purchase that turned “sour”. No opinion was ever expressed by the auditors. The official appointed by the auditor general was informed at all times. Repatriation of funds was awaited and its existence was confirmed by original bank documents. The existence of a potential problem or a required counter investment was not known before the middle of April 1993 and steps for the disclosure to the ministers involved and the supplementation of local funds, were taken in July 1993 with the conditional agreement of the auditor general’s appointed official whose written opinion was required by State expenditure/His Minister. Unusual circumstances developed before that (last) date and I therefore refused to express an audit opinion, unless all reasonable steps were taken to obtain instructions from the bank and supportive documents (taking into account the specific circumstances known at the time). The necessary details are still handled at the highest level and I personally have attempted unsuccessfully to obtain the details which I need in this instance.
The initial transfer of cash flow statements and reports were identified and labelled as “Overseas funds for the purchase of raw materials”.
Funding statements were drawn up until 22.08.1992 and an interim audit was not done after that date and before July 1993 with regard to the year February 1993. The transfer of the second amount for raw materials took place on 20 October 1992 and I was not aware of this when I handed over my reports to CSF and the Auditor General. Please note that two components of the original amount, about US $790 000 returned to South Africa in December 1992.
The Auditor General of the time was personally informed of the two aspects which had not been finalised when an investigation into “unsubstantiated statements and rumours “ was done and before there was any reason to believe that the funds involved would not return. No audit assurance was given. Supporting documents were expected from the bank until 29 April 1994. Because no audit report for the project was done for the years 1993 and 1994, it will now be presented. An Unqualified audit report for 1993 and 1994 will be issued to D. John Truter Financial Consultants CC, the only non-dormant corporation/CC and which also only served as a go-between/facilitator with a very limited own budget. All other transactions were handled as Trust issues.

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TOP SECRET
GG/UG/302/6/COAST BFW
Telephone: 6715413
Enquiries: Brig W. Basson
SAMS Headquarters
Private Bag X102
Hennopsmeer
0046
28 November 1989

PROJECT COAST: POSSIBILITIES FOR PRIVATISATION

BACKGROUND
1. Project COAST was launched in 1982 with the initial aim to establish a Chemical and Biological Warfare capacity (CBW capacity) for the SADF. This was done in phases, beginning with an investigation into the elements of a CBW system and the implementation of such a system for defensive purposes.
2. During the gradual process of completion of the investigations, the management committee of COAST (a reduced Defence Command Council) authorised the implementation of the system. This resulted in Project COAST becoming a collection of diverse projects in different stages of completion. These elements of the project correlate with the elements that were originally planned for implementation. They are realised in a number of objectives of Project COAST. These objectives were updated in 1988 and approved by the Chief of the SADF.
3. To make sense of the future it is therefore necessary to look at each of the different sub-elements of the project individually. Privatising some of the elements will influence the development of the project to a lesser degree than others.
4. A number of restrictions with regard to the privatisation or the continued management of the project must also be taken into consideration. The most important factor is undoubtedly the lack of strategic leadership with regard to the future of a CBW capacity in the SADF. If it is not a priority, it is easier to allow non-military organisations to control the facilities. If a CBW capacity is a priority, it will not be so easy to allow an organisation with certain moral and ethic objections to such a capacity, to control the facilities. The chair of Sentrachem has already informed me about such objections.
5. The other important factor is that of peace of mind for the senior personnel who are involved in the project. They are unsure as to how they should interpret the direction in which South Africa is moving with regard to military development. Many of them feel that military budget cuts will result in the closing of the project which will leave them without jobs. In addition to this, recent reports in the newspapers contributed to the “threat” to their future. Some people are not sure to what extent they will be protected if certain facts are announced. This situation has resulted in a type of schizoid reaction where they want to be “liberated” from the security forces’ environment but at the same time also remain caught up in the “safety net”. Whatever happens, the SADF will have to approach the issues of privatisation and down-scaling of the project with extreme care, in order to avoid further damage - if these people feel they cannot trust us any longer, it will create a potentially dangerous situation.

OBJECTIVES OF PROJECT COAST
6. To allow a sensible discussion of the elements of project COAST, the objectives of the project are described.

7. Objective 1. The establishment of facilities for sensitive and dangerous CBW research and production. Two laboratories were established for the project:
a. Delta G Scientific (DGS) for chemical warfare research and production.
b. Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) for biological warfare.

8. Objective 2. The establishment of security fronts and security systems for the research facilities.
a. Security systems. Very sophisticated systems were installed at both facilities to prevent an intrusion. Specialised “PWO”-capabilities were established for in-house sabotage attacks.
b. Security cover. To maintain a front of open, normal commercial practice, marketing divisions were established and agencies were established in Europe to market the services of Delta G and RRL. The dog-breeding centre was established at RRL to explain the movement of security force personnel.

9. Objective 3. The establishment of safety systems for the CBW research facilities. For COAST this meant the following:
a. To supply an industrial medical service to employees working with sensitive, dangerous chemicals to avoid involving the general medical profession.
b. To supply an emergency medical and disposal team to deal with accidents and contamination. This service will link up with other emergency services in the event of a serious accident.

10. Objective 4. To conduct basic CBW research:
a. The running of an efficient financial and administrative management system for the project.
b. The running of an effective project management system.
c. To conduct research with regard to basic aspects of chemical warfare (offensive).
d. To conduct research with regard to basic aspects of biological warfare (offensive).
e. To conduct research with regard to basic aspects of physiological research - essentially with regard to defensive and therapeutic aspects.
f. To conduct research with regard to basic aspects of psychological research - essentially with regard to defensive and therapeutic aspects.
g. To conduct research with regard to basic aspects of material technology and defensive systems.
h. To conduct research with regard to covert as well as conventional systems.

11. Objective 5. The running of a CBW technical information system. The purpose of this system is to:
a. establish an undercover connection with all overseas technical databases.
b. collect all the technical information of the various projects and to set up an internal database for own use.

12. Objective 6. To establish an industrial capacity with regard to the production of offensive and defensive CBW equipment. In this regard the project offers access to the basic technology by acting as mediator between local and overseas companies. The process of industrialisation in co-operation with Armscor is also co-ordinated.

13. Objective 7. To give operational and technical CBW support (offensive and defensive). This is usually divided into two sections:
a. Conventional. This kind of support usually entails supplying equipment (offensive and defensive) that has not yet been cleared for use by standard procedures. This includes the storage of the equipment.
b. Covert. This support is given to Commanding General Special Forces and his organisations, CSI (Chief of Staff Intelligence) and his organisations and the SA Police and National Intelligence. This service includes the preparation of equipment, training with the equipment, transporting the equipment as well as support during application.

14. Objective 8. Conducting own CBW operations. This is similar to covert support, except for the use of own operators due to access and other circumstances.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE OBJECTIVES AND POSSIBILITITES FOR PRIVATISATION
ESTABLISHING A CHEMICAL RESEARCH FACILITY
15. This facility has already been built and equipped with sophisticated equipment and apparatus. We have already produced about 20 tons DG003 (a CR-variant) 10 tons were used by the SA Police and the SA Army for the production of weapons. This is an exceptional achievement because only two other countries in the world were able to equal this level of production, namely the UK and the USA. A few years ago the CSIR (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) and Sentrachem, led by Lt Genl Neethling (SAP), attempted to produce the original CR, but they failed.

16. As early as 1987 the first steps were taken to begin the process of privatisation. The basic approach was to divide the relatively large asset that was difficult to manage, into smaller manageable packages. The other facet of this approach was to determine a cut-off point for the closing of the loan account as well as establishing the book value. At this stage ownership of the facility will be transferred to the directors and the loan account will be reflected as an SADF loan. The representative of the Auditor General for the project has no objections to this process. However, before the transfer of shares are executed, the minister will have to authorise it. From this point the relationship between the facility and the SADF is contractual, which means that the flow of funds will be in accordance with the research and production contracts signed by both parties. Payment will be in accordance with achievement.

17. Since the last briefing to the Minister of Defence in 1987, the process regarding Delta G Scientific has evolved as follows:
a. The loan account was closed in the 1988 Financial Year.
b. The total book value of the facility at that stage (as audited by the representative of the Auditor General) amounted to R35 million.
c. Research and production contracts between DGS and the SADF were signed.
d. The assets of the facility were divided into two manageable parts, namely:
i. A real estate company that owns the land, the buildings and the utilities.
ii. An operating company that owns the equipment and production installations.

18. The current situation concerning the real estate company is as follows:
a. The company is called Randjespark Property Holdings (RPH).
b. The book value of the estate is R20 million.
c. The company shares are held by a COAST front company and the company has a loan account from the SADF of R20 million.
d. The company is currently earning an income from rental from the operating company - an amount that is determined by the auditors.
e. This rental income is ploughed back into Project COAST.

19. It will therefore be possible to sell RPH at any time. The most important issue is to determine a market related price for this company. The current book value of R20 million is definitely overcapitalised if compared to the open commercial industry. However, it will have to be evaluated taking into account the reasons for its construction, namely for the use of extremely sensitive substances that are not used in a normal industrial environment. It is suggested that mr. Van der Walt of Sentrachem is approached to determine a market related price.

20. The current situation regarding the operating company is as follows:
a. The company is called Delta G Scientific (DGS).
b. The company shares were issued in the name of the four company directors, but are still held by the auditor. After ministerial approval the structure of shares will be changed to award shares to the top management as well as the scientists. Ownership of the company will be transferred to the shareholders. A certain period will have to be negotiated with the shareholders to pay back the outstanding loan of about R12 million.
c. The flow of funds from COAST to the company is determined on the basis of contracts.

21. The operating company experiences the same problems than the real estate company. The company’s book value is probably also unrealistically high compared to the open industry. Equipment of a worse quality and less refined production systems would have been used by the “open”/commercial sector. It is suggested that Sentrachem be approached to determine a realistic “market value” for the company.

22. It seems therefore as if the basic steps to privatisation are completed and that a part of the project is already privatised. The most important move to make next will be to determine a realistic market value for the two companies.

23. After the market value has been determined, the final steps to privatisation will be to find buyers for the companies.

24. According to current evaluations and offers made during the past two years to various chemical companies (Sentrachem, Sasol and Protea Chemicals) as well as financial institutions (Volkskas, Nedbank, Corbank and others), only two candidates have proved themselves able/equipped for a possible take-over, namely:
a. Sentrachem
b. The current management and staff of DGS
i. supported by a financial institution and/or
ii. supported by a loan from the SADF.

25. In addition to the financial implications of this transaction, a number of other factors will have to be considered when the final decision with regard to a buyer is made. The most important of these are as follows:
a. Future strategy and need with regard to a CBW capacity by the SADF.
b. Peace of mind for employees and those involved in the project.

26. Future strategy and need. If the SADF does express the need for a future CBW capacity, the fact that Sentrachem is a large organisation that has a moral an ethical obligation to its shareholders cannot be disregarded. Certain requests will therefore have to be considered on this basis and it can be expected that “control” of the companies will be compromised. Security will also become a problem because it will be impossible for Sentrachem to deviate from the normal management procedures and control of access will not satisfy SADF standards. If the need for a CBW capacity is expressed, it will undoubtfully be better to sell the facility to the current management because they are already morally involved, they are interested in the type of work and there will be no need for them to report to a large number of shareholders.
27. Peace of mind for employees. During the past few years the staff of DGS has given their full support to the project. Recent events have made them uneasy. If the project is downscaled, they would want to know what their future prospects are. For this reason it is important to formally involve them in the project by giving them ownership.

28. It is therefore recommended that Mr van der Walt of Sentrachem is approached to put together a project team to investigate the facility and to make recommendations for the settlement of the loans/loan accounts.

ESTABLISHING A BIOLOGICAL FACILITY
29. The planning of this facility only started in 1984. Therefore this subproject (Roodeplaat Research Laboratories - RRL) is not as well developed as Delta G Scientific. The building program is in its final phase. After the building program has been completed, a similar process to that of DGS will be followed:
a. To divide it into a manageable format.
b. To close the loan account.
c. To transfer ownership to the management and determine the size of the loan.
d. To determine a realistic market value.
e. To sell the facility to possible candidate/s.

30. It is not easy to determine the tempo at which this process will have to be executed. One important factor is the future demand in the SADF for trained dogs and the possible closing of the training school for dogs. If the SADF expresses a future need for trained dogs and Roodeplaat is able to train the animals, it will without doubt speed up the process of privatisation.

ESTABLISHING SECURITY SYSTEMS AND SECURITY COVER
31. These processes have basically been completed and, unless new threats are identified, there are no foreseen changes.
32. However, for the next two years the budget will have to provide for the effective implementation of the marketing effort overseas. We have appointed an agent who has had previous limited exposure to the commercial aspects of DGS and RRL overseas, to negotiate contracts and advertise the “open” aspects.

ESTABLISHING SECURITY SYSTEMS FOR THE FACILITIES
33. As was mentioned before, this service includes two aspects, namely the industrial medical service and the emergency/cleaning-up team in the case of an accident. Initially these services were managed through the central office of Project COAST. This meant that vehicles, radios and other telecommunications equipment, together with detection and decontamination equipment had to be bought and maintained. Project staff and members of 7 Med Bn Gp were used to maintain the equipment. However, the quality of security cover was unsatisfactorily and the direct involvement of military personnel was problematic.
34. This part of the project was subsequently privatised. A contract was signed with a company called Lifestyle Management (Pty) Ltd. This company was founded by previous members of 7 Med Bn Gp and is recognised by the private sector. The company takes full responsibility for the services involved and charges an annual contractual fee.

CONDUCTING RESEARCH
35. Efficient project management. The project is under the current management of Brig W. Basson. Due to the need for large-scale contact and discussions with “civil” organisations, a “front” company, Infladel (Pty) Ltd was established to do these negotiations. The company fulfilled the following four functions:
a. Technical project management.
b. Technical information systems management.
c. Financial management and internal auditing.
d. General administration.

36. This company has functioned as the central control office since 1983. As functions, as well as the situation with regard to security changed (six years is a long period for any central front to remain operative), it was decided that the central company will be dissolved by the end of the 1990 Financial Year and that it will be replaced by two closed corporations:
a. One for financial management and internal auditing.
b. One for technical information systems management and technical project management.

37. The closed corporation that will be in charge of the financial management and internal audit is D. John Truter Financial Consultants CC. This CC is currently affiliated to the Project and is still controlling certain management aspects. It is necessary to transfer this management to a private company, especially with regard to internal auditing of the sub-projects. Such a system will not lead to unnecessary questions asked by the uninformed employees of the sub-projects. There is also a possibility for privatisation if the CC buys the assets from the SADF and manages the finances on a contractual basis. This internal audit function is very specialised because it deals with project and contractual auditing.
38. Brig W. Basson will be responsible for the technical information systems management as well as technical project management. The final detail with regard to this aspect has not yet been cleared with the auditors and the possibilities for privatisation will be investigated.
39. Chemical research. The current situation with regard to research into chemical warfare agents is that research is limited to agents approved by the Defence Command Council, namely irritants and incapacitants. The aim of this research is to supply the SADF with all information and capacities with regard to the known agents as well as the newer, more cost effective agents. This includes the capacity for large-scale production on demand. The incorporation of these agents into ammunition is also addressed, but is dealt with as a separate project by Armscor. This research and production currently amounts to about R10 million per year. If the DGS project is privatised, the research will have to continue for an estimated additional three years in order to allow DGS to change to commercial projects. If the SADF decides to maintain this capacity, a proper evaluation will have to be made of the level of activities regarding such a capacity. The contracts will then have to be re-negotiated.
40. Biological Research. Current Biological warfare research focuses on offensive, epidemic agents. The researchers are also working on the development of new agents. The research amounts to about R8 million per year. No ammunition is being produced at this stage. As is the case with DGS, the future contractual situation will have to be re-evaluated before and after privatisation.
41. Physiological Research. The research aims to increase a soldier’s efficiency in a chemically contaminated environment by evaluating the physiological limitations caused by protective precautions and developing corrective precautions, as well as by investigating and developing therapeutic and preventative measures. This research is completely privatised. The research is contracted to a private company, Lifestyle Management (Pty) Ltd. These contracts are expected to last another two years. The idea is for Armscor, who has not previously had the capacity to do this kind of work, to gradually become acquainted with the nature of the work and to eventually take over the research.
42. Psychological Research. This research covers the full spectrum of the CBW field. It deals with the impact/effect of the work and its circumstances on the researcher in the laboratory, its effect on the morale of the soldiers, the propaganda and anti-propaganda involved and it includes threat analysis and decision making processes with regard to CBW. It also deals with the aspect of verification by addressing the interpretations and reactions of eyewitnesses. This research is also completely privatised and contracted to Lifestyle Management (Pty) Ltd. It is unlikely that the research will ever be taken over by Armscor because they do not have the professional skills for this kind of work.
43. Material technology and Defensive Systems Research. This research is done in co-operation with a Belgian as well as a German group. It is already privatised through a contractual relationship with the company Protechnik (Pty) Ltd that was founded in the RSA by the Belgians and the Germans for this specific reason. Their aim is for Armscor to gradually take over the research over the next two years. The work mainly deals with the key technologies for a defensive capacity, e.g. activated carbon for protection and ion-mobility studies for detection. In addition to this, researchers are evaluating and developing systems, e.g. mask systems.
44. Research with regard to Offensive Systems - Conventional and Covert. The aim of this research is to create a bridge between the agent on the one side and the ammunition on the other. Researchers are trying to develop the best possible distribution techniques for the agent. Because it is important that the source of the agent has to, at all costs, remain a secret to the developer of the ammunition, Brig W. Basson acts as an intermediary in this process. For the development of conventional weapons, projects are undertaken in co-operation with Swartklip Products (a branch of Armscor). A number of small companies are used for covert work, e.g. QB Laboratories (Pty) Ltd and others with clearance.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY WITH REGARD TO DEFENSIVE CBW EQUIPMENT
45. Two companies were used to obtain the necessary foreign technology. Most of these projects are completed and the technology handed over to Armscor for further development. For the coming Financial Year it is expected that a small amount will have to be spent on certain electronic technology from the UK for the building of own detection apparatus. The companies that were previously assigned to the task, were Exipro (Pty) Ltd and Technotek. The Belgian group is Technotek’s chief supporting group and the company is currently being prepared to be sold to Armscor.

SECURITY FORCES SUPPORT TO CBW OPERATIONS (OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE)
46. For obvious reasons it will not be possible to privatise this support and therefore the project will continue running this branch. This deals with the development, purchase or storage of non-standard material that is used by the security forces in urgent operational situations. It does not include the purchase or procurement of standard CBW equipment. If staff support is needed, it is given by 7 Med Bn Gp.

CONDUCTING OWN CBW OPERATIONS
47. This aspect is almost identical to that of par 46, the only difference is that 7 Med Bn Gp members are the operators here.

CONCLUSION
48. The aim of this document is to clearly define the goal structure of Project COAST and to discuss the possibilities for privatisation of the various sub-projects. However, it will only be possible to determine a final approach after we have established and defined certain important strategies, e.g. if there is a continued demand and if there is one, what will be the nature of the operations.
49. The possibility to privatise the project as a whole and to develop a central contractual research set-up without any ownership responsibilities for the SADF does however exist.

signed by:
(W. BASSON)
PROJECT OFFICER COAST: BRIG
WB/SJ

DISTR
Mr P Theron
GG: to Lt Genl Knobel in person
CSF: to V Adm Bekker in person

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TOP SECRET

GG/UG/302/6/J1282/5/1
Telephone nr: 6715413
Enquiries: Brig W. Basson
SAMS Headquarters
Private Bag X102
Hennopsmeer
0046
6 July 1992

FUNDING REQUIREMENTS AND HANDLING OF FUNDS: PROJECT JOTA
Appendix A : List of outstanding research contracts : Project Jota
Appendix B : List of outstanding defensive CBW equipment purchasing contracts : Project Jota
Appendix C : Expected delivery dates : defensive CBW equipment purchases for the rest of the 93 Financial Year : Project Jota
Appendix D : Expected cash flow plan per activity for the rest of the 93 Financial Year : Project Jota
Appendix E : Project Jota : Consolidated budget : April 1993 - March 1994

1. Your letter HSF/UG/302/6/C119 dated 2 July 1992 refers. Your request for further information before any further payments are made in favour of the project, will be dealt with in this document. Firstly, I shall try to introduce you to the philosophy and strategy regarding the current handling of funds for Project Jota. The practical implications of this will then be explained. After you have learned the background information and gained the correct perspective, your requests (para 3.a. to 3.e. of your letter) will be dealt with as efficiently as possible.

BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT PLAN WITH REGARD TO THE HANDLING OF FUNDS
2. In the past, a South African front company used to handle contract negotiations with suppliers of services for the project. For the past two years the company D. John Truter Financial Consultants cc (DJT) fulfilled this role. Therefore funds were flowing from the State coffers by means of Treasury orders to DJT and from there to the supplier.
3. This mechanism could not last (especially in this new environment of investigative commissions etc.). There was also no guarantee that State interests would be protected with regard to information gathered by the running of this sensitive project. It was clear that we had to find another mechanism by means of which the process could be managed.
4. Although the very sensitive kind of work that was done by this project, has actually decreased, there are a whole range of projects that need to be protected with regard to their technical information. Recent developments have proved that in public investigations, e.g. the Goldstone Commission, it is no longer possible for the SADF and the SAP to protect this information. It seems now as if the Goldstone Commission is about to subpoena Swartklip Products (a Denel affiliation) to reveal the nature, the contents and the effect of all the products that are produced for SAP use. A large number of products that are produced for Jota, is meant for future use in critical riot control situations. If the nature of these products is announced at this stage, the instigators and people who promote these riots will be able to use it for propaganda against the use of such agents and to develop efficient precautions. The fact that the SADF is at the same time the developing agent as well as the client for these products, will undoubtfully have to be protected in order for the SADF to maintain the “tactical higher ground”.

CURRENT PLAN FOR THE HANDLING OF FUNDS
5. In order to protect the security plans and technical information of Project Jota, a mechanism for contracting and the handling of funds was developed which will entail the following: DJT acts as an “agent” for several overseas companies and indirectly handles their orders for specific research, development and production. DJT controls the process in the RSA, receiving all delivered products and handles their exportation. DJT does not export the delivered products itself, but delivers them to the SADF, where they are further dealt with.
6. To support this plan, the funds that are assigned to this project are moved to an overseas account. This procedure is approved and supervised by the SA Reserve Bank and mediated by Nedbank. No RSA front company is used for this purpose. The funds are then moved around in Europe through a number of accounts in order to conceal the “origin” and then transferred to specific project accounts. (These accounts have been in use for several years.) The foreign company places an order through the “agent” (DJT) and the bank involved (UBS in Zurich) issues the guarantees and letters of credit according to agreements. The money is then sent to the RSA as the delivery is made. The money goes to DJT or sometimes directly to the supplier.

IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SYSTEM
7. The most important implication of this system is that we are dealing with a number of “elusive” organisations. The foreign companies are either shell organisations or they don’t exist. DJT as an “agent” does not have the same status and abilities than a “principal”. It is therefore possible that the RSA producers will go through a commercially unstable stage. The banks that are handling the funds and making and guaranteeing the payments will also have to be kept happy and pacified at all costs. Without their co-operation this system cannot possibly work.
8. The bankers involved must definitely not suspect any malpractice. They must also not be given any reason to feel unease. Funds must be transferred orderly and on time to fund the commercial paper that will be generated Transfers must not attract any attention or at any time be noticed in the interbanking system as “suspicious” activities. We will have to be even more careful these days, particularly if one takes into account the modern tendency of banks to look out for “money laundering” operations.
9. A further important factor to be considered is that of exchange rate losses. We change Rands into foreign currency and back again. The Rand is still very stable. The Rand currently experiences a six-months rise with regard to the USA Dollar. The SA Reserve Bank limitations do not allow us to buy dollars ‘in advance’. It is of the opinion that such a system is too expensive and leaves room for uncontrollable manipulation of the system. However, in the long-term the Rand shows a constant decrease in value to the dollar. The longer the period of repatriating the money, the less losses will be incurred and the bigger the chances are for recovering the costs.
10. It must also be taken into consideration that a single letter of credit stipulating delivery dates and payments, is less expensive than several self standing letters of credit. Therefore, to save money, letters of credit are issued which cover all the activities that take place during the year. However, in order to have these letters issued, funding must be made available to the banks at the beginning of the period, otherwise the banks will not issue them. Although we were not initially able to already move funds this year, the bankers decided to help us due to our trading history. However, we will have to recover these shortages within the first four months of the financial year and make the necessary investments at the banks.
11. If one is able to establish a proper trading history, it is easier to negotiate better interest rates for the investments. Our current stable deposit record contributes to the fact that we earn optimal interest on this money.
12. These days the European banks have very strict precautions to prevent “money laundering” through the drug industry. Since we often deal with ‘doubtful’ suppliers (especially with regard to controlled chemicals), we will have to be very careful not to create this image. These days it takes us two months on average from the time the money is sent from the RSA, to when it finally reaches its destination in Europe.
13. It is therefore very clear that the most important implication of this system is for the earliest possible positioning of the money in Europe. Repeated small transfers are expensive and create “unease” in the system.

LIST OF OUTSTANDING CONTRACTS AND DELIVERIES
14. All outstanding contracts and current enterprises are listed in Appendixes A and B.
15. The expected/planned delivery dates for the CBW defensive equipment purchases are listed in Appendix C. It is not easy to determine the delivery date for the research contracts. Feedback and reporting is done on a monthly as well as a quarterly basis. This usually entails a report or a sample of a product.

EXPECTED CASH FLOW PLAN FOR THE REST OF THE 93 FINANCIAL YEAR
16. This plan is explained in Appendix D. It is clear that the available funding only covers the demand for this year. There is no provision for mistakes.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE DJT BANK ACCOUNT
17. The total available amount of cash in the DJT accounts (locally as well as overseas) was R4 357 542,25 on 3 July 1992.

DJT FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE 91/92 FINANCIAL YEAR
18. These statements are not available yet. Mr Theron is involved in auditing 90% of the suppliers and sub-contractors. These audits need to be completed to consolidate the information and verify DJT accounts by means of source documentation. These statements are usually only available by the end of August. The Auditor General’s requirements are that these statements as well as the audit report be ready by September of each year. This gives the AG enough time to complete all his reports. As soon as these statements are ready, they will be handed over to Brig Coertzen.

EXPECTED CASH REQUIREMENT PER CONTRACT FOR THE 1993/1994 FINANCIAL YEAR
19. This information is contained in Appendix E.
20. If any further information on this subject is required, I suggest that we discuss it as soon as possible.

signed by:
(D.P. KNOBEL)
SURGEON GENERAL: LT GENL

WB/SvW
DISTR
CSF - in person

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